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ABSTRACT
Despite the legal profession’s historical resistance to technological
advances, the burgeoning world of cyberspace is bringing change to
the practice of law. As laypeople flock to the Internet to seek help with
their legal problems, lawyers are going online to provide such assis-
tance. Yet, these exchanges are occurring without close consideration
of whether they create attorney-client relationships—the source of
weighty ethical and legal obligations. In many cases, lawyers seek to
avoid the consequences of such relationships merely by disclaiming
their existence.
In this Article, Professor Lanctot examines the issue of lawyer-
layperson communications in cyberspace from doctrinal and histori-
cal perspectives. The Article’s analysis of the case law demonstrates
that online exchanges resulting in the giving of specific legal advice
likely will be viewed as creating attorney-client relationships. Moreo-
ver, disclaimers are unlikely to provide the protection that many law-
yers seek. The Article then reviews the history of bar regulation of ad-
vice-giving in a variety of contexts, from the Good Will Court radio
broadcasts of the 1930s to today’s seminars and 900-number services.
The Article shows that the bar consistently has both viewed the fur-
nishing of particularized legal advice as creating an attorney-client
relationship and frowned on such advice-giving in nontraditional
contexts. The bar’s cool response to forms of legal assistance spurred
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by new technology sounds a cautionary note for lawyers on the Inter-
net.
Yet, if attorney-client relationships in cyberspace present some
peril, through the specter of legal liability or of bar disciplinary action,
they also present enormous promise for addressing the unmet legal
needs of many Americans with lower incomes. Professor Lanctot
concludes the Article by discussing the challenge of adapting the tra-
ditional, full-service model of attorney-client relationships to the
question-and-answer format of cyberspace. One means of doing so,
known as discrete task representation, may allow lawyers to avoid the
legal and ethical pitfalls of online practice yet provide valuable legal
assistance to those who cannot afford traditional representation.
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[T]he computer will obviously raise problems in particular areas of
the law where it becomes a productive instrumentality replacing
human beings . . . . The role for the law teacher as a leader in the de-
velopment of the law is to anticipate those problems. . . . Out of such
a fund of carefully considered writing, judges and legislators will find
the means of dealing with computer bugaboos hypothecated by
many writers.
William B. Eldridge, 19631
Enough, if something from our hands have power
To live, and act, and serve the future hour.
William Wordsworth, 18202
INTRODUCTION
Change comes slowly to the legal profession, even in the Digital
Age. On the eve of a new millennium, American lawyers only now
are beginning to perceive what much of the commercial world al-
ready understands—the potential that computer technology holds for
transforming the way business will be done in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Although most law firms today have some familiarity with the
online world,3 far fewer have fully incorporated all the elements of
1. William B. Eldridge, Automation as a Challenge to Legal Education: A Defense of the
Tried and True (1963), in COMMUNICATION SCIENCES AND LAW: REFLECTIONS FROM THE
JURIMETRICS CONFERENCE 15, 20-21 (Layman E. Allen & Mary E. Caldwell eds., 1965).
2. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, The River Duddon: A Series of Sonnets (1820), in POETICAL
WORKS 296, 303 (Thomas Hutchinson & Ernest De Selincourt eds., 1974).
3. In 1997, nearly two-thirds of American law firms had websites. See, e.g., Lawyers,
Firms Vie for Visibility by Creative Use of Home Pages on Web, 66 U.S.L.W. 2652 (Apr. 28,
1998); Sharp Rise in Web Sites by Largest Firms, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 1997, at B7 (indicating that
64% of firms in the top 250 had websites and that 33% had sites reportedly generating busi-
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digital technology into their daily practice of law. Indeed, there re-
mains a sizeable segment of the profession that has never ventured
into cyberspace and that seems to harbor latent nostalgia for the days
of parchment and quill pens, or at least for mag cards and IBM Selec-
tric typewriters.4 Yet, lawyers of the future will ignore cyberspace at
their peril, because it is through that “unique and wholly new me-
dium of worldwide human communication”5 that much of the legal
business of tomorrow could be conducted. 
                                                                                                                                     
ness). The most recent statistics indicate that 80% of small firms surveyed by the American Bar
Association now use the Internet, up dramatically from 38% in 1996. See Legal Tech. Resource
Ctr., American Bar Ass’n, 1998 Small Law Firm Technology Survey (visited Sept. 10, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/98small.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See gener-
ally HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., HOW TO PRACTICE LAW WITH COMPUTERS (3d ed. 1998) (ex-
plaining how computers, word processing, and electronic publishing can help attorneys practice
law).
4. Anecdotal evidence of lawyer technophobia in the face of increasing computerization
abounds. See, e.g., PARK B. DILKS, JR., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, A LAW FIRM AND ITS
TIMES, 1873-1993, at 387 (1994) (stating that the firm refused to reimburse attorneys in 1980 for
purchase of personal computers because it was possible that everyone would want one, which
would be “ludicrous”); BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 36 (1991)
(“Attorneys are most comfortable when conservative. Either they want to do it the old way, or
they want to see a herd doing it the new way.”); Joan Countryman & Gary Peterson, Improving
Productivity with Computers, A Government Example, LEGAL ECON., Apr. 1988, at 51, 51
(quoting a government lawyer as saying: “Don’t bother putting one of those terminals in my
office. I won’t use it.”); Vernon R. Proctor, Reality Bytes: A Luddite Lawyer Looks at Legal
Technology, 14 DEL. LAW. 48 (1996) (“I am now the only lawyer in my office without a PC — a
distinction that I wear as a badge of honor.”); Wendy R. Liebowitz, Notes from the ABA
Techshow: All Wired Up and Places to Go, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at B9 (reporting that
“[u]ntil recently there were two main obstacles to lawyers’ using technology: lawyers and tech-
nology”); Stephan J. Mallenbaum, No, It’s Not a Very Large Paperweight, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22,
1993, at S1 (“[F]or many attorneys, the personal computer . . . serves as a fancy office ornament
or as an expensive extra shelf for paper files.”); Thom Weldlich, A Better Client Trap? Click
Twice on Mouse for Legal Services, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 22, 1994, at A1 (claiming that lawyers are
not known for “pioneering the use of new technologies”). Conservatism in the use of computers
is not limited to lawyers, of course. The 1997 debate over whether laptop computers should be
permitted on the floor of the U.S. Senate reflected similar tensions. See Eric Schmitt, Senator
Tries a Trade Deal: His Briefcase for a Laptop, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at A22 (“[N]othing
is simple when it comes to tinkering with the traditions of the United States Senate, whose
chamber still has original 19th-century wooden desks, inkwells and spittoons.”).
5. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). As the Supreme
Court explained:
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of commu-
nication and information retrieval methods. . . . Taken together, these tools consti-
tute a unique medium—known to its users as “cyberspace,” located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to
the Internet.
Id. at 851.
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Today, while the legal profession retains its historical ambiva-
lence toward technological advances, laypeople are gravitating to the
Internet to seek help with their daily legal problems, and they are be-
ginning to find such help. A growing number of lawyers have begun
to use the medium of cyberspace to give specific legal advice to lay-
people who request it. This little-known phenomenon poses funda-
mental questions about the very nature of attorney-client relation-
ships in the Digital Age.
Since few commentators have yet focused on the nature and
scope of online legal advice, a brief surf of the Internet is in order be-
fore we begin. In cyberspace, the much-decried unmet legal needs of
middle-income people are available for the world to see, with just a
few clicks of a mouse. The Internet abounds with tales of legal woe,
presented through a number of different vehicles. One way for lay-
people to seek legal advice is through online newsgroups, which are
discussion forums online, categorized by subject, in which people post
and read messages at the newsgroup site.6 A representative news-
group, alt.lawyers.sue.sue.sue, features countless pleas for legal assis-
tance from laypeople who claim to have been injured in accidents,
fired from their jobs, treated unjustly in a divorce proceeding, or oth-
erwise confronted by a calamity requiring a legal response.7 In an-
other type of discussion group, called a “listserv” or mailing list, mes-
sages are sent to a central e-mail address and then redistributed to
6. See id. (“Newsgroups . . . serve groups of regular participants, but these postings may
be read by others as well. There are thousands of such groups, each serving to foster an ex-
change of information . . . on a particular topic . . . . About 100,000 new messages are posted
every day.”). For a useful glossary of Internet terms, see PAUL S. JACOBSEN, NET LAW: HOW
LAWYERS USE THE INTERNET 213-23 (1997).
7. See Current Topics in alt.lawyers.sue.sue.sue (visited Sept. 21, 1998)
<alt.lawyers.sue.sue.sue> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). On September 21, 1998, for ex-
ample, among the first few messages in the current topic list in alt.lawyers.sue.sue.sue were:
“Do I have a case?—Neglect/Failure to Warn? (Texas)”; “Hearing Loss at employment—
worth suing?”; and “dog bite.” See id. A typical posting begins as follows:
I had sinus surgery and the doctor messed up my eye and I now have double vision. I
have tried to sue for malpractice but have not been able to find another doctor to tes-
tify against the doctor. Apparently – double vision is on [sic] of the possible side ef-
fects. . . . Can I sue him for failing to warn me?
Tully Ward, Do I Have a Case?—Neglect Failure to Warn (Texas) (posted Sept. 21, 1998)
<alt.lawyers.sue.sue.sue> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Similar claims abound at other
newsgroups like misc.legal and alt.self-help-law. The sheer volume of information on the Inter-
net makes it impossible to identify every law-related newsgroup online with any assurance that
the list is complete. A good source for finding newsgroups is Dejanews. See Deja.com (visited
Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.deja.com> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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the list’s subscribers; some such lists may also feature requests for le-
gal advice.8 A different version of these groups is the “chat room,” in
which two or more individuals may communicate in “real time,” re-
ceiving responses on the screen as soon as they are typed in.9 Lawyers
occasionally answer these questions, often while simultaneously dis-
claiming any intent to form an attorney-client relationship.10
Specific websites have also been established to facilitate requests
for legal advice. One early site was Dear Esquire, described by one
commentator as “a sort of legal on-line ‘Dear Abby’ where the ques-
tion-and-answer process is formalized and limited by restrictions and
warnings in an evident effort to minimize liability.”11 Dear Esquire
has proved to be a prototype for many other sites, such as FreeAdvice
and LawGuru.12 These sites encourage laypeople to post legal ques-
8. Pages at the University of Chicago and Findlaw.com websites contain good compila-
tions of such legal listservs. See Findlaw LegalMinds (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.findlaw.com/lists> (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Index of /~llou/lawlists
(visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/~llou/lawlists> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
9. See Reno, 844 U.S. at 851-52. (“In addition to posting a message that can be read later,
two or more individuals wishing to communicate more immediately can enter a chat room to
engage in real-time dialogue—in other words, by typing messages to one another that appear
almost immediately on the others’ computer screens.”). One such site is DivorceNet Chat,
which features conversations about divorce issues. See DivorceNet Chat (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.divorcenet.com:3335> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). DivorceNet Chat is
linked to the Family Law Advisor Home Page. See www.DivorceNet.com (last modified Aug.
26, 1999) <http://www.divorcenet.com> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Its disclaimer as-
serts: “Nothing contained on the messages board should be construed as ‘legal advice’ nor is an
attorney-client relationship created by virtue of any communication.” Password Administration
– Create a New Account (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.divorcenet.com/forum2/new.html>
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). There are other chat rooms at sites such as prairielaw.com
and Legal dot Net. See prairielaw.com (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://forums.prairielaw.com>
(on file with the Duke Law Journal); The Forum (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://chat.legal.net:8080> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
10. It bears mentioning that, although the responses purport to come from lawyers, iden-
tity in cyberspace may still be easily concealed or falsified. For our purposes, we shall assume
that the online legal advice postings we are discussing were posted by attorneys.
11. Joan C. Rogers, Ethics, Malpractice Concerns Cloud E-Mail, On-Line Advice, 12 Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), Mar. 6, 1996, at 59, 70.
12. FreeAdvice.com, describing itself as having been rated the most useful consumer legal
site in a USA Today poll, claims to provide “general legal information,” but says it is not a
“substitute for personal legal advice.” FreeAdvice.com (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.freeadvice.com> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Like most similar attorney
websites, LawGuru.com, sponsored by the law firm of Eslamboly & Barlavi of Los Angeles,
features a detailed disclaimer that the questioner is expected to check off and to agree to be-
fore submitting a query. The disclaimer warns that the information given cannot “replace a
face-to-face meeting or telephone consultation with a ‘real live’ attorney” and states that no
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tions, identifying their state of residence, and suggest that lawyers
who are licensed to practice in those states post responses.13 The
questions and the answers are publicly available to anyone who ac-
cesses the websites.14 Consider one typical exchange on the Dear Es-
quire site:
Dear Sirs As a medical student in July of 1993 I injured my right leg
on school property at the University of Pittsburgh childrens hospital
I was not aware that I would become chronic causing me pain an suf-
fering when I stand or walk for any length of time. Until March or
February of 1994 a MRI shows damage to the joint membrane
causing swelling and pain to the joint I have had multiple injections
of the leg and it helps buy when I have to stand or walk for any pe-
riod of time I suffer great Pain, I am now living in California. With
my parents no job med school loans and great pain Can I file any
suit for damages?
A reply, signed by a lawyer, read as follows:
                                                                                                                                     
attorney-client relationship will be created in the absence of a written representation/retainer
agreement, even if a response was given to a question. LawGuru.com (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.lawguru.com/cgi/bbs2/user/submit.cgi> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For
examples of other consumer legal sites, see prairielaw.com (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://prairielaw.com> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (offering e-mail discussion groups,
message boards, and articles on legal topics); Martindale-Hubbell’s Lawyers.com (visited Sept.
20, 1999) <http://www.lawyers.com> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (featuring a question-
and-answer service). One cautionary note for anyone studying this area is that websites come
and go without warning. The website of CourtTV, the cable television station, once featured a
similar question-and-answer format called Ask-A-Lawyer, which has since apparently been dis-
continued.
13. See, e.g., LawGuru.com (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.lawguru.com/cgi/bbs2/user/submit.cgi> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
14. See, e.g., Dear Esquire: Submit a Question (visited Sept. 17, 1999)
<http://www.legal.net/ldn2/index-c1.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Among the is-
sues and questions posted at the site are: “Am I Married?”; “Can they fire me after 29 years of
employment?”; “Cleaner destroys sweater”; “Creditors are telling me they are going to garnish
my wages”; and “My landlord is evicting me because I have a dog.” Id. The questioner is asked
to check a box online to signify agreement with a disclaimer, which reads:
I agree to not rely on any information that might be provided in response to ques-
tions submitted to Dear Esquire. I understand that the information provided in this
column is not intended to be a substitute for the services of a competent legal profes-
sional and that I should seek the advice of a legal professional in all matters which
may require legal advice or action.
Id. A similar website, The Law Office, also provides answers to legal questions. See The Law
Office (visited July 23, 1997) <http://www.thelawoffice.com> (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal). That site’s disclaimer reads: “The Law Office Inc. is not engaged in the practice of law. It
is understood that non-professionals using information from The Law Office for self-help are
acting as their own attorney. If the services of a lawyer are desired, you should enter into an
attorney-client relationship.” Id.
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You now face many obstacles which would prevent recovery for the
injuries you sustained in July of 1993. The statute of limitations in
Pennsylvania for such injury is two years. You would have been re-
quired to commence a legal action for such recover no later that July
of 1995. Additionally, the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act requires
that you notify any governmental agency within one year of the in-
jury. It appears that you have taken neither act required and my
opinion is that you are now barred for recovery from this accident.15
This legal advice, which is fairly typical of that found on these web-
sites, is specific, tailored to the facts furnished by the questioner, and
given as if it were definitive.
Another way for laypeople to seek legal advice online is to go to
the websites of individual attorneys or law firms and to send ques-
tions directly to the attorneys by e-mail. These sites differ from the
preceding two types of sites in that neither the questions nor the an-
swers are visible to the public. The sheer volume of material on the
Internet makes it impossible to catalog all the relevant sites, but we
can consider a few representative examples. One free site is the web-
site of the Goodman Law Firm in Arizona, which offers a “Debt
Collection Claim Evaluation.”16 The firm promises a “free evaluation
of your debt collection claim” upon submittal of an online form.17
Other law firms’ sites also feature online client intake forms, without
expressly offering to provide legal advice through the Internet.18
More recently, some lawyers have begun using the Internet to
offer answers to legal questions for a fee. Richard R. Baker’s site, ti-
15. I Injured My Leg on School Property, Can I File Any Suit for Damages?(visited Sept.
21, 1999) <http://www.legal.net/ldn2/index-c1.htm> (all mistakes are reproduced as in original)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
16. Goodman Law Firm, P.C. (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.goodmanlaw.com> (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
17. Goodman Law Firm, Debt Collection Claim Evaluation (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.goodmanlaw.com/debt.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The form fur-
ther provides: “If you have not received a response within 72 hours, please call our office.” Id.
Another lawyer’s website offers to answer or to refer legal questions for no charge, with the
questioner agreeing that he is “forming only a semi-confidential relationship,” and further
agreeing not only that the request does not create an attorney-client relationship, but also that
the questioner “may only retain an attorney by entering into a fee agreement, and that [he is]
not hereby entering into a fee agreement.” Law Offices of Herbert Monheit, Post Free Legal
Question (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.civilrights.com/caseform.html> (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
18. See, e.g., Siskind, Susser, Haas & Devine, US Offices Consultation Questionnaire Form
(visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.visalaw.com/intake.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (featuring a client intake form for an immigration law firm).
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tled LegalQuestion.com, is typical of these sites. It provides the fol-
lowing terms:
You, the Questioner/Client will ask a short legal question of 200
words or less and our firm will provide a written e-mail response for
a fee of $25 which will be billed to your credit card via our secure
server. Each question will be responded to within a reasonable time
and although both parties understand that an Attorney/Client rela-
tionship may be created hereby, it is understood and agreed to that
such relationship will terminate upon the sending of our e-mail re-
sponse to your e-mail address and no further legal services or advice
will be required. It is further agreed to by you that the submission of
your question shall not place upon Attorneys the duty to protect any
statute of limitations or any other rights on your behalf or cause At-
torneys to have a duty to take any action in any court of law, unless
we agree in writing.19
Other sites purport to provide similar services.20 Unlike the other
types of sites discussed earlier, fee-based legal advice sites tend to ac-
knowledge the possibility of an attorney-client relationship, but use
disclaimers in attempts to limit the duties attorneys might owe to
their cyberclients.
This brief survey has provided an overview of how laypeople
currently use the medium of cyberspace to seek legal advice. Not
only are there endless variations on these types of communication,
but the rapid technological changes that have characterized the
19. Law Offices of Richard P. Baker, P.A., Legal Services Agreement – Terms and Condi-
tions (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.legalquestion.com/ask-a-question-terms.html> (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). The disclaimer further purports to limit the attorneys’ liability
for the answers and to waive confidentiality and conflicts of interest, and rather brazenly as-
serts: “You further understand and are advised that there is no malpractice insurance for inter-
net advice.” Id.
20. See, e.g., Ask-A-Lawyer (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.ask-a-lawyer.com> (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). The site of Peter R. Stone offers to answer a short legal ques-
tion for $20. See id. The disclaimer resembles the one above, acknowledging the possibility that
the exchange creates an attorney-client relationship but purporting to limit any duties to the
client. See Limitation of Liability (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.ask-a-
lawyer/disclaimer.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Another example is the website
of Levine & Yates of Arlington, Virginia. See Law Offices, Levine and Yates (visited Sept. 20,
1999) <http://www.visa-usa.com> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (offering immigration
and citizenship law advice). In a published interview, one of the attorneys from that firm “ac-
knowledged that once payment is accepted, the e-mail correspondent becomes ‘our client,’ and
the firm treats the Internet contact as seriously [as] if it were an office consultation.” William C.
Smith, Offering Legal Advice over Internet May Lead to Cyber-Malpractice, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, May 19, 1997, at 6.
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Internet in recent years no doubt will yield further innovations not
anticipated here. Although the proliferation of this activity has re-
ceived little publicity, what may be most surprising to the casual ob-
server is not that so many laypeople want legal advice to help them
solve their problems. Rather, it is that so many lawyers are appar-
ently willing to provide it.21
The emergence of these new and largely unexamined methods of
delivering legal services has profound implications for the practice of
law in the twenty-first century.22 On one hand, the millions of Ameri-
cans whose legal needs have largely gone unmet in recent years may
finally have recourse: an army of cyberlawyers, ready and willing to
answer legal questions online, either for free or for a small fee. On
the other hand, the specter of lawyers casually typing out off-the-cuff
responses to questions posed by strangers and posting them online
for all the world to see must be the stuff of a bar regulator’s night-
mares. Online advice-giving raises a host of ethical issues. Public ex-
changes of often-sensitive personal information and specific legal ad-
vice present questions of confidentiality. Lawyers answering legal
questions about which they have little or no expertise may violate the
duty of competency. The possibility that a lawyer might inadvertently
create a conflict of interest by answering legal questions from some-
one with an interest adverse to a current or former client is particu-
larly troubling in the sometimes-anonymous world of cyberspace.
Lawyers answering questions about the law in jurisdictions in which
they are not licensed to practice may violate restrictions against the
unauthorized practice of law. Most notably, the likelihood that some
disgruntled recipient of negligent online legal advice will sue for mal-
practice lurks over all.23
21. The potential use of discussion groups for marketing legal services is discussed in some
detail in JACOBSEN, supra note 6, at 130 (quoting a lawyer as saying: “I know one American
lawyer who has generated over $500,000 in business in 18 months on the newsgroups.”). Jacob-
sen notes that some newsgroups seem to be “full of people seeking free legal advice.” Id. at
132.
22. See Richard S. Granat, From Legal Services to Information Services (last modified May
5, 1999) <http://www.digital-lawyer.com/legalservice.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(“The day when people can ask their computers an intelligent question and get a relevant an-
swer at low cost from the convenience of their homes is the day that many lawyers will be
looking for work.”).
23. For a general overview, see CATHERINE J. LANCTOT, Legal Ethics and the Internet, in
THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR PENNSYLVANIA LAWYERS 117 (Pennsylvania Bar Institute ed.,
1997); William C. Smith, Ethical Entanglements on World Wide Web, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
May 8, 1997, at 1.
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Before any of this parade of horribles can be addressed, how-
ever, one threshold question must be resolved: does giving legal ad-
vice to a layperson create an attorney-client relationship? If it does
not, then the online exchanges I have described may evoke regula-
tory concerns about advertising and solicitation, but they do not trig-
ger the weighty obligations inherent in attorney-client relationships.24
On the other hand, if giving legal advice under certain circumstances
can make the recipient a client, the traditional duties of confidential-
ity, competence, and loyalty, as well as other obligations, are fully
implicated.
The ethical questions arising from lawyers’ expanding use of the
Internet have not yet generated the scholarly focus that they clearly
deserve,25 although some practitioners have contended that there are
no legal barriers to online advice.26 Those few commentators to have
24. Additionally, even where an attorney-client relationship is not formed, a lawyer may
owe comparable fiduciary duties to prospective clients and third parties. See infra Part I.D.
25. To the extent that there has been some consideration of ethical issues for lawyers in
cyberspace, it has centered largely on questions of advertising and solicitation raised by attor-
ney websites, as well as on confidentiality issues presented by e-mail communications. For dis-
cussions of advertising and solicitation issues, see generally Ethics, Malpractice Concerns Cloud
E-Mail, On-Line Advice, supra note 11; Brian G. Gilpin, Attorney Advertising and Solicitation
on the Internet: Complying with Ethics Regulations and Netiquette, 13 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 697 (1995); T.K. Read, Pushing the Advertising Envelope: Building
Billboards in the Sky Along the Information Superhighway, 23 W. ST. U. L. REV. 73 (1995);
Ann Davis, Firms Join the Web Marketing Craze, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at A1; William E.
Hornsby, Jr., Ethics Rules for Ads May Cover Web Sites, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 1996, at C1; David
P. Vandagriff, Marketing in Cyberspace, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 84. Discussions of e-mail issues
include Lucy Schlauch Leonard, Comment, The High-Tech Legal Practice: Attorney-Client
Communications and the Internet, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 851 (1998); Jonathan Rose, Note, E-
Mail Security Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client Privilege, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 179 (1997); Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment, Making a Wrong Turn on the
Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail, the Attorney-Client Privilege and Inadvertent Dis-
closure, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 347 (1997). The best source for current bar opinions, as well as
commentary on various ethical issues, is the website Legalethics.com, maintained by attorney
Peter Krakaur. As of September 21, 1999, he listed 50 ethics opinions that relate either to the
Internet or to other forms of electronic communication. See Legalethics.com: Ethics Opinions
(last modified Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.Legalethics.com/opins.htm> (on file with the Duke
Law Journal). Many of the opinions address the issue of confidentiality in e-mail communica-
tions with clients. It should also be noted that the ABA has recently recognized the challenges
posed by cyberspace, circulating a draft report that focuses in particular on the application of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to legal marketing on the Internet. An index to the
report is available at the website Legalethics.com. See Index of /articles/aba (visited Sept. 20,
1999) <http://www.legalethics.com/articles/aba> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
26. See JACOBSEN, supra note 6, at 134-35:
If you are an attorney on the net and haven’t given free advice at cocktail parties or
over the Net, you are a strange bird indeed. . . . [You] advise them, generally, how
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noted the existence of these lawyer-layperson exchanges in cyber-
space generally have warned of the potential pitfalls associated with
giving legal advice online to strangers.27 In the past few years, a hand-
                                                                                                                                     
various laws may be applied to the facts. The advice really is always that a more
thorough investigation of certain legal issues and facts is required, that the person
should employ counsel ASAP for specific, stated reasons, and that upon more thor-
ough investigation other laws and issues may be important. Now, this is legal ad-
vice—but I fail to see how it constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in any juris-
diction or is likely to constitute “wrong” advice or unauthorized practice that will get
anyone into trouble when offered by an attorney who is licensed to practice in the
state where he/she is physically located.
(quoting attorney Michael Daymude).
27. See Kathryn M. Fenton, Legal Ethics and the Internet, ANTITRUST, Summer 1997, at
43, 45:
Correctly identifying such inquiries as opportunities for demonstrating substantial
expertise that might land a new client representation, attorneys and law firms have
been known to prepare elaborate and highly detailed responses to Internet inquiries.
Depending on the level and nature of the information received and the advice pro-
vided, however, attorneys may be dismayed to discover that through such communi-
cations they have inadvertently created an attorney-client relationship with the re-
questing party.
See also Peter Krakaur, The Internet: An Ethics Wake-Up Call (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.collegehill.com/ilp-news/ilpn2.txt> (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
Given the relative novelty associated with this method of communication, however,
many attorneys seem to ignore some of the traditional screening mechanisms they
employ over the telephone or in person when asked a legal question. For example, if
an individual enters an attorney’s office, stops an attorney on the street, or calls an
attorney on the telephone with a specific legal question, most attorneys conduct
some form of conflicts analysis and discuss attorney-client communication issues with
the individual. On the Internet, it often seems that such caution is ignored.
See generally LAWRENCE J. FOX, LEGAL TENDER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HANDLING
PROFESSIONAL DILEMMAS (1995) (providing fictional stories to illustrate potential ethical di-
lemmas); JACOBSEN, supra note 6, at 80 (“Be aware of the risk that an email correspondent
may assume you are acting as his or her lawyer and will rely on anything you say.”); Brad Hunt,
Comment, Lawyers in Cyberspace: Legal Malpractice on Computer Bulletin Boards, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 553 (1996) (arguing that a disclaimer will shield attorneys from liability for their
posts to legal bulletin boards); Natacha D. Steimer, Note, CyberLaw: Legal Malpractice in the
Age of Online Lawyers, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 332 (1995) (asserting that a lawyer should be
accountable for the consequences of a negligent post to a legal bulletin board); Richard S.
Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked
World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339 (1996) (examining jurisdictional issues in
cyberspace); Josh Blackman, Crossing the Ethical Line Online, LAW OFFICE COMPUTING, Feb.-
Mar. 1996, at 64 (urging the ABA and state bar associations to issue advisory opinions on on-
line legal advice); Maureen Castellano, Policing Cyberspace, N.J.L.J., Apr. 8, 1996, at 1 (citing
conflicting views on the subject of online legal advice in New Jersey); Daniel B. Kennedy, PC
Practitioners Proliferate, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 36 (advising caveat emptor with regard to on-
line legal advice); Wendy R. Leibowitz, Policies Set the Tone—and Just May Save a Firm from
Litigation, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at B20 (recommending that firms set clear policies on
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ful of bar opinions from several jurisdictions have reached varying
conclusions about whether the giving of legal advice online creates an
attorney-client relationship,28 but as yet there has not been a detailed
legal analysis of the issue. Most commonly, lawyers attempt to avoid
the myriad problems raised by this conduct by including a disclaimer
in the advice given, thus theoretically defeating a later claim by the
recipient of the information.29 To date, however, there has been very
                                                                                                                                     
technology use); Smith, supra note 20, at 6 (urging application of common sense to the issue of
online legal advice).
28. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 (1997) (rec-
ommending that lawyers should “probably not” answer questions raised in chat rooms online);
Ill. St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 96-10 (1997) (stating that “lawyers participating in chat-groups or other
on-line services that could involve offering personalized legal advice to anyone who happens to
be connected to the service should be mindful that the recipients of such advice are the lawyer’s
clients, with the benefits and burdens of that relationship”); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance
Comm., Op. 98-6 (1998) (cautioning that lawyers should be careful about creating attorney-
client relationships when answering legal queries online); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 94-27 (1995) (permitting online legal discussions “solely for the purpose of discussing legal
topics generally, without the giving of advice or the representation of any particular client”);
Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 95-A-576 (1995) (unpublished opinion) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that lawyers may respond to lay requests through private
e-mail, but should be aware that giving specific legal information may create an attorney-client
relationship); cf. Or. St. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1994-137 (1994) (permitting the
development of an online legal data base that would furnish information in response to inquir-
ies, but would not be staffed by a live person).
29. Most commercial sites or attorney sites that purport to dispense advice include some
type of disclaimer. See, e.g., Dear Esquire (visited Sept. 17, 1999)
<http://www.legal.net/ldn2/index-c1.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
The purpose of Dear Esquire is to educate the public about legal options that may
exist. Dear Esquire is not intended to provide specific legal or other professional ad-
vice upon which guests may rely. Posting of answers in no way constitutes an en-
dorsement . . . of the information given by individual attorneys, paralegals or law
students. Guests are advised and encouraged to seek the help of a competent legal
professional in all matters where specific legal advice and/or action may be required.
One commentator has recommended using the following disclaimer:
This Web page is a public resource of general information which is intended, but not
promised or guaranteed, to be correct, complete and up-to-date. However, this Web
page is not intended to be a source of advertising, solicitation, or legal advice; thus
the reader should not consider this information to be an invitation for an attorney-
client relationship, should not rely on information provided herein and should always
seek the advice of competent counsel in the reader’s state.
Jeffrey R. Kuester, Attorney Sites Can Avoid Violations of Ethics Rules, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 12,
1996, at B11. Large law firms tend to include extensive disclaimers on their websites. See
Wendy R. Liebowitz, The Sins of Law Firm Web Sites: Are Ethical, Dignified Sites Dull?,
NAT’L L.J, Aug. 18, 1997, at B6 (describing King & Spaulding’s “mother of all legal disclaim-
ers” on its website, www.kslaw.com).
LANCTOT TO PRINTER 11/30/99 2:56 PM
160 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:147
little analysis of whether such disclaimers would actually be effective
in a malpractice claim by a disappointed cyberclient.30
Because giving legal advice on the Internet raises ethical ques-
tions that are likely to be confronted by every state bar disciplinary
authority in the next several years, the issue of legal advice-giving on
the Internet warrants close examination now, while the technology
remains in its relative infancy. In this Article, I shall examine the
question of whether giving legal advice online creates an attorney-
client relationship from two different perspectives.31 In Part I, I con-
sider this question from a doctrinal point of view, examining both the
recently adopted Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
and the case law that addresses formation of attorney-client relation-
ships.32 This review demonstrates that courts traditionally have been
30. See Castellano, supra note 27, at 1 (describing conflicting views about the effectiveness
of disclaimers); Peter Krakaur, The Ethics of Giving Casual Legal Advice Online (visited Sept.
20, 1999) <http://www.ljx.com/newsletters/internet/1998/1998_05_00.html> (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (“Sharp, relevant disclaimers can help frame the nature of the exchange,
but attorneys ought not rely on them exclusively.”); J.T. Westermeier & Leonard T. Nuara,
Ethical Issues for Lawyers on the Internet and World Wide Web, COMPUTER LAW., Mar. 1997,
at 8, 13 (noting inconsistent advice on effectiveness of disclaimers); Todd Woody, An Internet
Free-for-All, CONN. L. TRIB., June 10, 1996, at 26 (regarding a disclaimer as an “electronic tal-
isman to ward off malpractice suits, disciplinary charges and other potential pitfalls that come
with being on the cutting edge of law and technology”).
31. Before considering the implications of online advice-giving by lawyers, it is important
to distinguish this conduct from other kinds of Internet activity. First, although many lawyer
websites contain information about the law, and sometimes statutes or cases themselves, this
type of information is not “legal advice” for purposes of our discussion, because the informa-
tion is not provided in response to a query from a layperson. See, e.g., Arent Fox Publications
(visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.arentfox.com/publicat.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (containing newsletters on legal topics written by attorneys of the Arent Fox law
firm). Merely posting legal information on websites may raise other ethical issues, but it does
not constitute legal advice. Also outside the scope of this discussion is legal advice given online
by a lawyer to an existing client, or given with the express understanding that a traditional at-
torney-client relationship is being created. Again, such activity generates ethical concerns
about confidentiality and the unauthorized practice of law, but the question of whether an at-
torney-client relationship has been created is not at issue. Finally, preparation of legal forms by
non-lawyers through exchange of information via the Internet poses questions about the unau-
thorized practice of law, but this kind of interaction ordinarily does not purport to create attor-
ney-client relationships. These activities do raise a myriad of ethical issues that merit scholarly
attention in the future.
32. I believe that lawyer activity on the Internet can be analyzed under traditional legal
principles, just as any of the other activities in which lawyers regularly engage, and I reject the
notion that an entirely new body of “cyberlaw” must be created to cope with the innovations
sparked by the “Computer Revolution.” At the same time, I acknowledge that the medium of
digital communications may pose unique problems to which the law must adapt, just as the law
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willing to infer attorney-client relationships when lawyers give spe-
cific legal advice to laypeople under circumstances in which it would
be reasonable for them to rely on the advice. Courts have treated the
giving of legal advice as the essence of the practice of law, and under
certain circumstances, advice that is specific to the unique set of facts
advanced by the questioner is likely to provide a basis for imposing
all the duties inherent in a more traditional attorney-client relation-
ship. Indeed, even without the creation of a formal attorney-client
relationship, lawyers may incur obligations from their receipt of con-
fidential information, such as in preliminary consultations to deter-
mine whether to take a case. I also address the question of disclaim-
ers, showing that there is substantial doubt about whether even a
carefully worded disclaimer could defeat a subsequent claim against a
lawyer who gave specific legal advice online.
Common law provides a substantial basis for imposing the obli-
gations of an attorney-client relationship on lawyers who give specific
legal advice to laypeople online, but the precedent is hardly conclu-
sive. For that reason, in Parts II and III, I turn to the history of bar
regulation of such conduct to see how the norms of the profession
have treated the act of giving legal advice outside formally created
professional relationships. This empirical study shows that, at least
since the 1930s, bar opinions in a variety of different contexts have
asserted that furnishing more than generalized legal information can
create an attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the
questioner. The historical record also reflects that the regulatory re-
sponses to such conduct have often been prompted by technological
advances. It is for this reason that I begin my historical survey in Part
II with the long-forgotten story of the Good Will Court, an innovative
method of giving legal advice over the radio that emerged in the
                                                                                                                                     
has adapted throughout history to technological developments. See Mitchel L. Winick et al.,
Attorney Advertising on the Internet, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1487, 1528 (1996):
Cyberspace is a world created for multi-dimensional communication in diverse
forms. In one form, it is comparable to traditional . . . communication such as print
and broadcast media. In another form, it is comparable to interactive communication
such as telephones. In any form it is flexible, allowing the exchange of ideas person-
to-person, group-to-group, privately or publicly. Cyberspace communication is like
everything we have known about communication—and like nothing we have ever
known.
 There remains some debate as to whether new ethical rules are required to address issues
arising from lawyer activity in cyberspace. See Wendy Leibowitz, Legal Ethics in an Electronic
Age: Where No One Has Gone Before?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at B8 (noting the contro-
versy over whether existing ethical rules suffice).
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1930s, only to be rapidly suppressed by the organized bar. The bar’s
response to the then-revolutionary technology of radio, used as a fo-
rum for laypeople to describe their legal problems and to receive free
legal advice from lawyers and judges, stands as a cautionary tale for
lawyer activity on the Internet.
As I shall show in Part III, the organized bar has attempted since
the 1930s to regulate the giving of specific legal advice in a variety of
other contexts, such as radio and television call-in shows, newspaper
advice columns, books, seminars, and 900-number telephone lines. In
each instance, the bar has attempted to distinguish between the
transmission of general legal knowledge, which it has viewed as per-
missible, and the presentation of specific legal advice tailored to an
individual’s particular problem, which it has treated as impermissible.
Particularly noteworthy in this record is the skepticism of bar regula-
tors—who have purported to regulate such advice-giving in the name
of consumer protection—regarding the use of disclaimers to avoid
the evils that might flow from these exchanges of advice. Often, how-
ever, the bar’s reaction to such innovations has reflected unspoken
concerns about the image of lawyers generally, and about the eco-
nomic consequences that could flow from less-structured professional
relationships.
I conclude that giving specific legal advice to online questioners
ordinarily will create an attorney-client relationship. But what are the
ramifications of this conclusion for future regulation of this conduct?
Based on legal precedent and on historical experience, one might
confidently predict that the organized bar will react with reflexive
hostility to the emergence of online legal advice-giving.33 Consider for
a moment the legal profession’s record with respect to another revo-
lutionary form of communication—the telephone. The invention of
the telephone transformed communications and made the emergence
of large business entities possible.34 Although extravagant claims
33. See Kuester, supra note 29, at B11 (“The disdain with which many attorneys view law-
yer advertising and unauthorized practice of law is likely to exacerbate traditional technopho-
bia and the temptation to apply to the dynamic realm of multimedia rules specifically written
for the static media of the past.”).
34. Alexander Graham Bell received his patent on the telephone on March 7, 1876. See
THE READER’S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 90-91 (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty
eds., 1991). President Rutherford B. Hayes installed the first telephone in the White House in
1878, the same year that New Haven, Connecticut, opened the first telephone exchange in
America. In less than 25 years, there were 1.5 million telephones in the United States. JAMES
WEST DAVIDSON ET AL., NATION OF NATIONS: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
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were made concerning the telephone’s potential to revolutionize so-
ciety,35 many people remained unconvinced, at least initially, about
the telephone’s value in business transactions.36 In fact, Alexander
Graham Bell’s prospective father-in-law, a Boston lawyer, dismissed
the invention as “only a toy” and attempted to discourage him from
pursuing its development.37
As telephones came into the law offices of the late nineteenth
century, attorneys often greeted their arrival skeptically.38 One author
has envisaged the scene:
It is easy to imagine the telephone salesman endeavoring to con-
vince lawyers of the benefits of the telephone, and just as easy to
imagine that before we lawyers would admit this new invention into
our law offices, we would insist on carefully considering all the con-
sequences, especially those relating to our rules of professional re-
sponsibility. Thus, no doubt our first reaction to the possibility of in-
stalling a telephone was a resounding no.39
                                                                                                                                     
REPUBLIC 653 (1990). Nevertheless, on the eve of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, only
about 40% of all American households had telephones. See CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA
CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940, at 255 (1992).
35. Much of the early rhetoric about the telephone mirrors contemporary claims about
computers. In The History of the Telephone, a Bell Telephone–sponsored paean to the inven-
tion, the author confidently proclaimed:
With the use of the telephone has come a new habit of mind. The slow and sluggish
mood has been sloughed off. The old to-morrow habit has been superseded by “Do It
To-day”; and life has become more tense, alert, vivid. The brain has been relieved of the
suspense of waiting for an answer, which is a psychological gain of great importance.
HERBERT N. CASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 231-32 (1910).
36. See John Brooks, The First and Only Century of Telephone Literature, in THE SOCIAL
IMPACT OF THE TELEPHONE 208, 211-12 (Ithiel de Sola Pool ed., 1977) (describing the bias
against the telephone held by many literary men who thought that it threatened their privacy).
“Public officials, even in the United States, have been slow to change from the old-fashioned
and more dignified use of written documents and uniformed messengers; but in the last ten
years there has been a sweeping revolution in this respect.” Id. at 201. Bell Telephone’s history
of the telephone, published in 1910, recalled: “So entirely has the telephone outgrown the ridi-
cule with which, as many people can well remember, it was first received, that it is now in most
places taken for granted, as though it were a part of the natural phenomena of this planet.”
CASSON, supra note 35, at v.
37. CHRISTOPHER CERF & VICTOR NAVASKY, THE EXPERTS SPEAK: THE DEFINITIVE
COMPENDIUM OF AUTHORITATIVE MISINFORMATION 205 (1984) (quoting Gardiner Greene
Hubbard’s advice to his prospective son-in-law, Alexander Graham Bell).
38. For a description of law practice at the turn of the century, see Harry J. Lambeth,
Practicing Law in 1878, 64 A.B.A. J. 1014, 1015-23 (1978).
39. Louis M. Brown, Emerging Changes in the Practice of Law, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 599,
599; see also Colleen L. Rest, Note, Electronic Mail and Confidential Client-Attorney Commu-
nications: Risk Management, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 309, 309 (1998) (describing lawyers torn
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Lawyers also greeted the advent of other business machines like
typewriters with deep suspicion.40 Future Secretary of State John Fos-
ter Dulles recalled that when he joined the large New York law firm
of Sullivan & Cromwell in 1911, neither telephones nor stenogra-
phers were widely accepted as part of traditional law practice.41 He
remembered that “[s]ome of the older partners felt that the only dig-
nified way of communication between members of the legal profes-
sion was for them to write each other in Spencerian script, and to
have the message thus expressed [sic] delivered by hand.”42 In fact,
Sullivan & Cromwell did not obtain a telephone until 1887, nearly a
decade after the invention became available, and that telephone was
a wall phone located in the outer office, which the clerks were for-
bidden to touch except when it rang.43
                                                                                                                                     
by a concern that use of the telephone would violate confidentiality but that failure to use the
telephone would be inefficient). In response to these concerns, one author invented a substan-
tial legal telegraphic code to preserve confidentiality. See FRANK W. HELLER, LEGAL
TELEGRAPHIC CODE (1925).
40. See Brown, supra note 39, at 601 n.3 (noting older lawyers’ resistance to introduction
of the typewriter). Louis Brown imagined partners in 19th-century law firms objecting to the
use of the typewriter to prepare legal documents because “there were no cases in the books
upholding the legal validity of documents prepared on a typewriter.” Id. at 600. For discussions
of the shift from scribes and scriveners to typewriters, see William T. Braithwaite, How Is
Technology Affecting the Practice and Profession of Law?, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1113, 1120-21
(1991); Nazareth A.M. Pantaloni III, Legal Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the Legal Or-
der, 86 L. LIBR. J. 679, 692-94 (1994).
41. See Wayne K. Hobson, Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law
Firm, 1870-1915, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST–CIVIL WAR AMERICA 3, 10
(Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) [hereinafter THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS].
42. John Foster Dulles, Foreword to ARTHUR H. DEAN, WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL
1854-1948, at i, iii (1957).
43. See DEAN, supra note 42, at 28. Although the first New York City telephone exchange
was created in 1878, the firm thought it incompatible with a law practice:
At first it was considered unprofessional for a lawyer to have a telephone. Some law-
yers were also distrustful of the privacy afforded by the instrument. This distrust may
possibly have been aggravated by the fact that at the time there was one central ex-
change called ‘Law’ for all lawyers in the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx.
Id. at 27-28. Other law firms similarly struggled with the logistics of the new technology. A law
clerk at a large New York law firm recalled that when he entered the practice in 1887, there
was only one telephone in the corner of the office:
[I]f anybody was not busy and the telephone rang, that person would get up and an-
swer it. We had two floors and if the telephone rang for a person on the upper floor
and a man was foolish enough to answer it it was just too bad, as he had to run up to
the next floor to get the person wanted. No stenographers. There was only one man
in the office that could write shorthand and he wasn’t so good.
ROBERT M. LUNNY, KELLEY DRYE & WARREN, AN INFORMAL HISTORY 1836-1984, at 82-83
(1985) (quoting Adrian Larkin); see also DILKS, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that the telephone
did not come into use at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius for more than a decade after its invention);
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Of all the Gilded Age lawyers who balked at the introduction of
new machines into the practice of law, none typified this antipathy to
technology more than Clarence Seward, the managing partner of
what would later become Cravath, Swaine & Moore.44 According to
Cravath’s official firm history, “Seward sought in vain to save the of-
fice from the machine, which was destroying the simplicity of Ameri-
can life.”45 Seward’s adamance about the intrusion of modern tech-
nology was so pronounced that he not only disliked the telephone,46
he even balked at the use of elevators. In a story so telling that it can
only be apocryphal, one colleague described the time that Seward re-
fused to take an elevator up four flights to a hearing in federal court
and insisted instead on walking. When he finally arrived at the court-
room, Seward was reportedly so out of breath that the argument had
to be cancelled and the case submitted on the briefs.47
Confirmed technophobes like Seward notwithstanding, the
emergence of new business machines dramatically altered the prac-
tice of law in the Gilded Age, greatly facilitating the ability of grow-
ing law firms like Cravath to serve the needs of an expanding corpo-
rate world.48 But Clarence Seward’s Luddite spirit still haunts the le-
gal profession today, and it may manifest itself again as issues sur-
rounding the use of computer technology come to the forefront of
                                                                                                                                     
Rest, supra note 39, at 309 n.1 (describing how a telephone was kept in the reception area by a
New York firm only to show “how up to date the firm was”).
44. Seward, the nephew of Lincoln’s Secretary of State, became head of the firm before
age 40 and led the firm from 1867 to 1897. See 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM
AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-1947, at 116-17 (1946).
45. Id. at 448.
46. See id. As was the practice in the early days of the telephone, the firm installed one
unit in the entrance hall, and by 1888 had installed a “telephone closet.” Id. Nevertheless, Se-
ward so disliked the invention that for several years he refused to answer the telephone. See id.
at 448-49. By 1891, he had relented enough to permit the installation of telephones on the part-
ners’ desks. See id. at 449. Seward also resisted the use of typewriters for his correspondence,
because “[h]e felt that the clients would resent the lack of personal attention to their business
implied in sending them machine-made letters.” Id. Swaine describes an elaborate ruse used by
other lawyers in the firm to obtain a typewriter for the office without incurring Seward’s ire.
See id. at 449-50.
47. See id. at 448.
48. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 607 (2d ed. 1985) (de-
scribing how typewriters made traditional law clerks obsolete); Hobson, supra note 41, at 10
(“[T]he large firm utilized modern means of communication and modern forms of office or-
ganization. Indeed, it may be said that the telephone, the typewriter, and probably the female
stenographer-typist made the proliferation of large law firms possible.”). One lawyer reported
at the time that these three developments “tripled a lawyer’s productivity.” Id. at 24 n.23 (citing
THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER’S LIFETIME 393 (1914)).
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professional consciousness.49 Bar opinions are likely to insist that
lawyers give only generalized legal information over the Internet, but
not offer specific legal advice, and lawyers who persist in providing
online services are likely to be cautioned to avoid any commitment to
a full professional relationship.50 It is not hard to imagine that some
unlucky cyberlawyer will be the subject of disciplinary action and
held out as an example to others, especially when so many online
lawyers are apparently oblivious to their professional obligations.51 In
a profession as risk-averse and technologically challenged as the legal
profession, it will take very little to discourage many lawyers from
expanding their online activities.52
There is, however, another path the legal profession could take.
Rather than try to discourage online advice-giving, we could instead
recognize the vast untapped potential of cyberspace to aid in resolv-
ing one of the bar’s most intractable problems—the delivery of legal
services to people53 who cannot otherwise afford them.54 Instead of
49. The philosophy of the Luddites, early 19th-century opponents of technology, may have
new resonance in the Digital Age. In his provocative book, Kirkpatrick Sales has argued for a
modern revival of the Luddites’ objections to the destructive aspects of technology. See gener-
ally KIRKPATRICK SALES, REBELS AGAINST THE FUTURE: THE LUDDITES AND THEIR WAR
ON THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: LESSONS FOR THE COMPUTER AGE (1995).
50. Some suggest that the legal profession’s objections to the innovations of cyberspace
are largely self-protective. See, e.g., Paul D. Rheingold, The Web’s Prying Eyes, AM. LAW.,
May 1997, at 38, 38 (“One is reminded of the efforts of religious leaders to stop the Gutenberg
printing press in the fifteenth century. The church feared that easy dissemination of informa-
tion to the masses would endanger its monopoly on information and undermine its point of
view.”).
51. Recent actions taken against online activity include the disbarment of a Tennessee
attorney who was accused of having used “spam” to flood newsgroups with advertisements, and
the pending Texas probe into the sale of legal self-help books online by Nolo Press. See Ten-
nessee Disciplines Lawyer for Internet E-Mail Campaign, 13 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA), (July 23, 1997), at 218, 218; Rinat Fried, Texas vs. Publisher: Are Books Law-
yers?, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at A4; Your Right to Use Self-Help Law Books and Software
(visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.nolopress.com/texas/rights.html> (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
52. See Kuester, supra note 29, at B11 (“As more restrictive ethical rules start appearing
around the country, more attorneys will be deterred from diving into the cyberpool, and still
others—especially those in larger, more conservative firms—are likely to get out of the wa-
ter.”).
53. My recommendations are most relevant for middle-income people because those in
lower income brackets are unlikely today to have access to a personal computer or the requisite
training to use the Internet, and so it is at best impractical to recommend online advice-giving
as a solution to their legal needs. When computers become as affordable and as easy to operate
as television sets, and when there is universal access to the Internet, the potential for using cy-
berspace as a medium for delivering low-cost legal services will be substantially enhanced.
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stressing the use of disclaimers, the bar could encourage lawyers to
take seriously their ethical obligations in cyberspace and to embrace,
rather than to reject, the creation of attorney-client relationships in
nontraditional ways. By doing so, lawyers might be able to provide
assistance to far more people than they currently reach by more tra-
ditional methods. Although part of this process will require educating
lawyers about cyberspace, it will be even more important for the bar
to reach some consensus on whether the traditional model of full-
fledged attorney-client relationships should be rethought. The time
may be ripe for renewed consideration of whether “unbundling” legal
services, also known as “discrete task representation,” would provide
a more effective model for lawyers in the twenty-first century to use
in providing the kind of limited legal help many average people need
but cannot afford.
The final piece of this puzzle is for the growing community of le-
gal ethics scholars to focus its considerable energies on examining the
ethical implications of cyberspace practice. The statement of William
Eldridge that begins this Article55 remains as fitting today as it was
thirty-six years ago. Those in the field of legal ethics have not yet be-
gun to grapple with the challenges posed to law practice by the Digi-
tal Age, and the time to do so is now, before those issues overtake us.
This Article begins the dialogue.
                                                                                                                                     
54. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND
THE PUBLIC, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE 4 (1996):
The two most important general findings from the CLNS [Comprehensive Legal
Needs Survey] are that approximately half of all low- and moderate-income house-
holds in the survey reported facing some situation that raised a civil legal issue and
yet that most of these situations were not brought to the system of justice.
Recent contributions to the debate over unmet legal needs include Talbot D’Alemberte,
Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 631 (1998), which dis-
cusses means by which indigent persons can access the legal system, and Steven Lubet &
Cathryn Stewart, A “Public Assets” Theory of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Obligations, 145 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1245 (1997), which discusses a new theory of why lawyers should be required to perform
pro bono service. Among the solutions that have been raised are programs for mandatory pro
bono service, alternative dispute resolution, subsidized legal services, and the lessening of re-
strictions on non-lawyers providing some legal services. For general discussions of these issues,
see GEOFFREY HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1063-71 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing how the poor often have unserved legal needs); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 711-809 (2d ed. 1995) (examining the distribution of legal services in
the United States).
55. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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I. FORMING AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP BY GIVING
LEGAL ADVICE
In order to understand the implications of giving legal advice
online, we must first examine the common law governing the creation
of attorney-client relationships. Scholars have devoted little work to
this specific issue,56 perhaps because in most situations no one dis-
putes the existence of the relationship. Nevertheless, a showing that
an attorney-client relationship exists is a fundamental aspect of many
areas of law, including claims of legal malpractice, conflicts of inter-
est, attorney-client privilege, and unauthorized practice of law.57 The
specific question before us is whether giving legal advice can suffice
to create an attorney-client relationship.58
The most recent analysis of the formation of an attorney-client
relationship is found in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Govern-
ing Lawyers, approved by the American Law Institute (“ALI”) in
early 1998.59 Section 26 of the Restatement outlines the principles
governing the formation of the attorney-client relationship as follows:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer mani-
fests to the person consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to mani-
fest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably
56. The most comprehensive treatment of this issue is found in Ronald Friedman, The
Creation of the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Emerging View, 22 CAL. W. L. REV. 209
(1986).
57. See id. at 209-10:
Although the question of whether or not an attorney-client relationship exists may
arise in a variety of contexts, there are basically six situations in which the provable
existence of an attorney-client relationship takes on significance. These six are: the
legal malpractice lawsuit; the client’s attempt to be compensated from a clients’ secu-
rity fund; the attorney’s attempt to claim an attorney’s lien; the attempt by a third
party to establish the attorney’s authority, actual or apparent, to bind the client; the
petition to appropriate authorities to have the attorney disciplined; and, evidentiary
matters relating to the attorney-client privilege.
58. See Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar Admission into Federal and State Components:
National Admission for Advice on Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 453, 461 (1997) (“Giving a
client legal advice tailored to the specific facts presented by that client is at the heart of the
definition of the practice of law.”).
59. See Restatement on Lawyers Completed With Final ALI Approval of All Sections, 66
U.S.L.W. 2716 (May 26, 1998). For an overview of the Restatement, see the series of symposium
articles in 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 541-789 (1997).
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should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to pro-
vide the services.60
The Restatement thus contemplates that the attorney-client rela-
tionship arises either by consent of both parties, or under an estoppel
theory, where the putative client reasonably has relied on the lawyer
to perform legal services.61 The Restatement’s approach generally is to
treat the relationship as a product of contract law.62
As I shall show in this part, the online posting of a specific legal
question by a layperson manifests the intent to have a lawyer perform
legal services—specifically, to provide legal advice. The lawyer can
manifest consent to perform legal services in a number of ways. Most
simply, he can post a public message or send a private e-mail message
to the putative client expressly stating his consent to give the legal
advice. The lawyer can also manifest consent by performance—that
is, by providing the requested legal advice. Moreover, even if the
lawyer does not wish to enter into a professional relationship with the
online questioner, furnishing specific legal advice in response to the
question, without more, can constitute consent regardless of the law-
yer’s subjective intent. Indeed, under part (b) of the Restatement test
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1)].
61. The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not specifically address the for-
mation of the attorney-client relationship. Rather, in a preliminary section entitled “Scope,”
the Model Rules provide:
[F]or purposes of determining the lawyer’s authority and responsibility, principles of
substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relation-
ship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only
after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has
agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule
1.6, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer rela-
tionship shall be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any spe-
cific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble para. 15 (1998). Some jurisdictions
have defined the relationship by statute. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 951 (West 1998) (defining
client as “a person who . . . consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing
legal service or advice from him in his professional capacity”).
62. This is the traditional approach. See Friedman, supra note 56, at 213 (“[T]he starting
point of analysis in the creation of an attorney-client relationship is the law of contract.”). For
another overview of this area, see David N. May, Note, Inhouse Defenders of Insureds: Some
Ethical Considerations, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 881, 905-10 (1998). An oft-cited definition is that in
Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977): “The relationship is created when (1) a
person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought pertains
to matters within the attorney’s professional competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or im-
pliedly agrees to give or actually gives the desired advice or assistance.”
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described above, a lawyer posting such advice online without dis-
claiming any intent to create an attorney-client relationship could still
incur the obligations of a professional relationship if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the questioner is reasonably
relying on the lawyer’s advice. Most importantly, a careful examina-
tion of the law suggests that the attorney-client relationship cannot
easily be disclaimed and that, under certain circumstances, even an
explicit disclaimer may not suffice to shield an online lawyer from po-
tential liability for the legal advice given.
The Restatement’s explanation of how attorney-client relation-
ships are formed is consistent with the substantial body of case law
addressing this issue. A closer examination of the contours of that
law is essential to understanding the potential perils of online advice-
giving. I shall examine each aspect of the Restatement test in turn.
A. The Client Manifests an Intent to Receive Legal Services
Under what circumstances may a request for legal advice consti-
tute the first step in the formation of an attorney-client relationship?
In the traditional setting of a lawyer’s office, there is little mystery
about this aspect of the formation of a professional relationship. The
layperson comes to the office of the lawyer and expressly asks the
lawyer to perform legal services, most commonly by describing a set
of facts and asking either for specific legal advice or for the lawyer’s
assistance in accomplishing a particular objective.63 A request for le-
gal advice standing alone may suffice to manifest the intent to receive
legal services. Well-established principles hold that there need be no
written contract and that payment of a fee is not a prerequisite to
finding a professional relationship, although such a fee will be a
strong indication that such a relationship existed.64
63. See RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, § 26 cmt. c:
A client’s manifestation of intent that a lawyer provide legal services to the client
may be explicit, as when the client requests the lawyer to write a will. The client’s in-
tent may be manifest from surrounding facts and circumstances, as when the client
discusses the possibility of representation with the lawyer and then sends the lawyer
relevant papers or a retainer requested by the lawyer.
64. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.
1978) (holding that an attorney-client relationship need not be based on a formal contract and
that it may arise even if no fees are paid); Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp. 841, 845
(M.D. Ala. 1992) (finding payment of legal fees may be evidence of an attorney-client relation-
ship); Keoseian v. Von Kalkbach, 707 F. Supp. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[The] defendant has
found no case, nor has this Court, where a person who signed a retainer agreement was never-
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Perhaps the best-known cautionary tale for treating a layper-
son’s request for legal advice as the first step in forming an attorney-
client relationship is Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,65 de-
cided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1980. Togstad’s notoriety
in legal ethics circles stems largely from its broad reading of how an
attorney-client relationship may inadvertently be created, and it thus
merits careful consideration here. Joan Togstad, the wife of a patient
who had suffered a stroke after surgery, met with attorney Jerre
Miller regarding her husband’s condition about fourteen months af-
ter the hospitalization had begun, believing that she might have a
case for medical malpractice.66 She told Miller what had happened at
the hospital, and Miller took notes and asked questions during the
meeting, which lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour.67 At
the end of the appointment, Miller told Mrs. Togstad that “he did not
think [they] had a legal case, [sic] however, he was going to discuss
this with his partner.”68 Mrs. Togstad understood that Miller would
call her if he changed his mind.69 Miller never called her, never dis-
cussed fee arrangements, never authorized the receipt of medical re-
cords, and never billed for the interview.70 Most significant, however,
is the fact that, according to Mrs. Togstad, Miller never informed her
                                                                                                                                     
theless found not to be a client.”); In re Johore Inv. Co., 49 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1985) (“[E]stablishment of attorney-client relationship [is not] dependent on fees paid . . . . An
attorney-client relationship can exist even if services are rendered gratis.” (citations omitted));
Foulke v. Knuck, 784 P.2d 723, 726 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“Although it is not necessary for [an]
individual to pay the attorney a fee for the services rendered in order for [a] relationship to be
established . . . payment for legal services . . . is persuasive evidence that an attorney-client re-
lationship was established.” (citation omitted)); Gillespie v. Klein, 406 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (“To the ordinary person, even one knowledgeable in business, receipt of an
attorney’s bill is usually a reasonable sign that the attorney feels he performed legal services
based on an attorney-client relationship.”); cf. Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1115
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[A]lthough a fee arrangement is not necessary for establishment of an attor-
ney-client relationship, the absence of such arrangement can be an indication that [an] attor-
ney-client relationship never existed.”). See generally May, supra note 62, at 907 n.183 (1998)
(collecting cases where payment of a legal fee was found to be evidence of an attorney-client
relationship).
65. 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (per curiam).
66. See id. at 690. The appointment had been made for her by her husband’s former su-
pervisor, who also accompanied her to the meeting. See id.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id. Miller disputed the nature of this conversation, asserting that he had told her
that “there was nothing related in her factual circumstances that told [him] that she had a case
that [his] firm would be interested in undertaking,” and that he had told her that he would call
back only if his partner disagreed with his view of the case. Id. at 691.
70. See id. at 690.
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that he had no expertise in medical malpractice, never suggested that
she see another lawyer, and never mentioned that the statute of limi-
tations on her claim was only two years.71
A year later, Joan Togstad consulted another lawyer, but by then
the statute of limitations had expired.72 She sued Miller and his firm
for legal malpractice, claiming that she had been given a “qualified,
quality legal opinion that [she and her husband] did not have a mal-
practice case.”73 The jury ultimately found that there had been an at-
torney-client relationship and that Miller was liable for malpractice in
the amount of nearly $650,000.74 On appeal, the court addressed the
question of whether the conversation between Togstad and Miller
had given rise to an attorney-client relationship. The court explained
that the issue could be resolved under either a contract or a tort the-
ory.75 According to the court, the jury could have found on this evi-
dence that “[the putative client] sought and received legal advice
from [the lawyer] under circumstances which made it reasonably
foreseeable to [the lawyer] that [the putative client] would be injured
if the advice were negligently given.”76 In particular, Mrs. Togstad
“went to Miller for legal advice, was told there wasn’t a case, and re-
lied upon this advice in failing to pursue the claim for medical mal-
practice.”77
Although not universally accepted,78 Togstad has stood for two
decades as a warning to law students and lawyers about the dangers
71. See id. Miller again disputed Mrs. Togstad’s account. He testified that he had told her
his firm was not expert in the area of medical malpractice and had encouraged her to consult
another lawyer. See id. at 691.
72. See id. at 690.
73. Id. at 691 (alteration in original). Although he disputed whether he had furnished “ad-
vice,” Miller conceded at trial that “she was seeking [his] opinion as an attorney in the sense of
whether or not there was a case that the firm would be interested in undertaking.” Id.
74. See id. at 692.
75. See id. at 693. According to the court, applying negligence principles to these facts
would require a showing that the “defendant rendered legal advice (not necessarily at some-
one’s request) under circumstances which made it reasonably foreseeable to the attorney that if
such advice was rendered negligently, the individual receiving the advice might be injured
thereby.” Id. at 693 n.4. In contrast, using a contract theory would require “the rendering of
legal advice pursuant to another’s request and the reliance factor, in this case, where the advice
was not paid for, [would] need [to] be shown in the form of promissory estoppel.” Id.
76. Id. at 693.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Comment, Attorney Malpractice: Use of Contract Analysis to Determine the
Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 MINN. L. REV. 751, 759 (1979) (criticizing Tog-
stad). Much of the criticism has focused on the fact that Togstad does not rely on an express or
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of providing off-the-cuff legal advice.79 Togstad suggests that a re-
quest for legal advice about the merits of a particular claim may
readily suffice to begin the process of forming an attorney-client rela-
tionship. Indeed, the issue of creating obligations in attorneys from
initial consultations has become increasingly prominent in recent
years, and more courts appear willing to treat a request for legal ad-
vice as the beginning of an attorney-client relationship, even if the
parties never formally agree upon representation.80
                                                                                                                                     
implied contract to impose liability and thus leaves the precise source of the attorney-client re-
lationship ambiguous. One critic asserted:
The contract approach is not a useful analytical tool for determining the existence of
an attorney-client relationship because a lawyer’s duty to exercise reasonable care in
giving professional advice frequently does not arise from contract, but from the posi-
tion the lawyer occupies as an expert in legal matters. Because of his assumed exper-
tise, the lawyer is in a unique position to cause harm if he gives erroneous legal ad-
vice to a person who has consulted him.
Id. at 758. Only a few Minnesota cases have actually applied Togstad’s holding, although the
case is often cited by other courts as well. In Veit v. Anderson, 428 N.W.2d 429 (Minn. 1988),
the plaintiff had previously consulted the lawyer on other legal matters, but the lawyer had told
him that he did not wish to represent him in a pending real estate deal. See id. at 432. Never-
theless, the plaintiff alleged that, in the course of assisting the plaintiff in the real estate trans-
action, the lawyer had given him erroneous legal advice about the effect of signing a certain
document. See id. at 431. The court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether an attorney-client relationship had been created, as it arguably was reasonable for the
plaintiff to rely on the lawyer’s representations. See id. The court explained: “If [the lawyer] did
advise [the plaintiff] on the legal effect of the agreement, he may have established an attorney-
client relationship with [the lawyer].” Id. at 432; see also Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319
N.W.2d 26, 30 (Minn. 1982) (“[T]he relationship is created whenever a person seeks and re-
ceives legal advice from a lawyer under circumstances in which a reasonable person would rely
on the advice.”); TJD Dissolution Corp. v. Savoie Supply Co., 460 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (defining the tort theory of attorney-client relationships as one which “protects lay
people where it would be reasonably foreseeable to the lawyer that the person might be injured
if the advice is given negligently” (citing Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 693 n.4)).
79. The case is cited in many legal ethics textbooks. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW & ETHICS 677-85 (4th ed. 1995); HAZARD ET
AL., supra note 54, at 481-87.
80. See, e.g., Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp 841, 845 (describing “a small, but
growing, body of law and commentary which has attempted to address the circumstances under
which an initial consultation between a prospective client and an attorney could be viewed as
having developed into an attorney-client relationship”). See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990) (noting that the duty of confidenti-
ality for information derived from preliminary consultation arises under rules of ethics, the law
of agency, and the law of evidence, and that the duty persists even if no formal attorney-client
relationship is established); Debra Bassett Perschbacher & Rex R. Perschbacher, Enter at Your
Own Risk: The Initial Consultation & Conflicts of Interest, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689, 701-05
(1990) (discussing situations in which an attorney-client relationship can arise without formal
agreement by both parties); John Casey Pipes, The Implied Professional Relationship: An Ex-
tension of the Attorney’s Duties and Obligations, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 319 (1996) (examining ar-
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Today, a case like Togstad could easily arise online instead of in
a traditional office visit. The question-and-answer from Dear Esquire
that we reviewed earlier is reminiscent of Togstad, in that the ques-
tioner described a potential negligence action and the lawyer told the
questioner that he had no viable legal claim.81 But how similar are the
two situations? Posting a request for legal advice on the Internet is
different in many ways from an office visit. Most obviously, a request
posted online generally is not targeted at a particular attorney, but
rather at a broad audience of lawyers, in the hope of receiving a re-
sponse from one of them. In addition, one might argue that ex-
changes online lack the formality and face-to-face interaction of the
traditional office visit. An examination of the case law, however, re-
veals that the courts have at times found a viable request for legal
services in circumstances far less formal than those in Togstad. A re-
quest for legal advice may be found even when the exchange between
lawyer and client was brief,82 or when the lawyer and putative client
never met in person.83
                                                                                                                                     
eas in which the courts have extended some aspects of the attorney-client relationship to situa-
tions in which an attorney did not represent a client in the traditional sense).
81. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
82. See In re Johore, 49 B.R. 710, 714 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) (finding a single, 90-minute
consultation in which confidential information was disclosed sufficient to establish an attorney-
client relationship); Herbes v. Graham, 536 N.E.2d 164, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding an at-
torney-client relationship after a single 90-minute discussion of possible representation); King
v. King, 367 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (finding an attorney-client relationship after
a client had a single confidential meeting of 30 minutes with an attorney); Intercapital Corp. v.
Intercapital Corp., 700 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a two-hour preliminary
discussion in confidence sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship); cf. Seeley v.
Seeley, 514 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that after a single office visit of 90
minutes, “no formal attorney-client relationship resulted, [but] the foregoing facts establish[ed]
that a fiduciary obligation nevertheless arose with respect to the matters discussed at the con-
ferences”).
83. See Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp. 841, 844 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (finding a
de facto attorney-client relationship sufficient to disqualify an attorney who had previously rep-
resented a client in another matter after that attorney had a single phone conversation about
possible further representation with the client); Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 624 F. Supp.
937, 942 (D. Minn. 1985) (finding that legal advice over the telephone about a statute of limita-
tions is evidence of an attorney-client relationship); Bays v. Theran, 639 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Mass.
1994) (finding an attorney-client relationship from a legal consultation conducted solely by
mail and telephone); DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass.
1983) (finding that an attorney-client relationship may have arisen from telephone discussions
between a lawyer’s secretary and the putative client). But cf. David B. Lilly, Co. v. Fisher, 799
F. Supp. 1562, 1568 n.7 (D. Del. 1992) (finding that unconfirmed telephone calls, with no
documentation that legal advice was given, were insufficient to establish definitively an attor-
ney-client relationship).
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Two cases are particularly noteworthy in considering the con-
tours of a putative client’s request for legal advice. In Foulke v.
Knuck,84 a lawyer seeking to divorce his wife met with another lawyer
to discuss legal issues surrounding the divorce and questions involv-
ing child custody.85 He paid the lawyer for this meeting but did not re-
tain her to represent him in the divorce.86 The second lawyer later
sought to represent the wife in the divorce proceedings, claiming that
she had never undertaken to represent Foulke as a client.87 The court
disagreed, stating that the existence of an attorney-client relationship
“is proved by showing that the party sought and received advice and
assistance from the attorney in matters pertinent to the legal profes-
sion.”88 Moreover, the court rejected the contention that this meeting
simply constituted a “sharing of legal information.”89 The court ex-
plained that “[w]hether one seeks legal information or legal advice
from an attorney, the attorney is being consulted for his or her pro-
fessional, legal expertise.”90
The second case is Todd v. State of Nevada,91 in which an attor-
ney had been visiting a client in prison when another inmate handed
him a written account of the facts surrounding his own imprison-
ment.92 The court held that the letter was subject to the attorney-
client privilege because the inmate had sought the lawyer’s advice on
matters that were within his professional competence and the law-
yer’s acceptance of the letter was an implied agreement to render the
advice sought.93 The Todd court stated that “[a]bsent a written con-
tract for services, we can envision no clearer facts which would estab-
lish an attorney-client relationship.”94
84. 784 P.2d 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
85. See id. at 725.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 726. The court further noted: “The fact that a consultation is relatively brief does
not negate the establishment of an attorney-client relationship.” Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also King v. King, 367 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (finding an attorney-
client relationship where a half-hour meeting between a husband and an attorney to discuss an
imminent divorce was for the purpose of obtaining professional legal advice and confidential
information was disclosed to facilitate such advice).
91. 931 P.2d 721 (Nev. 1997).
92. See id. at 723-24.
93. See id. at 725.
94. Id.; see also In re Lieber, 442 A.2d 153, 155 (D.C. 1982) (finding an implied attorney-
client relationship after a lawyer voluntarily placed his name on a roster to assist inmates in pro
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These cases indicate that a request for legal advice may easily
begin the process, even in apparently casual situations, of creating a
professional relationship. In light of these cases, the legal queries
posted in newsgroups, in chat rooms, and on various websites would
seem to fit easily into the framework created by this precedent. One
might counter, however, that a critical distinction between requests
for specific legal advice such as those in Togstad, Foulke, and Todd,
and similar requests online, is that postings in newsgroups and chat
rooms are made openly, rather than in confidence.95 Online lawyers
might argue that a layperson who truly expects legal advice will pres-
ent his legal problem in confidence and will expect a confidential re-
ply.
What may appear intuitive to lawyers may not be so obvious to
laypeople, particularly those who believe that they have no other re-
course for obtaining legal advice. The Restatement does not require
that the desire to obtain legal services be expressed in confidence,
nor does it state that confidential information must be conveyed to
the lawyer in order for a relationship to arise. Indeed, as Parts II and
III will show, the bar’s historical warnings against giving specific ad-
vice in public settings such as radio talk shows and seminars have
been based on the assumption that laypeople are likely to rely on
such advice. Moreover, a client or prospective client may always
choose to waive the duty of confidentiality.96 Communicating confi-
dential information to a lawyer is often powerful evidence of the in-
tent to form a professional relationship. It often may impose duties
on a lawyer even if the representation is declined, but it does not ap-
pear to be a required aspect of the client’s request for legal services.97
                                                                                                                                     
se civil actions and was assigned to an inmate). But cf. United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622,
628 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining to infer an attorney-client relationship where a district court judge
had appointed as counsel for fugitive defendants an attorney who had neither known about nor
consented to the appointment).
95. This distinction is less pertinent to questions that are e-mailed directly to an attorney’s
website, because these questions ordinarily are not visible to anyone other than the recipient.
Confidentiality issues about e-mail security and ethical obligations regarding encryption may
arise, but for our discussion they do not affect the outcome.
96. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998) (defining
parameters of confidentiality of information in attorney-client relationships).
97. This is not to suggest that the confidentiality of the information is irrelevant to the de-
termination of whether a relationship existed. In conflict of interest cases, for example, some
courts have determined that the information furnished by the putative client in the initial con-
sultation was insufficiently confidential to merit disqualification. Perhaps the best known ex-
ample of this approach is Mailer v. Mailer, 455 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. 1983). In that case, the court
declined to order disqualification of a lawyer after an initial one-hour consultation with the es-
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Thus, a request for legal advice that appears on a bulletin board or in
a chat group, accessible to anyone with a Web browser, may suffice
under existing case law to start the process of forming an attorney-
client relationship, even though it is not “confidential.”
One might also argue that online requests for legal advice are in-
sufficiently formal to trigger an attorney-client relationship and that
they should be treated instead as the cyberspace equivalents of so-
called cocktail party questions. The notion that a legal question posed
to a lawyer in a social setting does not amount to a request for legal
advice is not a new one,98 and the Restatement rather offhandedly an-
nounces in the comments to section 26 that “a lawyer may answer a
general question about the law, for example in a purely social setting,
without a client-lawyer relationship arising.”99 The rationale is not
explained, nor is a case cited for this proposition.
At least two possible rationales in support of this comment sug-
gest themselves. The first is that a “general question about the law” is
not a request for legal services. This distinction becomes critical as we
review the bar’s historical regulation of legal advice-giving, which al-
ways has attempted to draw a sharp distinction between general legal
                                                                                                                                     
tranged wife of author Norman Mailer, even though she had furnished some information and
filled out a client history form. See id. at 1213. Noting that the question was “close,” the court
nevertheless permitted the lawyer to represent Norman Mailer in the divorce because the in-
formation disclosed was on the public record and was not “intimate,” cautioning that this
“probably brings us as close to the outer limits as we shall want to go.” Id. The case seems in-
consistent with more modern approaches to conflicts of interest that have emerged since the
Model Rules, and even in Massachusetts the case has been limited. See, e.g., DeLoury v. De-
Loury, 495 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (disqualifying an attorney after a one-hour con-
sultation in which the lawyer prepared an intake form, the putative client disclosed family his-
tory and financial matters, as well as intimate details, and the lawyer gave some preliminary
advice about Massachusetts law). Nevertheless, there is similar precedent in other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Derrickson v. Derrickson, 541 A.2d 149, 151 (D.C. 1988) (holding that no attorney-
client relationship arose between an attorney and a client who had met for a brief consultation
eight years prior to the present case, where the consultation involved no sharing of confidential
information).
98. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 5.6.2, at 210 n.54 (1986):
Courts have drawn a line of sorts between instances of casual, friendly, or social con-
versation, where no liability should arise, and more formal and serious occasions on
which the lawyer could reasonably be understood to be applying or undertaking to
apply the skills of a lawyer for the benefit of a client.
See also Friedman, supra note 56, at 217-25 (discussing nontraditional means of creating attor-
ney-client relationships).
99. RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, § 26 cmt. c; accord Franko
v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (Grant, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“Obviously, specific advice given to an unrepresented party in a formal office
setting carries more weight than general advice given at a cocktail party.”).
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information and specific legal advice. The second possible support for
this conclusion is that a lawyer would not reasonably expect a ques-
tioner to rely on information furnished in a casual social setting and
that it would not be reasonable for a questioner so to rely.
These theories do not entirely resolve the issue, in the context of
either a cocktail party conversation or an Internet exchange. One
may readily envisage a scenario in a social setting in which someone
wants specific legal advice from a lawyer and indicates that she will
rely on the advice. At a party, a casual acquaintance might describe
his termination from a job to an employment law specialist, for ex-
ample, and ask her whether he should file a lawsuit. In response to
the employment law question, an unwary lawyer could well provide
sufficiently detailed advice, tailored to the questioner’s individual
facts, of the sort she would provide in an office setting. There is no
guarantee that she could later avoid a lawsuit for malpractice on the
ground that she gave such advice at a cocktail party rather than in her
office. Indeed, even in the absence of precedent holding a lawyer li-
able for cocktail party pontifications, legal ethics professors regularly
have cautioned their students against precisely such behavior.100 Sim-
ply dismissing Internet exchanges as the cyberspace equivalent of so-
cial banter will not resolve this issue.101 Moreover, the formality req-
uisite for reasonable reliance may vary among settings. What might
be unreasonable reliance in a social setting might well be reasonable
in the environment of cyberspace, where individuals are more prone
to seek attorneys out rather than happen upon them accidentally.
This review of what constitutes a request for legal services re-
flects that the courts have been willing to construe this element
broadly, and nothing suggests that the courts will take a different ap-
proach with respect to similar requests occurring in cyberspace. In-
deed, a case could be made that courts ought to be particularly pro-
tective of laypeople who seek legal advice online. Most lay question-
ers who post specific information about their legal problems and ask
100. See, e.g., RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 28 (1995) (proposing a hypothetical suggesting that a lawyer who gives ad-
vice at a cocktail party could inadvertently create an attorney-client relationship).
101. This is not to say that the informality of a particular exchange is irrelevant to the de-
termination of whether an attorney-client relationship was created. See, e.g., Farmer v. Mount
Vernon Realty, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 223, 225 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding that “informal conversation
[between an attorney and a client], without any additional contact between the two parties,
cannot establish an attorney-client relationship . . . . At best, the conversation . . . was a pre-
liminary step to the establishment of an attorney-client relationship.”).
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for help expect that they will be able to rely on the answer they re-
ceive. Posting legal questions would otherwise seem to be a futile ex-
ercise. Even a cursory review of the postings to websites like Dear
Esquire shows a disturbingly large number of laypeople with pressing
legal problems who believe they have no other way to find help. The
level of detail supplied in many of these questions indicates that the
average questioner is not asking for legal information out of idle cu-
riosity or academic interest. Rather, these questioners need legal ad-
vice, and they expect that they will receive it. What happens when
they do receive it is the subject of the next section.
B. The Lawyer Manifests Consent to Provide Legal Services
The second aspect of forming an attorney-client relationship is
the lawyer’s consent to provide legal services. In a traditional office
setting, there is little ambiguity about this prong as well. As com-
ment e to section 26 of the Restatement explains: “The lawyer may
explicitly agree to represent the client or may indicate consent by ac-
tion, for example by performing services requested by the client.”102
Although the agreement is ordinarily embodied in an oral or written
agreement with respect to fees, it need not be. In an online exchange,
for instance, a lawyer could explicitly consent to represent the puta-
tive client by posting a response or by sending an individual e-mail
directly to the questioner that says, “I will represent you in this mat-
ter.”
The more important question is whether providing the requested
legal advice, without specifically agreeing to enter into a professional
relationship, also suffices as consent. The Restatement clearly sup-
ports this approach, using the following illustration:
Client telephones Lawyer, who has previously represented Client,
stating that Client wishes Lawyer to handle a pending antitrust in-
vestigation, and asking Lawyer to come to Client’s headquarters to
explore the appropriate strategy for Client to follow. Lawyer comes
to the headquarters and spends a day discussing strategy, without
stating then or promptly thereafter that Lawyer has not yet decided
whether to represent Client. Lawyer has communicated willingness
to represent Client by so doing. Had Client simply asked Lawyer to
102. RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, § 26 cmt. e.
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discuss the possibility of representing Client, no client-lawyer rela-
tionship would result.103
A number of cases also have held that providing specific legal
advice in response to a request for such assistance forms an attorney-
client relationship.104 Indeed, even giving legal advice in less formal
situations, such as when a lawyer advises a pro se litigant, may suffice
to create professional obligations.105
103. Id. illus. 1.
104. See Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir.
1993) (“[A]n attorney-client relationship is formed when an attorney renders advice directly to
a client who has consulted with him seeking legal counsel.” (citations omitted)); In re United
Utensils, 141 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (finding that a corporate lawyer who gave
personal legal advice to an individual connected with a corporation may have created a conflict
of interest); Davis v. State Bar, 655 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Cal. 1983) (finding an attorney-client rela-
tionship from evidence of ongoing consultations between an attorney and a client); King v.
King, 367 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding an attorney-client relationship after an
initial consultation meeting); Herbes v. Graham, 536 N.E. 2d 164, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“If
the client consults the attorney for the evident purpose of securing legal advice, an attorney-
client relationship will probably be found regardless of the attorney’s intent or the fact that a
further relationship did not develop as a result of the primary consultation.”); DeVaux v.
American Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 358 (Mass. 1983) (finding a possible attorney-
client relationship where a lawyer’s secretary told the client to send a letter and arranged a
medical exam on her behalf); Admiral Merchants Motor Freight v. O’Connor & Hannan, 494
N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. 1992) (holding that an attorney-client relationship can form “whenever
an individual seeks and receives legal advice from an attorney in circumstances in which a rea-
sonable person would rely on such advice”); Seeley v. Seeley, 514 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (App. Div.
1987) (finding meetings to discuss possible representation and legal matters sufficient to create
fiduciary obligations similar to those of an attorney-client relationship); In re Bristow, 721 P.2d
437, 441 (Or. 1986) (finding an attorney-client relationship where a lawyer gave legal advice
but did not formally represent the client); In re McGlothen, 663 P.3d 1330, 1334 (Wash. 1983)
(finding an attorney-client relationship where a lawyer acted largely as an advisor and no ex-
press relationship was established); cf. Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 463 F.
Supp. 914, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (“Although the relationship of attorney and client may be im-
plied from the conduct of the parties, such conduct must evidence an offer or request by the
client for legal services and an acceptance of the offer by the attorney.”); Robert F. Housman,
The Ethical Obligations of a Lawyer in a Political Campaign, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 3, 42 (1995)
(suggesting that lawyers should be wary when contacted by a political campaign for legal ad-
vice, because an attorney-client relationship could result).
105. See generally Helen B. Kim, Note, Legal Education for the Pro Se Litigant: A Step To-
ward a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641, 1658-60 (1987) (suggesting that law-
yers conducting classes for pro se litigants must disclaim an attorney-client relationship); Eliza-
beth J. Cohen, Afraid of Ghosts, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 80 (suggesting that assisting pro se
litigants could create attorney-client relationships); cf. Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of
Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyer’s Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85
CAL. L. REV. 79, 91-93 (1997) (arguing that Model Rule 4.3 bars giving legal advice to unrep-
resented persons and should be formally construed as such); Kathy Garner, Lawyer-Librarians
in Public Law Schools: The Ethical Conundrums of Pro Bono Activities, 84 L. LIBR. J. 31, 58
(1992) (“Liability might also arise when a lawyer-librarian is helping a pro se patron. Even if
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Consider In re Raynard,106 a bankruptcy case in which a debtor,
having been served with a summons and a complaint, called a law
firm he had selected from the Yellow Pages to obtain an advertised
“free telephone consultation.”107 The lawyer advised the debtor that
he need not take any formal action in response to the complaint, ad-
vice that was erroneous and resulted in entry of a default judgment
against the debtor.108 The debtor later tried to have the default set
aside because of what he claimed to be the negligence of his attorney.
He maintained: “I certainly did not deliberately fail to adequately
explain the nature of the lawsuit to the attorney; in fact, I would not
have call [sic] a lawyer if I had not been motivated to protect my in-
terests.”109 The court rejected the motion on the ground that the
debtor was bound by the omissions of his attorneys, inasmuch as
these limited contacts had sufficed to create an attorney-client rela-
tionship:
At least for the duration of Defendant’s telephone conversation with
the attorney at Clark, Washington & Smith, an attorney-client rela-
tionship appears to have existed. An attorney-client relationship
may be inferred if a party shows that the advice or assistance of an
attorney is both sought and received in matters pertinent to the at-
torney’s profession. Additionally, even where no express attorney-
client relationship exists, an attorney may be held liable for negli-
gence if the attorney gratuitously undertakes to perform a legal
service to another with the other’s approval.110
It takes little imagination indeed to envision a similar claim arising
from an online exchange.111 One might easily substitute the services
                                                                                                                                     
neither intends to create an attorney-client relationship, such a relationship could be in-
ferred.”).
106. 171 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
107. Id. at 700.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 702 (citation omitted); see also Jacobson v. Pitman-Moore, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 937,
942-43 (D. Minn. 1985) (refusing to toll a statute of limitations when the plaintiff missed a
deadline based on a brief meeting in which the lawyer had advised that the time limit did not
apply, because “[i]f [the lawyer] believed that he was not acting as plaintiff’s attorney, [the law-
yer] logically would not have given plaintiff legal advice and would have clarified the fact that
he was not representing plaintiff”).
111. The Raynard case highlights the additional possibility that a court might use the theory
of “gratuitous undertaking,” in which a lawyer volunteers to perform a service for a nonclient,
to impose liability for giving legal advice. See Raynard, 171 B.R. at 702. As one commentator
notes:
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offered at a law firm’s free website for the free telephone consulta-
tion at issue in In re Raynard.
Togstad also provides guidance in this regard. The lawyer in
Togstad subjected himself to malpractice liability because he gave
specific legal advice to someone who had requested such advice: he
told Mrs. Togstad that she had no case, and in so doing, created a
professional relationship with her.112 No fee was necessary, and the
lawyer’s subjective intent not to form a relationship was not determi-
native.113 The linchpin for the analysis was the giving of legal advice.114
                                                                                                                                     
The lawyer who offers gratuitous advice is in a position analogous to a physician who
witnesses a traffic accident. The law does not impose a duty on physicians to treat a
victim of the accident. Should the physician undertake to treat a victim, however, he
will be liable if he does so negligently. Similarly, if a lawyer voluntarily offers legal
advice to an individual, an attorney-client relationship should be deemed to be es-
tablished and he should be liable if his negligence causes harm to the individual.
Comment, Attorney Malpractice, supra note 78, at 758 n.50 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (4th ed. 1971)); accord 1 RONALD E. MALLEN &
JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.2, at 559 (4th ed. 1996) (“If the party is not ad-
verse, gratuitous advice can suffice for imposing a duty of care. In some jurisdictions, the meas-
ure of care is the same standard of care as if there were a formal retainer.”); PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (noting the dif-
ference between misfeasance and nonfeasance and the importance of an affirmative act in cre-
ating a legal duty); cf. O’Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (App. Div. 1960)
(“The law is settled that a physician who undertakes to examine or treat a patient and then
abandons him, may be held liable for malpractice.”). Nevertheless, the cases in which such li-
ability has been found are rare. See Hacker v. Hillard, 570 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(“The cases actually applying this rule to find attorney liability are few, and liability has been
found only when the attorney undertook, gratuitously or otherwise, to complete an affirmative
act for the party who later brought suit.”). Moreover, these situations have traditionally been
viewed as an aspect of nonclient, third-party liability, rather than implied attorney-client rela-
tionships. See Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “Non-Clients”: Reconceptual-
izing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous
Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 660 (1994).
112. See Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980).
113. See id.
114. See id. Although there are relatively few cases in which courts have actually imposed
liability based on an implied attorney-client relationship, this may simply reflect that the issue
is rarely contested in a typical legal malpractice action. Numerous courts have asserted that an
attorney-client relationship can be implied if the attorney gives legal advice. See, e.g., Randolph
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 995 F.2d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that an attorney-client re-
lationship may be implied by conduct); DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d
355, 357 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a contract is implied when a party solicits from an attorney
legal advice within the attorney’s professional competence and the attorney agrees to give it);
In re Perry, 494 N.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Minn. 1992) (ruling that an attorney’s court appearances
and drafting of documents on behalf of his ailing mother constituted legal advice and thus cre-
ated an attorney-client relationship).
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To create an attorney-client relationship, however, the lawyer’s
advice must be specific to the facts of the putative client’s case. First,
as previously noted, giving specific legal advice in response to a set of
particular facts is the hallmark of the practice of law, while providing
general information about the law is not.115 Second, it is reasonable
for a putative client to rely on advice that is specifically tailored to his
particular request, and the courts are clear that it is the reasonable
belief of the client that will govern.116 Defining a bright line between
115. See supra note 58.
116. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.
1978) (noting that the privileges of the attorney-client relationship are based on the client’s in-
tention to obtain legal advice and the belief that he is consulting a lawyer for that purpose);
Keoseian v. Von Kaulbach, 707 F. Supp. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In every situation where
an attorney-client relationship has been found . . . the client’s belief has some reasonable basis
in fact that he has some interest of his own in common with others which he is seeking to ad-
vance by securing legal advice.”); Alexander v. Superior Court, 685 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Ariz.
1984) (noting that a client’s reasonable belief that an attorney-client relationship existed is an
important factor in the court’s evaluation of the relationship); Foulke v. Knuck, 784 P.2d 723,
726 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (considering the client’s belief that he is seeking and receiving legal
advice on a specific matter); In re Lieber, 442 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982) (considering
the client’s perception of an attorney as retained legal counsel as a factor in determining
whether an attorney-client relationship exists); George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822, 827 (N.M. 1979)
(finding that an attorney-client relationship existed without proof of the essential terms, be-
cause the attorneys had failed in their responsibility to be clear enough to avoid a misunder-
standing of the relationship); In re Galton, 615 P.2d 317, 325 (Or. 1980) (holding that a lawyer
who furnished legal advice free of charge to a corporation that called from time to time seeking
advice could be considered an attorney for the corporation, because a lawyer not on retainer
“[may] be considered an attorney for a client who, from time to time, calls that lawyer seeking
legal advice and receives such advice as a matter of course”); Intercapital Corp. v. Intercapital
Corp., 700 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (regarding a consultation and the client’s
view that the attorney was being retained as enough to establish an attorney-client relation-
ship); Developments in the Law – Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1244, 1322 (1981) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (“The focus on the client’s per-
spective, rather than on the sometimes misleading external indicia of the objective approach,
safeguards an individual’s belief and reliance.”); see also Sandum v. Doherty, Rumble & But-
ler, No. C7-94-801, 1994 WL 593925, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1994) (“Although we de-
cline to mandate that direct contact between the plaintiff and the attorney must always occur in
order for an attorney-client relationship to exist, the plaintiff’s reliance on the legal advice must
be reasonable under the circumstances.” (emphasis added)). In contrast, if no individualized
advice is given, it is unreasonable for the layperson to believe that a professional relationship
has been created. See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that an individual who contacted a law firm as principal of an organization had no reason-
able basis for concluding that the attorney represented her as an individual); In re Cumberland
Investment Corp., 120 B.R. 627, 629 n.3 (Bankr. D. Ky. 1990) (stating that one factor to con-
sider when determining whether there was an attorney-client relationship is whether the indi-
vidual “sought individual legal advice or asked questions relating to personal representation”).
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general information and specific legal advice, however, has proved
difficult.117
There is no reason to believe that these consent-by-performance
principles would not also be applicable in cyberspace. Suppose that
Mrs. Togstad had posted her question about medical malpractice to
the Dear Esquire website and that attorney Miller had posted the re-
ply that he gave her orally in the office. This reply surely could meet
the test of creating an attorney-client relationship. Even though one
could argue that it is unreasonable for online questioners to rely on
such advice, the case law discussed above suggests that the courts are
willing to take a broad view of reasonableness and to treat fairly cas-
ual interactions between lawyers and laypeople as sufficient to create
professional obligations. Moreover, because the factual context of the
disputed exchange is necessarily critical to this determination, courts
will have to look to the unique nature of cyberspace communication
to decide whether a reasonable consumer of online legal services
would rely on the information provided.118 In the Dear Esquire ex-
change we considered earlier,119 a court could well conclude that it
was reasonable for the questioner to rely on an apparently specific
and definitive legal opinion given in response to his request.
In short, lawyers who provide specific legal advice online may
find it difficult at some future point to persuade a court or bar coun-
sel that they did not intend to incur any professional obligations by
answering questions in cyberspace. Therefore, the question of
whether lawyers can give such advice and simultaneously disclaim
any responsibility for its accuracy must be considered.
117. See Sandra E. Purnell, Comment, The Attorney as Mediator—Inherent Conflict of In-
terest?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986, 1010 (1985) (“No bright line can be drawn between giving ad-
vice and providing impartial information.”).
118. The possibility that specific legal advice given online could create an attorney-client
relationship has been addressed by a few bar opinions. See Ill. St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 96-10 (1997)
(“[L]awyers participating in chat groups or other on-line services that could involve offering
personalized legal advice to anyone who happens to be connected to the service should be
mindful that the recipients of such advice are the lawyer’s clients, with the benefits and burdens
of that relationship”); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (1998) (cautioning
that an attorney’s responding to a question about a class action in an online discussion group
could create an attorney-client relationship if the layperson reasonably believed it to be legal
advice). For further discussion, see infra Part III.E.
119. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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C. The Lawyer Fails to Manifest Lack of Consent, and the Lawyer
Knows or Reasonably Should Know That the Person Reasonably
Relies on the Lawyer to Provide the Services
The Restatement identifies an alternative way of creating an at-
torney-client relationship in the face of a request for legal services,
one derived from the theory of promissory estoppel.120 Two prongs
must be satisfied. First, the lawyer must fail to manifest a lack of con-
sent to the creation of a professional relationship.121 Second, the law-
yer must know or reasonably should know that the person is rea-
sonably relying on the lawyer to perform the services.122
Togstad can also be seen as an example of this method of creat-
ing an attorney-client relationship. In Togstad, attorney Miller failed
to make clear to Mrs. Togstad that he did not intend to act as her at-
torney and to advise her about her malpractice claim.123 Moreover,
because he gave her an assessment of the merits of her claim and
made representations that he would take additional steps on her be-
half,124 he reasonably should have known that she reasonably was re-
lying on him to determine whether she had a case that was worth pur-
suing.125 Although such cases are uncommon, there are situations in
which courts have found sufficient evidence to warrant consideration
of whether an attorney-client relationship was created by a lawyer’s
failure to disclaim such a relationship in the face of reasonable reli-
ance by the putative client.126
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979) (stating that if the prom-
isee reasonably relies on a promise, the promise is binding “if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise”). Although commentators differ as to whether the resulting li-
ability of the lawyer is the product of an actual attorney-client relationship, as the Restatement
apparently assumes, or whether it is the court that imposes the obligations of an attorney-client
relationship even where none has been created, the effect is the same in either scenario. For a
modern critique of the concept of promissory estoppel, see Sidney DeLong, The New Require-
ment of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 943.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
122. See id. (stating that “the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action” by the
promisee).
123. See Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980).
124. See id. at 690.
125. See id. at 693.
126. See, e.g., Van Brode Group, Inc. v. Bowditch & Dewey, 633 N.E.2d 424, 428-29 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994) (stating that attorneys have a fiduciary duty toward nonclients who the attorney
knows will rely on services rendered); Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151, 157 (Tex. App.
1989) (holding that if an attorney is aware or should be aware that her conduct could lead a
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A similar scenario easily could arise in an online exchange, as in
the Dear Esquire exchange.127 A lawyer could give specific legal ad-
vice in response to an online query without indicating that she did not
wish to undertake a full-fledged representation. At the same time,
the nature of the communication could give the lawyer either actual
or constructive knowledge that the questioner intends to rely on the
advice or is otherwise depending on the lawyer to protect his legal in-
terests. Such a situation would meet the requirements of the Restate-
ment, and could thereby result in liability for an unwary lawyer.
Many have assumed that the simple solution to this problem
would be for lawyers to disclaim any intent to create an attorney-
client relationship. Theoretically, such disclaimers would defeat both
prongs of the Restatement definition, as they would simultaneously
manifest a lack of consent of the lawyer and render any reliance by
the questioner unreasonable. In the alternative, a disclaimer that did
not defeat the formation of an attorney-client relationship might
nonetheless serve to limit liability by limiting the scope of representa-
tion. I consider each of these possibilities in turn.
1. Using Disclaimers to Avoid Attorney-Client Relationships.
Not surprisingly, most attorneys include some type of disclaimer in
their responses to questions or on their websites, some of which we
examined above.128 Indeed, much of the legal advice-giving activity
online seems to hinge on the belief that blanket use of disclaimers
will protect lawyers against all risks associated with their conduct.
Many commentators have advocated the use of disclaimers, without
looking more closely at whether they would be legally effective
against a private malpractice claim or would ward off disciplinary ac-
tion.129
                                                                                                                                     
reasonable person to believe that she was being represented by the attorney, a duty arises for
the attorney to advise the client that she is not representing the client). See generally John F.
Sutton, Jr., The Lawyer’s Fiduciary Liabilities to Third Parties, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1056-
58 (1996) (discussing the factual issue of whether the attorney-client relationship arises from
particular conduct).
127. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Castellano, supra note 27, at 1 (noting the advice of several experts and expe-
rienced attorneys that lawyers employ disclaimers); Hunt, supra note 27, at 561-64 (advocating
blanket use of disclaimers). It might also be argued that no disclaimer is ever necessary online
because it is per se unreasonable for anyone to rely on legal advice that she obtains in cyber-
space. As activity in cyberspace becomes increasingly common, it is unlikely that such an ar-
gument would prove persuasive.
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The answer to whether an attorney-client relationship may be
avoided by way of disclaimer may not be as obvious as it appears at
first glance. There are three possible approaches to this question: (1)
an attorney may always disclaim the creation of a relationship; (2) an
attorney may never disclaim the creation of a relationship; and (3)
the effectiveness of disclaimers depends on the conduct of the lawyer
and the reasonable expectations of the putative client.
The assertion that any disclaimer of the intent to create an attor-
ney-client relationship would always be effective has some force, as it
is consistent with the traditional understanding of the attorney-client
relationship as one of contract. Case law permits lawyers expressly to
avoid creating professional relationships,130 and ethical rules require
lawyers to make clear in ambiguous situations whether they intend to
undertake a representation.131 Ordinarily, a lawyer need not enter
130. See, e.g., Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp. 841, 846 (M.D. Ala. 1992):
If, for example, the attorney has made it clear to the would-be client that there is no
attorney-client relationship and if the evidence further reflects that the would-be cli-
ent should have known that the relationship had not advanced to the point at which
it could be deemed a representation, then there would be no attorney-client relation-
ship despite the would-be client’s subjective belief.
See also State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117, 121 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (holding that when a lawyer
told a potential client in an initial telephone call that he would not represent him, the content
of the telephone call was not protected by attorney-client privilege, either because no attorney-
client relationship arose or because it was terminated by disclaimer prior to the incriminating
statements made by the putative client); Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71, 75 (Wash. 1992) (en banc)
(holding that a client’s subjective belief does not govern “unless it is reasonably formed based
on the attending circumstances, including the attorney’s words or actions,” and that the client
must show that the lawyer “acted inconsistently” with disclaimers of representation). In the
context of real estate transactions, one court has noted that “‘a simple clause in the agreement
stating that it was prepared by the attorney for the opposite party acting solely on behalf of that
party’s interest, and advising the other parties to seek independent legal counsel to protect
their own interests’” could avoid later claims of justifiable reliance. Hacker v. Holland, 570
N.E.2d 951, 956 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Fox v. Pollack, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532, 534 n.2
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)). Disclaimers have also been advocated to avoid third-party liability
for opinion letters. See Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Jackson, Brouilette, Pohl & Kirley,
P.C., 912 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). See generally John H. Bauman, A Sense of
Duty: Regulation of Lawyer Responsibility to Third Parties by the Tort System, 37 S. TEX. L.
REV. 995, 1013-14 (1996) (discussing courts’ treatment of lawyer disclaimers limiting the appli-
cation of communication).
131. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1998):
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands
the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct
the misunderstanding.
LANCTOT TO PRINTER 11/30/99 2:56 PM
188 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:147
into a representation to which she does not consent, and any expres-
sion of non-consent should suffice to defeat a subsequent claim that a
relationship was created, particularly since the burden of proof of the
existence of the relationship ordinarily rests with the putative cli-
ent.132 Under this view, the fact that legal advice is given in tandem
with a disclaimer is largely irrelevant. In the employment context, for
example, courts have been willing to give legal effect to disclaimers
that appear in employee handbooks, even when the conduct of the
employer is inconsistent with the disclaimer.133 Moreover, as I discuss
in Part III, various bar opinions have either recommended or re-
quired that lawyers disclaim the creation of attorney-client relation-
ships when they give legal advice in nontraditional contexts.134
                                                                                                                                     
See also id. Rule 1.13(d) (“In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when it is apparent that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents
with whom the lawyer is dealing.”). See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Privity Re-
quirement Reconsidered, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 967, 988-89 (1996) (noting that under strict privity
there would be no liability for negligent advice to a corporate constituent, but there could be an
issue of fact as to whether the constituent reasonably believed himself to be represented by the
corporate lawyer).
132. See Veit v. Anderson, 428 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
existence of an attorney-client relationship was a question of fact to be proven by the plaintiff
at trial).
133. Early employee handbook cases encouraged employers to limit their liability by using
disclaimers. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257, 1265 (N.J. 1985) (holding that
handbook provisions are binding on an employer “unless the language contained in the manual
were such that no one could reasonably have thought it was intended to create legally binding
obligations”). See generally Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effective
Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 365 (1989) (discussing
effective ways to use disclaimers to define the terms of an employment relationship). Courts
have tended to uphold such disclaimers even when the employees are legally unsophisticated.
See DeLong, supra note 120, at 1010-11 (asserting that although employees are rarely experi-
enced business persons represented by attorneys, disclaimers usually prevent a later assertion
of promissory estoppel). The voluminous case law is collected in George L. Blum, Annotation,
Effectiveness of Employer’s Disclaimer of Representations in Personnel Manual or Employee
Handbook Altering At-Will Employment Relationships, 17 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994). In other situa-
tions, ambiguity or conduct inconsistent with the terms of the disclaimer has rendered the dis-
claimer ineffective. See, e.g., McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 74 F.3d 1017, 1022 (10th Cir.
1996) (stating that an effective disclaimer must be “conspicuous and clear”); Mecier v. Branon,
930 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Vt. 1996) (ruling that disclaimers must be evaluated in the context of
other circumstances bearing on the agreement); Wlasiuk v. Whirlpool Corp., 914 P.2d 102, 111
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a jury could find that an employee reasonably relied upon
promises relating to treatment in specific situations).
134. See, e.g., Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 70-30 (1970) (limiting an at-
torney’s question-answer column in a newspaper to general questions answered in a “lecture
tone” and prohibiting specific answers to individual legal questions);  Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct, Op. 90-46 (1991) (requiring disclaimers in radio announcements providing
background information on the justice system); Md. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 85-13
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A recent example of an apparently effective disclaimer is dis-
cussed in People v. Gionis,135 in which a former client made incrimi-
nating statements to a lawyer, who gave him gratuitous personal and
legal advice. The court rejected a later attempt to suppress the state-
ments as subject to the attorney-client privilege, on the grounds that
the parties no longer had a professional relationship, that the conver-
sation did not touch on legal matters, and that the lawyer had ex-
pressly refused to represent the former client.136 The concurrence
noted the difficulty for a layperson when the lawyer’s conduct in giv-
ing advice is inconsistent with the lawyer’s disclaimer: “‘In view of
the frequency with which some persons seek to obtain informally and
gratuitously valuable legal advice, and the lamentable frequency with
which attorneys submit to such an imposition . . . it is often difficult to
determine whether the consultation is a professional one, within the
                                                                                                                                     
(1984) (authorizing an attorney to give general advice on a five-minute weekly radio program if
the audience is cautioned to seek legal advice as warranted and the attorney’s name is not dis-
closed); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1994-95/3 (1995) (requiring a radio program in
which attorneys provide general answers to factual situations provided by callers to include an
“extensive disclaimer, broadcast more frequently than at the beginning and end of the pro-
gram”); N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 664 (1994) (requiring a lawyer giving
advice over the phone to inform the caller: (1) that some issues may not be appropriate for this
medium; (2) whether the advice is general or specifically tailored to the caller’s predicament;
(3) of arrangements in case further legal work is required; and (4) of limits on the representa-
tion); Or. St. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1994-137 n.2 (1994) (suggesting that an online
legal information service include a disclaimer to avoid consumer expectation of an attorney-
client relationship); Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 425 (1985) (advising that lawyers
educating the public should caution an audience not to attempt to solve problems on the basis
of information provided). Other opinions providing similar admonitions are Ala. St. Bar, Op.
87-141 (1987); id. Op. 86-27 (1986); Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 89-19 (1989);
id. Op. 89-4 (1989); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 91-50 (1992); id. Op. 89-
41 (1990); Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 92-06 (1992); Md. St. Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 82-60 (1982); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-93/11
(1993); N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 480 (1981); N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 625 (1992); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Disci-
pline, Op. 94-13 (1994); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 87-1
(1987); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 86-4 (undated); Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l Ethics
Comm., Op. 394 (1979); Utah St. Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 96-12 (1997); Va.
St. Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1642 (1995); id. Op. 1577 (1994); id. Op. 410
(1983); Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Prac. of L., Op. 185 (1995).
135. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 456 (Cal. 1995). Gionis is discussed in Dennis Michael Torrey, Note,
People v. Gionis: Beware of Gratuitous Advice, Attorneys May Testify Against a Business Ac-
quaintance or Friend, 18 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 97 (1996).
136. See Gionis, 40 Cal Rptr. 2d at 465. The result in Gionis seems inconsistent with tradi-
tional attorney-client privilege, in that the privilege has often been held to attach to prelimi-
nary conversations between lawyers and potential clients, even if those communications do not
result in a professional relationship. See Torrey, supra note 135, at 108-09.
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privilege.’”137 Nonetheless, it is well settled that the mere subjective
expectation of a putative client will not suffice to create an attorney-
client relationship where none was intended by the attorney.138
The courts are unlikely to treat disclaimers as a magic shield for
online lawyers, however. Indeed, if disclaimers could be so easily
utilized, a lawyer could avoid the prospect of malpractice liability, or
even the reach of most ethics rules, simply by expressly disclaiming
the intent to create an attorney-client relationship with anyone.139
Lawyers could announce at the beginning of every office visit that
they do not wish to enter into a professional relationship and that the
information they are giving is not really legal advice, a practice that
has been condemned by at least one bar opinion.140 To take an ex-
137. Gionis, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2303, at 584 (McNaughton ed. 1961)).
138. See Developments in the Law, supra note 116, at 1323 (citing Levin v. Ripple Twist
Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 883-84 (E.D. Pa. 1976)):
If, for example, the attorney has made it clear to the party that there would be no
representation and if the court is convinced that the party should have known that
the relationship had not advanced to the point at which it could be deemed a ‘repre-
sentation,’ a court may find that there was no attorney-client relationship despite the
party’s subjective belief.
See also In re Weidner, 801 P.2d 828, 837 (Or. 1990) (per curiam) (“The evidence must show
that the lawyer understood or should have understood that the relationship existed, or acted as
though the lawyer was providing professional assistance or advice on behalf of the putative cli-
ent.”). Among the factors to be considered is the putative client’s subjective intention or expec-
tation, but there are numerous others:
evidence of objective facts on which a reasonable person would rely as supporting
existence of that intent, evidence placing a lawyer on notice that the putative client
had that intent, evidence that the lawyer shared the client’s subjective intention to
form a relationship, or evidence that the lawyer acted in a way that would induce a
reasonable person in the client’s position to rely on the lawyer’s professional advice.
Id. at 837.
139. Although one might argue that a lawyer who pursued this approach would soon have
no clients, we should recall that many people of moderate means might feel that they have no
recourse but to accept even such a limited promise of help from a lawyer.
140. See N.C. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 244 (1996). The opinion stated that it was
impermissible for a lawyer to begin every free initial consultation by having the prospective
client sign an intake sheet that read:
It is acknowledged that my appointment is for a free office consultation. No legal ad-
vice will be given. I will be provided only general information concerning North
Carolina laws. Upon a request, a fee will be quoted for legal representation. I under-
stand that no attorney-client privilege will exist unless and until I pay this firm to
represent me and that this free consultation will not preclude my spouse from em-
ploying Attorney X or any other attorney with XYZ Law Firm.
Id.
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treme example, a lawyer who accepted a retainer and filed a com-
plaint in court on behalf of a person could hardly avoid subsequent
malpractice liability by asserting that she had expressly disclaimed
the intent to create an attorney-client relationship, even if she had
such a disclaimer in writing.141 The lawyer’s actions would speak
louder than the lawyer’s words. At some point, the conduct of the
lawyer would be so inconsistent with the disclaimer of a professional
relationship that the disclaimer would be treated as ineffective.
One could also take the opposite position and claim that an at-
torney may never avoid the creation of an attorney-client relation-
ship by way of disclaimer. The rationale for such a rule would be that
it is the conduct of the lawyer and the expectations of the client that
should govern, rather than the boilerplate terms of some written
warning. If the lawyer purports to provide legal services to an indi-
vidual, that action triggers professional obligations regardless of
whether the lawyer has sought to avoid them. One might also argue
that the inequality of knowledge and bargaining power between law-
yers and putative clients suggests that disclaimers should be treated
as contracts of adhesion.142 Togstad again is the paradigm. There the
lawyer expressly told the would-be client that he did not wish to rep-
resent her, but at the same time he gave her legal advice on which she
justifiably relied.143 In other settings, the courts have suggested that
conduct inconsistent with the lawyer’s overt denial of an intent to
create an attorney-client relationship may override the disclaimer,144
141. This scenario arguably would implicate Model Rule 1.8(h), which precludes agree-
ments that prospectively limit malpractice liability to a client unless permitted by law and un-
less the client is independently represented by counsel. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1998). Model Rule 1.8(h) presupposes the existence of an attorney-
client relationship and thus is analytically distinct from the hypothetical under discussion, in
which the lawyer attempts to avoid at the outset the creation of a relationship that might bring
with it potential malpractice liability. See id.
142. See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18 (Richard A. Lord
ed., 4th ed. 1990) (outlining the law pertaining to unconscionable agreements).
143. See Togstad v. Veseley, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980).
144. For example, in Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 955-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the
court remanded on the issue of whether the seller in a real estate transaction had justifiably
relied on representations by the purchaser’s attorney: “An attorney has in effect consented to
the establishment of an attorney-client relationship if there is ‘proof of detrimental reliance,
when the person seeking legal services reasonably relies on the attorney to provide them and
the attorney, aware of such reliance, does nothing to negate it.’” Id. at 956 (quoting Kurtenbach
v. Tekippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977)). In contrast, a concurring judge argued that no at-
torney-client relationship was created by promissory estoppel because “many duties, responsi-
bilities and consequences attach to a true attorney-client relationship which do not come into
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especially since these principles will be construed against the law-
yer.145 Further, a variety of bar opinions have taken the position that
an attorney-client relationship, once created, cannot be disclaimed.146
                                                                                                                                     
play with regard to the status of the parties as defined by a promissory estoppel situation.” Id.
at 959 (Sullivan, J., concurring); see also Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71, 77 (Wash. 1992) (holding
that even though a lawyer specifically disclaimed any relationship with third parties, the law-
yer’s giving of legal advice raised a material fact as to whether the lawyer is liable for negli-
gence: “Under the extreme facts of this case, we hold simply that an attorney should advise the
unrepresented party to seek independent counsel before the attorney discusses the transaction
with that party.”); cf. Williams v. Fortson, Bentley & Griffin, 441 S.E.2d 686, 687 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (observing that a lawyer’s conduct at a real estate closing was inconsistent with a signed
disclaimer of the attorney-client relationship but still finding no relationship). In a different
context, the Iowa Supreme Court held that an attorney who surreptitiously tape-recorded an
individual for law enforcement purposes while expressly advising him to obtain individual
counsel and disclaiming any attorney-client relationship was nevertheless subject to bar disci-
pline for deceit: “That the trickery occurred outside the strict bounds of an attorney-client rela-
tionship is, we think, of only passing significance.” Committee on Prof’l Ethics and Conduct of
the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1992).
145. See Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp. 841, 846 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (“[T]he test
for determining the existence of this fiduciary relationship is a subjective one and hinges upon
the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention is
to seek professional legal advice.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Bennett Silver-
shein Assocs. v. Furman, 776 F. Supp. 800, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Thus, although doubts should
be resolved in favor of disqualification, the party seeking disqualification must carry a heavy
burden and must meet a high standard of proof before a lawyer is disqualified.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Johore Inv. Co., 49 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1985) (“If there is a doubt as to the existence of an asserted conflict of interest, the conflict
should be resolved in favor of disqualification.”); Reardon v. Marlayne, 416 A.2d 852, 858 (N.J.
1980) (“If there be any doubt as to the propriety of an attorney’s representation of a client,
such doubt must be resolved in favor of disqualification.”); Seeley v. Seeley, 514 N.Y.S.2d 110,
112 (App. Div. 1987) (noting the “settled principle that doubts as to the existence of a conflict
of interest must be resolved in favor of disqualification so as to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety”); Bruce L. Silverstein, Attorney Disqualification for a Conflict of Interest in Fed-
eral Civil Litigation: A Confusing Body of Law in Need of Organization, 30 VILL. L. REV. 463,
467 (1985) (discussing the presumption of “disclosed confidences” and the presumption of
“shared confidences” as two principles often applied by courts in determining whether to dis-
qualify a challenged attorney for a conflict of interest); Purnell, supra note 117, at 993-95 (de-
scribing how a policy of protecting clients has led courts to focus on whether a plaintiff had a
reasonable belief that an attorney-client relationship had been created); see also Perschbacher
& Perschbacher, supra note 80, at 704 (“It is the lawyer who is in the best position to set the
tone for an initial meeting . . . . The lawyer knows the ethical rules; the lawyer has the legal
background enabling him to anticipate the possible scenarios.”).
146. See, e.g., Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 93-8 (1993) (“A law-
yer operating a ‘900’ pay-for-information telephone number by which callers are given legal
information . . . enters into a lawyer-client relationship with the caller and may not avoid it by
disclaimer.”); N.J. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Unauthorized Prac., Op. 17 (1994) (opining that once an
attorney decides to render legal advice to a client or perspective client through a 900 number,
an attorney ought not to be able to avoid malpractice liability by claiming that no attorney-
client relationship exists); Utah St. Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 96-12 (1997)
(“[I]f legal advice is sought from an attorney, if the advice sought is pertinent to the attorney’s
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The truth, as usual, probably lies somewhere between these
two extremes. Whether a lawyer will be able to rely on a disclaimer
will hinge on the nature of the request for advice, the conduct of the
lawyer in response to the request, and the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the disclaimer. Having taken the safe middle course, how-
ever, I hasten to add that I expect that neither courts nor bar discipli-
nary authorities are likely to be sympathetic to cyberspace attorneys
who rely on disclaimers as all-purpose shields. In my view, if the legal
advice given is specifically tailored to the factual circumstances pre-
sented, that conduct will suffice to create an attorney-client relation-
ship, regardless of what boilerplate disclaimers the lawyer attaches to
the advice. An online disclaimer is more placebo than panacea.
Several factors lead me to this conclusion. The first factor is the
nature of the lawyer’s conduct. Giving legal advice in response to a
particularized inquiry is at the heart of the practice of law.147 A ques-
tioner is far more likely to rely on advice that is carefully tailored to
his unique factual situation, and so the more detailed the response,
the more reasonable it would be for a layperson to rely on the advice
given.148 Second, the nature of disclaimers in cyberspace may create
difficulties in enforcing them, as they may easily be ignored or
avoided with the inadvertent click of a mouse. Even if lawyers use
devices that require assent to a disclaimer before the questioner can
proceed, such conduct still presents difficulties in light of the courts’
traditional protectiveness of laypeople in transactions with attorneys.
Courts ordinarily will examine the facts surrounding the alleged crea-
tion of a professional relationship from the reasonable perspective of
the putative client.149 Even in the face of elaborate written disclaim-
ers, courts may well find it reasonable for laypeople to treat such dis-
claimers as nothing more than “legalese,” particularly if the conduct
of the attorney is inconsistent with the disclaimer.150 In addition, un-
happy online clients are likely to assert traditional contract chal-
lenges, arguing that these disclaimers are unconscionable contracts of
                                                                                                                                     
profession, and if the attorney gives the advice for which fees will be charged, an attorney/client
relationship is created that cannot be disclaimed by the attorney.”).
147. See supra note 58.
148. See Steimer, supra note 27, at 347-48 (stating that consideration of online questioners
as clients would depend on a court’s willingness to infer a contractual relationship, which “de-
pends in part on the extensiveness of the advice sought and the fact-intensiveness of the answer
given by the attorney”).
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
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adhesion, that they should be read narrowly because they purport to
exculpate lawyers from tort liability, or that they are inconsistent
with the administration of justice.151 Indeed, even if disclaimers in
general were ultimately held to be permissible by the courts, the spe-
cifics of many online disclaimers might well be insufficient to guard
against liability.152
Perhaps the most persuasive consideration is the legal profes-
sion’s historical opposition to legal advice-giving in nontraditional
contexts, as well as its general unwillingness to endorse the blanket
use of disclaimers to guard against the risks arising from lawyers’
giving specific legal advice to strangers. I address this history in Parts
II and III.
2. Using Disclaimers to Limit the Scope of Representation. Even
if a disclaimer does not prevent formation of an attorney-client
relationship, it may still serve a purpose. Suppose that an online
client like Mrs. Togstad sues her cyberlawyer for negligent advice,
and further assume that a court would find that the online disclaimer
did not suffice to defeat the formation of an attorney-client
relationship. The online lawyer might argue in the alternative that
the disclaimer serves as a limitation of the objectives of the
representation, as described in section 30 of the Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers, entitled “Limitation of Client or
Lawyer Duties”: “Subject to other requirements stated in this
Restatement, a client and lawyer may agree to limit a duty that a
lawyer would otherwise owe to the client if: (a) the client is
adequately informed and consents; and (b) the terms of the limitation
are reasonable in the circumstances.”153 Similarly, Model Rule 1.2(c)
provides: “A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if
151. See generally WILLISTON, supra note 142, § 18 (discussing unconscionable agree-
ments); id. § 19:21 (discussing strict construction of exculpatory contracts); id. § 12 (discussing
the voiding of contracts as against public policy); WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 9.1 (discussing
regulation of lawyer-client contracts).
152. Among the many potential challenges to the substance of the disclaimers is that they
are inherently false and misleading under Model Rule 7.1, that they constitute prospective
waivers of malpractice liability without the necessary safeguards required by Model Rule
1.8(h), and that they impermissibly limit the scope and objectives of the representation by
eradicating the duty of competence, violating Model Rules 1.2 and 1.3. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 7.1 (1998).
153. RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, § 30(1).
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the client consents after consultation.”154 The term “consultation” in
the Model Rules means “communication of information reasonably
sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the
matter in question.”155
The Restatement provides as an illustration of limited representa-
tion a situation in which a legal clinic provides thirty-minute reviews
of tax returns for a small fee.156 The clinic explains at the outset that
“the review may fail to find important tax matters” and secures in
advance the client’s waiver of the right to a complete evaluation
without paying additional fees.157 Such a provision would be permissi-
ble, according to the Restatement, because “[t]he client’s consent is
free and adequately informed, and clients gain the benefit of an inex-
pensive but expert tax review of a matter that otherwise might well
receive no expert review at all.”158 Similarly, a disclaimer that limited
the online lawyer’s obligations to providing a competent legal re-
sponse, without further requiring the lawyer to take steps to protect
the client’s interest, arguably could be consistent with these provi-
sions, if the circumstances of the exchange reflected informed con-
sent.
The nature of these online exchanges, however, makes it less
likely that the notion of limited representation, at least as it is cur-
rently understood, would suffice to protect online lawyers against
subsequent litigation. First, there are core attributes of the attorney-
client relationship, such as basic competency, that cannot be bar-
gained away.159 The comment to Model Rule 1.2 expressly states: “An
agreement concerning the scope of representation must accord with
the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. Thus, the client
may not be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to
violate Rule 1.1 . . . .”160 Second, there are difficulties inherent in
crafting a disclaimer that will adequately disclose all duties that are
owed and then disclaimed. Certainly the typical online disclaimer
154. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c) (1998).
155. Id. Terminology.
156. See RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, § 30 illus. 2.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 54, at 487 (“The Rule and Comment [to 1.2] thus pre-
clude an agreement limiting the scope of representation to a lawyer’s off-the-cuff opinion based
on no research or investigation, such as the advice provided by attorney Miller in Togstad.”).
160. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1998).
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posted today would not meet even the most liberal definition of “in-
formed consent” contemplated by the Restatement.161 Third, and per-
haps most important, the courts may be less sympathetic to attempts
to avoid malpractice liability than the drafters of the Restatement sec-
tion.162 In Nichols v. Keller,163 for example, a California court held that
a lawyer may be required to volunteer advice necessary to further the
client’s objectives involving matters beyond the scope of the relation-
ship if the failure to consider such advice could result in a foreseeable
adverse consequence to the client.164 The policy ramifications of per-
mitting sharp limitations on the nature of attorney-client relation-
ships have yet to be explored, but even the Restatement notes the risk
that “[i]n the long run . . . a restriction could become a standard prac-
tice that constricts the rights of clients without compensating bene-
fits.”165
I shall return to the concept of “limited representation” at the
end of this Article, where I consider whether it should be used as a
possible solution to the dilemma currently posed by online advice-
giving. For the moment, however, it is enough to say that the princi-
ple has a number of shortcomings that make it less than a blanket
remedy for lawyers in cyberspace. Let us now turn to another possi-
ble issue in this context—the question of obligations to nonclients, ei-
ther as prospective clients or as third parties.
161. The comment to section 30 of the Restatement notes that an effective limitation on a
lawyer’s duty to a client must meet the following five requirements: (1) it must inform the client
of the problems a limitation might entail; (2) it must be construed from the perspective of the
reasonable client; (3) the fee charged by the lawyer must remain reasonable in view of the lim-
ited representation; (4) any change made an unreasonably long time after the representation
begins must meet the more stringent tests of § 29A(1) for post-inception agreements or modifi-
cations; and (5) the terms of the limitation must in all events be reasonable in the circum-
stances. See RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, § 30 cmt. c. The com-
ment further notes: “For . . . clients [other than those sophisticated in such waivers], the re-
quirement [of reasonableness] is met if, in addition to informed consent, the benefits suppos-
edly obtained by the waiver . . . could reasonably be considered to outweigh the potential risk
posed by the limitation.” Id. § 30 cmt. c.
162. Indeed, the comment to section 30 identifies the protectionist concern that has often
motivated the courts: “Clients unsophisticated in such limitations may well have difficulty un-
derstanding important implications of limiting a lawyer’s duty. A lawyer who will benefit from
the limitation cannot always be trusted to explain its costs and benefits fairly.” RESTATEMENT
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, § 30 cmt. b.
163. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
164. See id. at 608.
165. RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, §30 cmt. b.
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D. Alternative Theories of Liability
1. Duties to Prospective Clients. I believe that the attorney-
client model is the most appropriate one to use in online advice-
giving. However, even if that model were not applicable, the lawyer
might still owe a variety of obligations to the questioner. Duties to
prospective clients have been identified in a variety of contexts.
Section 27 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
states: “When a person discusses with a lawyer the possibility of their
forming a client-lawyer relationship for a matter or matters, and no
such relationship arises, the lawyer must . . . use reasonable care to
the extent the lawyer gives the person legal advice or provides other
legal services for the person.”166 That section suggests that a lawyer
could still be liable for negligent advice given to the prospective
client, even if the circumstances do not give rise to an attorney-client
relationship. The Committee on Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) has also cautioned about
obligations of confidentiality in this context.167 In addition, the online
exchange could generate potential conflicts of interest for the lawyer,
even if the exchange did not ripen into an attorney-client
relationship.
2. Obligations to Nonclient Third Parties. One last potential
source of liability should be considered—duties to third parties.
Section 26 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
specifically contemplates that in certain circumstances lawyers may
owe a variety of duties to nonclients, including duties of maintaining
confidentiality,168 avoiding conflicts of interest,169 and providing
competent advice.170 The comment to section 26 notes that obligations
to nonclients can arise even when the lawyer has refused to accept
representation.171
The issue of third-party liability has received much attention in
recent years, and the arguments about the scope of this liability will
166. Id. § 27.
167. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358
(1990).
168. See RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1), supra note 60, §§ 27, 112.
169. See id. § 213.
170. See id. § 112.
171. See id. § 26 cmt. e, illus. 2.
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not be rehearsed here.172 At best, third-party liability might be the
appropriate prism through which to analyze a malpractice suit
brought by someone who had read a posting by a lawyer in response
to someone else’s query and had chosen to rely upon it. But in the
situation we are considering here, where there is a direct interaction
between the lawyer and the person seeking legal advice, the body of
law governing third-party liability adds little to the analysis,173 other
than to suggest the general fluidity of the concept of attorney-client
relationships and the emerging trend in the courts to expand attorney
liability.174
II. “SWING-TIME JUSTICE”: REGULATING RADIO COURTS IN THE
1930S
The foregoing review of various bodies of substantive law indi-
cates the strong possibility that a lawyer who gives legal advice in re-
sponse to a lay request may create, however inadvertently, an attor-
ney-client relationship if the circumstances create a reasonable ex-
pectation in the requester. Alternatively, the lawyer may incur obli-
gations under a variety of other theories. Nevertheless, the case law is
neither extensive nor definitive. In order to flesh out the picture
more fully, we must also consider the approach of the bar to the giv-
ing of legal advice in nontraditional settings. Examining the historical
record will show that giving legal advice has been viewed as a hall-
mark of the attorney-client relationship and that the bar has been dis-
tinctly hostile to lawyers’ answering lay questions about specific legal
issues, regardless of the medium in which these responses occur.
172. For a good overview, see generally Symposium, The Lawyer’s Duties and Liabilities to
Third Parties, 37 SO. TEX. L. REV. 927 (1996).
173. Two student notes addressing the issue of online legal advice have focused in part on
third-party liability. See Hunt, supra note 27, at 553; Steimer, supra note 27, at 332. Steimer’s
note further suggests that liability for negligent legal advice online could stem from section 552
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that “[o]ne who, in the course of his busi-
ness, profession, or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justi-
fiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care . . . .” Without en-
tering into an extensive critique of these approaches, I simply observe that they do not ade-
quately address the threshold issue of whether an attorney-client relationship is created by
these exchanges, which would make these more tenuous arguments about third-party liability
unnecessary.
174. For an excellent overview, see Moore, supra note 111, at 659.
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Since the 1930s, the organized bar has attempted to regulate
the giving of legal advice in a variety of different contexts: radio talk
shows, newspaper advice columns, seminars, and 900-number tele-
phone lines.175 As this part and the next will show, the bar has at-
tempted to distinguish between the transmission of general legal
knowledge, which it has viewed as permissible, and the presentation
of specific legal advice tailored to an individual’s particular problem,
which it generally has tried to prohibit.
For a number of reasons, I begin this historical survey with the
story of the Good Will Court. Just as computer technology has cre-
ated new concerns about advice-giving by lawyers, so the emergence
of radio as a means of mass communication in the 1930s generated a
new vehicle for dispensing legal advice—the “radio court,” in which
lawyers and judges would hear the legal problems of ordinary people
and attempt to solve them. Moreover, radio courts emerged during a
time of widespread economic hardship, and many perceived that the
legal needs of ordinary citizens were not being met. But the bar has
never been particularly sympathetic to novel ways of providing basic
legal advice. Although many laypeople viewed radio courts as a valu-
able educational service, the organized bar of the 1930s was less san-
guine about the prospect of “swing-time justice.”176 Within a year of
the program’s debut, the controversy generated by the Good Will
Court produced a flurry of bar opinions, revisions of ethical rules, and
finally a court challenge, bringing this innovation to an ignominious
conclusion that even the regular use of disclaimers at the beginning
and end of each program could not avoid. The saga of the Good Will
Court, long lost in obscurity, stands as a warning for lawyers seeking
to make innovative use of new communications media because it re-
flects the pattern of opposition to such nontraditional methods of
175. Although past regulatory efforts by the bar can be instructive, it is important to keep
in mind that some of the opposition to the giving of legal advice in nontraditional settings
stemmed from the traditional ban on lawyer advertising that remained at the core of discipli-
nary activities until the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977). See WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 14.2.2, at 777 n.26 (“The commonly accepted estimate
is that half of the ABA’s ethics opinions through the late 1960’s dealt with advertising and re-
lated issues.”); infra notes 257-258 and accompanying text (discussing Bates). Nevertheless, the
fact that many bar opinions have continued to criticize such activities as they have arisen in
such recent contexts as 900 telephone numbers suggests that past opposition to giving legal ad-
vice this way cannot simply be dismissed as outdated objections to lawyer self-promotion.
176. In re Blake, 17 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (sharply criticizing the phenomenon
of radio courts).
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dispensing legal advice that the organized bar has manifested for the
last sixty years.
Although the 1930s proved to be a difficult time for lawyers eco-
nomically, as for the rest of the country,177 the ABA emerged as a
powerful professional organization during this same period.178 During
the Depression, the organized bar became increasingly concerned
with stamping out the unauthorized practice of law,179 a focus linked
in no small way to the economic difficulties lawyers were experienc-
ing.180 At the same time, the new medium of radio appeared to pose a
threat to the legal profession because it offered a new method of fur-
nishing legal information to a mass audience.
Radio’s emergence as a mass medium began in earnest in the
late 1920s with the evolution of network broadcasting.181 As early as
177. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 158-59 (1976) (stating that in 1933
nearly half of Manhattan lawyers had annual salaries below subsistence level).
178. In 1910, the ABA had 3690 members, about 3% of all lawyers in the United States. By
1930, the ABA had about 27,000 members, comprising about 18% of all lawyers in the country.
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 289
(1950).
179. The ABA established its Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee in 1930. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 15.1.1, at 825. A contemporaneous article in the ABA Journal ex-
plains: “The extent to which such a practice had recently grown was such as to cause the Com-
mittee to believe that a special committee was needed to give it attention.” Committee on Un-
authorized Practice Created, 16 A.B.A. J. 687, 687 (1930). The ABA soon sponsored publica-
tion of a handbook on unauthorized practice. See FREDERICK C. HICKS & ELLIOTT R. KATZ,
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN (1934).
During the 20-year period between 1920 and 1940, the number and reach of state regulations
also expanded dramatically:
[T]he state statute books grew to include an impressive list of bans on the unlicensed
activity of real estate brokers, tax adjusters, collection agents, claims adjusters, nota-
ries, conveyancers, probate attorneys, law students, law clerks, and legal aid associa-
tions, as well as of banks, trust companies, title companies, collection agencies, mer-
cantile associations, insurance companies, and incorporated legal aid societies.
HURST, supra note 178, at 320-21; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Mo-
nopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1981) (noting that by 1938 over 400 state and local bar associations had
established committees similar to the ABA Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law).
For a general overview of the regulation of unauthorized practice of law, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 4 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 2)]
180. See HURST, supra note 178, at 323 (suggesting that the movement was “born more of
an emotional desire to do something in the face of social catastrophe, than out of any deeply
reasoned analysis”).
181. For good overviews of the history of radio broadcasting, see generally 1 ERIK
BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES TO
1933 (1966); 2 ERIK BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE
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1933, the ABA recognized the educational value of the new medium,
sponsoring its own radio series.182 The organized bar’s concern with
radio initially focused on the broadcasts of actual court proceedings,
particularly the sensational coverage of the 1935 trial of Bruno
Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh’s
son.183 In 1936, however, the creation of a new vehicle for dissemi-
nating legal advice over the airwaves sparked the attention of the or-
ganized bar. The focus of the legal profession’s wrath was a radio talk
show from New York City called the Good Will Court.
                                                                                                                                     
UNITED STATES 1933-53 (1968); J. FRED MACDONALD, DON’T TOUCH THAT DIAL!: RADIO
PROGRAMMING IN AMERICAN LIFE, 1920-1960 (1979).
182. The ABA had obtained free radio time from Columbia Broadcasting for a series of
weekly radio addresses by former ABA presidents and such legal luminaries as John Wigmore,
Karl Llewellyn, and Felix Frankfurter. See “The Lawyer and the Public” Is Title of Coming Ra-
dio Series, 19 A.B.A. J. 1, 1 (1933) (describing the radio series, the stated purpose of which was
“to acquaint the layman with the efforts being made by the bar to improve the administration
of justice and to show the great difficulties which lie in the way of this task”).
183. The ABA had begun to lobby for restrictions on radio broadcasts of court proceedings
even before the sensationalism surrounding the Hauptmann trial. On March 21, 1932, the
Committee on Professional Responsibility had issued Formal Opinion 67, noting that a recent
murder trial had been broadcast directly from the courtroom and stating that “[u]sing such a
trial for the entertainment of the public or for satisfying its curiosity shocks our sensibilities.”
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 67 (1932), reprinted in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 311
(1967 ed.) [hereinafter ABA OPINIONS]. At its 1932 Annual Meeting, the ABA adopted a
resolution decrying the broadcasting of judicial proceedings on the radio as a breach of deco-
rum because “the practice had attained such proportions throughout the country that it seemed
desirable to ask the Association to express itself in no uncertain terms.” See Broadcasting of
Judicial Proceedings from Court Rooms Condemned, 18 A.B.A. J. 762, 762 (1932). After the
Hauptmann trial, the ABA adopted Canon 35 as part of its Canons of Judicial Ethics, banning
cameras and microphones from courtrooms. See David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice:
Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35
ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 798 (1993) (linking the “circus-like and disruptive” presence of the media
at the Bruno Hauptmann trial to the subsequent enactment of Canon 35). As adopted on Sep-
tember 30, 1937, Canon 35 provided:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The tak-
ing of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses be-
tween sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated
to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving
his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in
the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 35, reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra, at 227. The ABA
amended Canon 35 in 1952 to include television coverage within its prohibition. See id.; see also
Harris, supra, at 798 n.103.
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The Good Will Court was the brain child of A.L. Alexander, a
former police reporter turned radio announcer.184 Alexander initially
sought out defendants in local courts to appear on his radio show,
and then found judges, and later lawyers as well, to give legal advice
on the air to the participants.185 Self-described as “a radio program
which brings the drama and human appeal of real legal cases told by
the people involved to real judges sitting unofficially,”186 the Good
Will Court quickly became “a sensation.”187 In the first year alone, the
Good Will Court reportedly received fourteen thousand cases from
the radio audience and presented thirty-two hundred of them to the
panel.188
To get a flavor of the appeal of the Good Will Court and to see
how closely it resembles online sites like Dear Esquire, consider the
184. See JOHN DUNNING, TUNE IN YESTERDAY: THE ULTIMATE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OLD-
TIME RADIO 1925-1976, at 241-42 (1976). Alexander is said to have been motivated by his
early experiences as a police reporter, where he had “seen first-hand the inequities of the legal
system.” Id. at 242. Another report asserts that Alexander’s inspiration came when he served as
an announcer for broadcasts by Tom Noonan, Bishop of Chinatown:
As announcer of that program Alexander watched the Sunday gatherings of down-
and-outers, the downcast and the hopeless, and out of it came the conviction that a
human interest program, conducted for the sole purpose of giving friendly aid, free
from the severe and sometimes terrifying atmosphere of the constituted courts would
be a boon to thousands, besides providing a vivid and convincing picture of the frail-
ties of some of our outmoded laws.
J. Arnold Farrer, Broadcasting—Good Will Courts, B. BULL. BOSTON B. ASS’N, Feb. 1937, at
12. It is not clear whether the Good Will Court was the first radio program of its type. One his-
torian records that a radio show called the True Story Court of Human Relations ran on the
NBC network in 1935, but he does not describe the nature of this program. See 2 BARNOUW,
supra note 181, at 109.
185. See DUNNING, supra note 184, at 242. Alexander first aired the program on March 31,
1935, on WMCA in New York City. See id. When his first program drew no response, Alexan-
der began to seek out defendants in city courts to ask them to discuss their problems on the air
anonymously. See id. He successfully obtained two New York judges, Jonah J. Goldstein and
Pelham St. George Bissell, who was President Judge of the New York City Municipal Division.
See id. More than 40 judges, participating in pairs, are said to have taken part in the Good Will
Court during its brief lifespan. See id. One member of each pair of judges was an expert on do-
mestic relations and the other an expert on civil litigation. See Court Drama Wins Network,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1936, § IX, at 10. For their services, the judges received a fee, which was
to be contributed to charity. See id.; Good Will Court Quits Broadcasts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1936, at 8.
186. Court Drama Wins Network, supra note 185, § IX, at 10.
187. DUNNING, supra note 184, at 242.
188. See Court Drama Wins Network, supra note 185, § IX, at 10. The numbers seem exag-
gerated at best, as they suggest that the Good Will Court considered more than 60 cases on
each weekly program.
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picture painted by Mitchell Dawson, a caustic critic of the program,
who also happened to be the chair of the Committee on Public Rela-
tions of the Chicago Bar Association:
“Judge, your honor, he only seems to be happy when he makes me
miserable. I don’t care for myself, but he beats the little girl . . . .”
“Your honor, I invested $1600 in a manufacturing business, but I
can’t get any accounting . . . .”
“I was married, your honor, and couldn’t get along with my mother-
in-law. She believed in spirits, and one night my husband accused me
of witch-craft . . . .”
“Your honor, judge, I married a girl out of a barroom. I tried to
make a good girl of her, but couldn’t and left her . . . .”
“Your honor, I’ve written a book. It’s fiction. It’s life. It’s a very
good book and I want to protect it . . . .”
“My wife ate lobster in a restaurant, your honor, and it made her ill.
We made a claim, but the insurance company turned us down . . . .”
One by one they parade before the microphone and tell their trou-
bles to a judge—two judges—who hold a pseudo court in a broad-
casting studio in New York City. A suave impresario marshals them,
keeps their recitals within bounds, and elicits advice from one of the
judges.189
The “suave impresario” was Alexander himself, who served as “me-
diator” in the presentation of cases to the judges.190
189. Mitchell Dawson, Good Will for Lawyers, 22 A.B.A. J. 862, 863 (1936). Dawson’s de-
scription of the proceedings appears to be reasonably accurate. In fact, an advertisement for
the Good Will Court that ran in the Sunday New York Times a week after its network premiere
included the following sample questions: “Shall I leave my husband?”; “Can my landlady turn
me into the street?”; and “Can my husband take my child from me?” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1936, § X, at 10.
190. See Court Drama Wins Network, supra note 185, § IX, at 10. One reviewer noted:
“[N]ature has given him the ideal type of voice[,] somewhat ministerial and full of the intona-
tions of sympathetic understanding, that fits the words to the role he plays, as sort of interlocu-
tor between litigant and judge.” Orrin E. Dunlap Jr., Tribunal of the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1936, § X, at 10.
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Several aspects of the Good Will Court should be noted. First,
the identities of the participants were kept confidential.191 Second, the
advice was given openly, over the airwaves, after each participant re-
cited his tale of woe. Finally, even at this early date, the issue of dis-
claimers had already arisen, although the language used was far less
technical than that which one would see today on a website. The
Good Will Court ran this disclaimer at the beginning of each broad-
cast: “Neither to listeners nor applicants does this Court supplant the
need for a lawyer’s advice. To those who come here it supplies kindly
and understanding guidance. To listeners it presents, in vivid human
terms, a cross-section of the great system of justice which protects us
all.”192 At the conclusion of each broadcast, the announcer pro-
claimed: “May we remind you, too, that different sections of the
country have different laws—and each legal case is affected by spe-
cial circumstances. So may we emphasize the fact that you need the
services of a lawyer for every legal problem.”193
Many lay commentators applauded this “ethereal clearing house
for human problems”194 as a public service.195 As a New York Times
article described it:
The court, as a social service, is a free tribunal, which aims to help
prevent crime by publicizing the laws. It is open to all comers who
have a legal problem of universal appeal, aids people in solving do-
mestic troubles and in finding legal redress for wrongs. The judges
who are presiding for the evening hear the angles of the respective
cases which the persons before the court present, and then make
recommendations as to the best courses for the persons to follow.196
The Times also reported that twenty welfare organizations had fol-
lowed up on the cases to see that they were “brought to a fair conclu-
sion.”197
191. See DUNNING, supra, note 184, at 241.
192. Farrer, supra note 184, at 12.
193. Id.
194. Court Drama Wins Network, supra note 185, § IX, at 10.
195. See, e.g., DUNNING, supra note 184, at 241 (“Good Will Court offered free legal help
to the poor long before legal aid societies and public defenders became fashionable.”); SAM J.
SLATE & JOE COOK, IT SOUNDS IMPOSSIBLE 130 (1963) (“This was one of the greatest services
ever offered on radio. And it was free. Too much so.”).
196. Court Drama Wins Network, supra note 185, § IX, at 10.
197. Id. One account reported that “Alexander’s staff answered all mail, giving free advice
even to those who weren’t invited to appear; some 6,000 people were helped in the first year
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The Good Will Court became so popular that NBC acquired the
show for national distribution in July 1936. The program was to air on
Sunday nights from 8:00 to 9:00 p.m.,198 sponsored by Chase & San-
born Coffee.199 The program “made compelling radio,” and its ratings
soared soon after its NBC premiere on September 20, 1936.200 Despite
its great success,201 however, the program was destined to run only
                                                                                                                                     
alone.” DUNNING, supra note 184, at 242. These reports seem highly exaggerated and suggest
that Alexander’s genius at promotion included not some small measure of puffery.
198. Court Drama Wins Network, supra note 185, § IX, at 10. Apparently a local version of
the program continued on WMCA on Wednesdays at 10:00 p.m. See Good Will Court Quits
Broadcasts, supra note 185, at 8.
199. See DUNNING, supra note 184, at 242. One measure of its success may be that it re-
placed the very popular Major Bowes Amateur Hour in its coveted Sunday evening time slot
from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. See Court Drama Wins Network, supra note 185, § IX, at 10. A re-
view in the New York Times that ran the week after the Good Will Court’s premiere quipped:
“When Major Bowes and his amateurs did not keep their rendezvous with the Sunday evening
microphone for some listeners no doubt it was almost as if the sun had failed to rise on sched-
ule.” Dunlap, supra note 190, § X, at 10.
200. DUNNING, supra note 184, at 241. Its premiere was not without controversy, as New
York City Municipal Court Judge Nathan Sweedler threatened a lawsuit for the unauthorized
use of the name “Good-Will Court,” which he claimed to have originated in Brooklyn in 1927.
See ‘Court’ on Air Faces Suit over Its Name, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1936, § II, at 12. He asserted
that A.L. Alexander had sought use of the name for noncommercial purposes, but had then
made a commercial program appropriating the name. See id. Judge Sweedler further claimed:
“The ‘Good-Will Court’ has been conducted by me and many others who gave their time free
without a thought of commercialization.” Id. The case, in which Judge Swindler had sought
$250,000 in damages, ultimately was dismissed for lack of injury on March 9, 1937, several
months after the program had been cancelled. See Good-Will Court Loses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1937, at 4.
201. The novelty of the Good Will Court, coupled with the fact that it had displaced one of
the most popular programs on the air, Major Bowes’ Amateur Hour, was newsworthy enough
to merit a lengthy review in the Sunday New York Times the week after its network premiere.
The review amplified further the emotional content of the Good Will Court:
The litigants are not rehearsed; they play roles in the actual drama of life for which
there are no scripts. Fate assigns the roles. The actors live and play the parts as no
trained radio performer could. The heart-breaks, the nervousness, tears, tragedy and
helpfulness, uncannily are electrified and can be sensed far beyond the microphone.
Dunlap, supra note 190, § X, at 10. The generally favorable review continued:
This tribunal of the air claims a lofty purpose, to do good in administering to human
welfare, but the benefits may go far outside the studio walls. These radio waves are a
mirror of life. The solution of an unfortunate person’s problem is but a small part of
the good-will spread by the court.
Id. Reflecting common concerns of the Depression era, the reviewer continued:
After attending the Good-Will Court on the air there are thousands no doubt sud-
denly thankful for the good things in life which they possess, but which others have
missed. The court, if it achieves nothing else, is certain to brush aside grumbling and
discontent. This broadcast reveals the load the neighbor is carrying, and it is likely to
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three months before its cancellation, under heavy pressure from the
legal profession.202
As the success of the Good Will Court quickly spawned a num-
ber of local copycat broadcasts,203 the organized bar began to mobilize
against the proliferating radio courts. The battle was fought on two
fronts—at the county and national levels. At the county level, the
powerful New York County Lawyers’ Association204 approved a re-
port by its special committee denouncing the Good Will Court.205 The
committee’s report recommended that the Appellate Division adopt
a rule banning participation by lawyers in such activities.206 The com-
mittee’s scathing critique is worth reviewing at some length, as its
points are reiterated in later opinions. One concern raised was the
lack of confidentiality.207 Another concern was the inadequacy of the
                                                                                                                                     
make those who eavesdrop more tolerant and encourage them to lend a helping
hand.
Id. The program was seen as having educational value, particularly for “many students of law,
for the broadcast puts them in touch with noted judges hearing actual cases.” Id. The reviewer
also surmised: “And no doubt there are countless lawyers listening-in, exactly as orchestral
conductors eavesdrop on their colleagues and rivals.” Id.
202. At the time of its cancellation, the Good Will Court was broadcast over 66 different
channels in 39 different states. See Rosenthal v. Shepard Broad. Serv., 12 N.E.2d 819, 820
(Mass. 1938).
203. It is difficult to determine how many similar radio programs appeared after the Good
Will Court’s premiere. A resolution by the California Bar criticizing the Good Will Court men-
tions the emergence of radio courts in San Francisco and elsewhere. See Alfred Bartlett, The
President’s Message, 11 STATE B.J. ST. CAL. 267, 267 (1936) (“It is improper for a former Judge
or an attorney to participate in, or permit the use of his name in a commercially sponsored ra-
dio program . . . .”). The Rosenthal opinion discusses both the Good Will Court and a Boston
variation called the Court of Common Troubles. See Rosenthal, 12 N.E.2d at 820. See also ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 166 (1936), reprinted in ABA
OPINIONS, supra note 183, at 436.
204. The New York County Lawyers’ Association, with 6,000 members, was the largest
voluntary organization of lawyers in the United States other than the ABA. See William L.
Ransom, Which Road for the Legal Profession, 22 A.B.A. J. 21, 21 (1936). A recent survey of
the economic condition of its membership had shown a substantial downturn, largely due to the
Depression, with nearly half the lawyers in New York County reporting an annual income be-
low the “respectable minimum family subsistence” of $2500 a year. Committee on Professional
Economics of New York County Lawyers Association Recommends Aggressive Effort to Relieve
Overcrowding and Improve Economic Conditions of Lawyers, 22 A.B.A. J. 439, 440 (1936).
205. See Lawyers Ask Ban on Radio ‘Court’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1936, at 12. The commit-
tee had consulted with representatives of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
the Bronx County Bar Association, the Brooklyn Bar Association, the Queens County Bar As-
sociation, the Nassau County Bar Association, and the Legal Aid Society. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. (“While the identity of the so-called litigant is not published, other persons in-
terested in the controversy can, of course, identify him by listening on the radio.”).
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advice given as a “snap judgment.”208 A third objection was the lack
of dignity inherent in such proceedings, as they exploited “morbid cu-
riosity.”209 There were also worries that uninformed listeners might
erroneously rely on the advice given.210 Perhaps most noteworthy is
the committee’s description of its motives:
The attitude of members of the bar to this program is not due to any
belief that their practice is in the remotest way affected by these op-
erations. They are interested, however, in its legal and ethical as-
pects. The conduct of litigants in these broadcasts frequently indi-
cates their belief that they are really appearing before a court. When
wrong advice is given, the litigant apparently has no recourse where
he has been misguided.211
Not only did the committee flatly reject the notion that the pro-
gram had any educational value, but it also asserted that judges on
the program were “using the power of their office and the influence
of their names to promote the business interests of others, in viola-
208. Id. (“The presentation is one-sided. There is no opportunity to obtain a complete
statement of the facts and the judge has practically no opportunity to check the correctness and
the soundness of his snap judgment.”).
209. Id. The New York Times described the scene further:
The judge attempts to give advice. He is frequently interrupted, and even corrected,
by the conductor. . . . The advice is accompanied by the announcer’s solicitation to
purchase the sponsor’s coffee. . . . The broadcast is conducted primarily for commer-
cial purposes, to exploit a morbid curiosity in the private woes and tribulations of the
so-called litigants.
Id.
210. See id. (“Listeners-in from other States are completely misled, in so far as the laws of
their States are concerned, by the unconsidered advice glibly given over the radio under the
conductors’ guidance.”).
211. Id. Another New York City bar association asserted:
Educational and sociological benefits do not result from the exploitation of the woes
and troubles of any individual by converting them to the entertainment and amuse-
ment of thousands; by presenting one side of a problem; by rendering an opinion on
the law, as it obtains in one state, to listeners in forty-eight states, many of whose
laws are at variance; by giving advice of doubtful practical value, since the inquirer
must ultimately see a lawyer or have his problem decided by a duly constituted court.
From the lawyers’ viewpoint the publicizing of answers on specific legal problems, as
in the broadcast referred to, does not carry with it the relationship of attorney and
client, with its resulting responsibility, and the conversion of serious, personal legal
problems into entertainment and amusement tends to diminish the respect for courts
and judges and impair the dignity of the bench and bar, and is therefore objection-
able.
Meeting of the Council, B. BULL. BOSTON B. ASS’N, Jan. 1937, at 16 (quoting a statement by an
unidentified New York City bar association).
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tion of the spirit and intent of the ABA’s Canon of Judicial Ethics.”212
In another opinion issued that year, the committee raised similar ob-
jections to a proposed radio program that would answer legal ques-
tions that had been mailed in by listeners.213
Despite mounting pressure, the Good Will Court continued to
make its case. Chase & Sanborn filed in the Appellate Division a
brief objecting to the proposed rule.214 It argued that the court was
“distinctly educational in its content and in the manner in which the
212. Lawyers Ask Ban on Radio Court, supra note 205, at 12. The committee focused on
Canon 25, adopted in 1924, which provided:
[A judge] should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing
the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or con-
tribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises.
He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue such a course of
conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor use the power of his office or the influ-
ence of his name to promote the business interests of others; he should not solicit for
charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which, in the normal course
of events reasonably expected, might bring his personal interest into conflict with the
impartial performance of his official duties.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 25 (1956). Furthermore, the committee opined that law-
yers and ex-judges participating in such programs also violated Canon 40 of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics, adopted in 1928, which provided: “A lawyer may with propriety write articles
for publications in which he gives information upon the law; but he should not accept employ-
ment from such publications to advise inquirers in respect to their individual rights.” CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 40 (1956).
213. The New York County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Professional Ethics issued
an opinion in response to Question No. 340, asking about the propriety of attorneys’ partici-
pating in programs about legal oddities in questions and answers by lawyers appearing for
commercial sponsors. See New York County Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 340
(1937). The format of the proposed program differed somewhat from that of the Good Will
Court, in that listeners would be asked to mail in questions and “[t]hose questions of general
interest [would] be answered on the following week’s broadcast, those not of general interest
[would] be answered by mail, not on the stationery of an attorney, but on the letterhead of the
program, ‘Your Attorney,’ or ‘The Unknown Attorney.’” Id. The opinion stated:
[A] lawyer is not justified in giving an opinion without an opportunity to obtain from
his client adequate information as to the facts in his client’s case and the documents
which the lawyer may deem material . . . nor can the client be safe in acting on gen-
eralizations. . . . [O]thers . . . may be misled into accepting the published question
and answer as applicable to their own problem.
Id. The opinion also noted that there might be concerns about unauthorized practice of law and
that its ethical concerns were not alleviated by the participating attorneys’ anonymity, because
it “tend[ed] to diminish the sense of personal responsibility of the attorney to the person so in-
quiring.” Id.
214. See Radio Court Held Benefit to Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1936, at 22. Chase & San-
born and its advertising agency, J. Walter Thompson Company, were represented by former
U.S. Attorney Charles H. Tuttle; A.L. Alexander was represented by prominent litigator Louis
Nizer. See id.
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content [was] presented,” and that it “serve[d] to accomplish effec-
tively and on an incomparable scale one of the objects which bar as-
sociations ha[d] recently been urging—to wit: the popularizing of the
law.”215 Asserting a ringing defense of the First Amendment (and a
thinly disguised slap at lawyer self-interest), the brief continued:
To shut off this method of speech, this medium of education and this
incitement to public thinking would be a gross interference with the
freedom of speech and of thought. To do so on purely technical and
legalistic grounds and for the fancied benefit of some particular class
would be to deny fundamental rights and to restrict the liberties and
opportunities of the whole community. . . . If such a force as this for
social betterment is contrary to law, then there is something wrong
with the law.216
Nevertheless, the debate over giving legal advice on the radio soon
reached national attention, as other state bars joined the call for can-
cellation of the Good Will Court and its progeny.217
215. Id.
216. Id. Letters of commendation were attached to the brief from a variety of lawyers and
politicians, most notably New York Governor Herbert Lehman, who stated that the Good Will
Court broadcasts “serve[d] a very real purpose in bringing to people a better understanding of
the scope and purpose of our courts and of our laws.” Id. Attorney General John J. Bennett
was quoted as saying: “The practice of having members of the local judiciary answer and advise
is to be commended. . . . The idea of the broadcast is a most humane one, since here is provided
a great system of public education.” Id. Other letters were received from legislators and city
officials, including both the governor and attorney general of New Jersey. See id.
217. The State Bar of California passed a resolution strongly disapproving of the Good Will
Court and local radio courts broadcast in San Francisco and Los Angeles as “contrary to the
best traditions of the bench and bar and the dignity and high standards of the judiciary.”
Bartlett, supra note 203, at 267. Describing the participation of lawyers and judges who, “after
listening to tales of human misery, publicly gave them legal advice,” the president of the State
Bar of California’s message accompanying the resolution noted that “nothing could be more
calculated to bring the judiciary and the legal profession into disrepute.” Id. Its resolution said:
“[I]t is therefore resolved that such radio programs and such conduct by judges and lawyers is
strongly disapproved and that it is earnestly urged that it be discontinued.” Id.; see also Daw-
son, supra note 189, at 863 (discussing lawyers’ opposition to the Good Will Court). The presi-
dent further noted: “An encouraging sign is that most of the lawyers and judges in this State
needed only to hear it suggested to them that such a program might be in bad taste, to cause
them to discontinue their participation in such programs.” Bartlett, supra note 203, at 269. The
Boston Bar Association joined the battle and adopted the resolutions of the ABA and the New
York County Lawyers’ Association. Surprisingly, one of its members had actually recom-
mended that the Bar Association consider sponsoring a “Radio Legal Clinic” like the Good
Will Court. See The Annual Meeting, B. BULL. BOSTON B. ASS’N, Nov.-Dec. 1936, at 7-9. In-
stead, the bar adopted a resolution condemning such courts. See Meeting of the Council, supra
note 211, at 15-16.
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On the national level, the influential ABA Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics and Grievances entered the fray in November 1936,
issuing a formal opinion that reiterated the New York County Law-
yers’ Association’s position that judges should not participate in such
a program.218 Much of ABA Formal Opinion 166 decried the lack of
dignity involved in such a commercialized format.219 The opinion also
expressed concern that “[b]ecause of the divergence in the laws of the
several states the advice given by the judge [was] apt to be misleading
to listeners in states other than in the state of origin.”220 Furthermore,
the advice might mislead the lay public, “since the ‘clients’ and those
who listen to these programs may think they are getting advice of a
duly constituted court.”221 Furthermore, “the ‘clients’ have no re-
course when they have been wrongly advised.”222 Although the opin-
ion acknowledged that the “announced purpose” of this radio pro-
gram was “to afford to indigent persons, unable to pay for the serv-
ices of attorneys, means of securing advice with respect to their legal
problems from judges of courts which are an integral part of the judi-
cial system of the state, and to ‘inform the public,’” it sarcastically
noted: “The obvious purpose is to promote the sales of the adver-
tiser’s product.”223 By participating in such programs, the opinion
averred, lawyers and judges “lower the esteem of the profession” and
“stir up legal strife.”224
218. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 166 (1936), re-
printed in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 183, at 437 (“It is the unqualified opinion of this commit-
tee that no judge or former judge nor any other member of the Bar should participate in any
such commercial program.”).
219. See id. The opinion noted: “At the outset we deprecate the simulation of an actual ju-
dicial proceeding by a group of lawyers or judges, and especially one having for its primary
purpose the advertising of an article of commerce. It is an affront to the dignity of judicial tri-
bunals and should not be tolerated.” Id. In particular, the opinion criticized the “emotional
outbursts of the ‘clients,’” worrying that laypeople [would] believe that “usual court procedure
[was] being followed.” Id. at 436.
220. Id. at 437.
221. Id. The committee concluded: “Our present economic structure justifies the mainte-
nance by the organized bar of the modern legal aid clinic to aid the individual lawyer in the dis-
charge of his obligation, but cannot justify its alleged counterpart in the commercial field of
radio entertainment.” Id.
 222. Id.
223. Id. at 436.
224. Id. at 437.
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A week later, the ABA’s Committee on Unauthorized Practice
of Law also weighed in with its own criticism of radio courts.225 It
complained:
By statutes and common law principles, corporations and non-
lawyers are forbidden to furnish legal advice and service because of
the danger to the public, just as ‘quack’ doctors are prohibited from
practising medicine, and the radio is thus being misused in a manner
which in many states would be clearly unlawful and improper. This is
particularly so in view of the fact that people asking advice through
this ‘Good Will Court’ are entirely deprived of the usual accepted
safeguards and protections to which they are entitled and, if misled,
have no recourse against the sponsors or others connected with the
program.226
Later that month, the ABA Journal ran a column by the Chicago
Bar Association’s Mitchell Dawson, titled “Good Will for Law-
yers.”227 Dawson attacked the Good Will Court for creating an inac-
curate portrait of the legal profession, noting: “The public is led to
believe that lawyers are expensive and out of the reach of the average
person. . . . The impression is indirectly conveyed that the poor and
unfortunate have no place to turn for free legal advice.”228 He also ac-
cused such programs of creating “good will” solely for the sponsors,
rather than for the “unfortunates” who were receiving legal advice.229
225. The Committee had been first appointed in 1930. See Rhode, supra note 180, at 8. The
ABA’s focus on unauthorized practice had emerged fully by 1936. The same issue of the ABA
Journal that contained ABA Formal Opinion 166 also contained an article titled War Declared
on Lawyers Aiding in the Illegal Practice of Law, 22 A.B.A. J. 887 (1936) [hereinafter Illegal
Practice of Law]. That article briefly describes a combined effort by the Committee and the
ABA’s Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances to “stamp out the unauthorized prac-
tice of the law that both the welfare of the public and that of the profession require.” Id. The
article further notes: “When a lay agency engages in the practice of law, it nearly always has
the cooperation of a lawyer. In fact, the assistance of a lawyer is indispensable to such prac-
tice.” Id.
226. See Illegal Practice of Law, supra note 225, at 887.
227. See Dawson, supra note 189, at 863.
228. Id. He continued: “The Good Will Court is a voice which by implication says to a mul-
titudinous radio audience that the lawyers have failed in their duty to society.” Id.
229. Id. Dawson further declared:
The good will which the Good Will Court seeks to engender is obviously good will
for its sponsor—a corporation in the business of selling a certain commodity. The le-
gal advice, which it so benevolently dispenses to the unfortunates who apply for it, is
paid for magnificently in sales of the sponsor’s merchandise.
Id. He concluded:
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An even harder blow to the Good Will Court was soon to follow.
In December 1936, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court acceded to the demand of the New York County Lawyers’ As-
sociation and issued a new rule for lawyers admitted to practice in
New York City and surrounding counties that would “prohibit them
from taking part in ‘good-will courts’ broadcast over the air.”230 The
rule itself did not expressly mention radio “courts,” but provided:
No attorney shall advise inquirers or render any opinion to them
through or in connection with a publicity medium of any kind in re-
spect to their specific legal problems, whether or not such attorney
shall be compensated for his services. Any attorney who violates the
rule shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct.231
Although Alexander kept up a brave front, insisting that the Good
Will Court would continue to be broadcast,232 the New York Appel-
late Division’s ban on appearances by lawyers and judges sounded
the death knell for his program. The cancellation of the Good Will
Court was announced two days later,233 and the New York County
Lawyers’ Association claimed a resounding victory.234
                                                                                                                                     
Lawyers assure one another at bar association meetings that they must maintain
their traditions, ideals, duties and responsibilities. These are truisms that are “gone
with the wind.” What we need to show is a picture of the lawyer in action, the lawyer
as hero, if you please, but a very human practical hero, whose services to his clients
and to society are personal, concrete, obvious and invaluable.
Id.
230. Lawyers Barred on Radio ‘Courts’, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1936, at 29.
231. Quarterly Review of Decisions: Radio, 9 AIR L. REV. 297, 300 n.9 (1938).
232. See Lawyers Barred on Radio ‘Courts’, supra note 230, at 29. Initial speculation had
been that Alexander would have to obtain lawyers or judges from outside the area covered by
the Appellate Division’s rule, which included the five counties of New York City and the coun-
ties of Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Putnam, Duchess, Orange, and Rockland. See id. Instead,
the December 16 program featured a sociologist giving advice. See id.
233. See Good Will Court Quits Broadcasts, supra note 185, at 19. In 1943, A.L. Alexander
revived the program, without the participation of lawyers and judges, on the Mutual Network,
as A.L. Alexander’s Mediation Board. The program never attracted the same audience as the
Good Will Court, but it ran in various formats until 1950. See DUNNING, supra note 184, at 242.
Self-described “marital expert” John J. Anthony also capitalized on the sensation created by
the novel format of a radio advice program, launching a new and wildly popular advice pro-
gram called The Goodwill Hour, in which he dispensed with lawyers and judges and gave ad-
vice to unfortunates on his own. See id. at 242-43.
234. See Hughes Jr. Lauds Bar for Legislative Work, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1937, at 28. In
the annual report of the New York County Lawyers’ Association, President Charles E. Hughes,
Jr., asserted: “[T]his program, publicizing legal advice to individual inquirers in connection with
commercial advertisements, was contrary to the public interest, since it was misleading to the
public and brought both the bench and the bar into disrepute.” Id. The battle was far from
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Although the battle had been won, the ABA continued its quest
to eradicate what it deemed the unauthorized practice of law. At its
annual meeting in 1937, the ABA approved Canon 47, “Aiding the
Unauthorized Practice of Law,” which reads: “No lawyer shall permit
his professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make
possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal
or corporate.”235 The ABA also waged an open campaign to encour-
age state and local bar associations to stamp out unauthorized prac-
tice.236 Although the extent to which the Canon was prompted by the
recent attack on radio courts is unclear, it is likely that at least part of
the concern over the dispensing of free legal advice over the air
waves might have been related to the economic considerations that
spurred concern about the unauthorized practice of law.
Yet another blow to the phenomenon of radio courts came over
a year after the cancellation of the Good Will Court, when the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a challenge to ra-
dio courts in Rosenthal v. Shepard Broadcasting Service.237 In Novem-
ber 1936, less than two weeks after the ABA issued Formal Opinion
166, three members of the Massachusetts bar sued the broadcaster of
the Good Will Court and a local variant called the Court of Common
                                                                                                                                     
over. In early 1937, the Judicial Council of New York recommended to the New York Legisla-
ture that it adopt a statute banning the use of the word “court” in the name of enterprises pur-
porting to be legal proceedings, explaining:
“It has been forcibly brought to the attention of the Judicial Council that a large por-
tion of the public believe [sic] that these proceedings represent a real court, real
cases, real litigants, and real decisions by real judges. This impression cannot be re-
moved unless the use of the word ‘court’ is discarded and it is essential in order that
the true administration of justice may not suffer severely, that the possibility of mis-
understanding be removed.”
Judicial Council for Women Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1937, at 2 (quoting the Judicial Coun-
cil). The Commission proposed adoption of the following statute:
No person, corporation, joint stock association, or any other body except the courts
organized under the judicial system of the United States, or of this state, or any po-
litical subdivision thereof, shall use the word ‘court’ in a name or title, or hold itself
out to be a court, so as to give to the public the impression that it is a part of the duly
organized judicial system of the United States or of this state or any political subdivi-
sion thereof.
STATE OF NEW YORK, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 35 (1937). The Council also recommended adoption of ethical rules designed to
enforce these proposed statutes. See id.
235. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 47 (1956).
236. See WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 15.1.1, at 825.
237. 12 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1938).
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Troubles238 under a 1935 state statute that banned corporations from
“‘giv[ing] legal advice in matters not relating to [their] lawful busi-
ness, or practic[ing] law.’”239
By the time the court issued its opinion in Rosenthal, both the
Good Will Court and the Court of Common Troubles had been dis-
continued, and “the inference seem[ed] strong . . . that there [was] no
likelihood that these programs [would] be resumed by the respon-
dent.”240 Nevertheless, the court asserted that these programs consti-
tuted the unauthorized practice of law under the Massachusetts stat-
ute, explaining: “The giving of advice as to legal matters has been
commonly recognized as an important part of the activities reserved
for members of the bar and constitutes the practice of law.”241 Moreo-
ver, the court concluded that giving legal advice on these talk shows
“not only violate[d] the confidential relation of an attorney and client
but [was] inconsistent with the traditional standards of the bar and
the courts.”242 The court rejected the argument that such radio pro-
grams provided a public service to those who could not afford legal
assistance, asserting: “There is no finding that the persons seeking
238. Like the Good Will Court, the Massachusetts radio court invited individuals to submit
questions in advance for response from a panel of active judges. See id. at 820. The court noted:
Most of the cases stated involved questions of civil rights and liabilities and were of a
nature usually dealt with by practicing attorneys in the course of giving advice to cli-
ents in office consultation and by judges of trial courts in the consideration of cases
before them while on the bench.
Id. The advice given addressed a wide range of matters:
[P]roper registration of an automobile, remedies for nonpayment of rent by a tenant,
the right of an administratrix to recover possession and control of personal property
belonging to the estate, the claim of a tenant for fixtures installed by him, the right of
a young woman to an engagement ring after termination of the engagement, and di-
vorce.
Id. The Court of Common Troubles also featured a disclaimer similar to that read on the Good
Will Court, stating that “the opinions to be expressed on the cases presented were to be based
on the law of Massachusetts, and that there was no intention to offer legal advice as a substitute
for that given by attorneys.” Id. at 821.
239. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 346, § 1 (1935)).
240. Id. at 821. The Court of Common Troubles was last broadcast on December 19, 1936,
and the Good Will Court was last broadcast on December 20, 1936. See id. The court noted that
“[t]he circumstances attending [their] discontinuance [were] not set out with much fulness in
the record.” Id. at 821.
241. Id.
242. Id. The ABA Journal reported this opinion in April 1938, and noted that a lawyer’s
participation in such a broadcast might violate newly adopted Canon 47. See Lawyers Partici-
pating in Radio Broadcasts May Violate Canon 47, 24 A.B.A. J. 334, 334 (1938).
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and receiving such advice were indigent. There is an express finding
that the respondent was conducting these programs as part of its
commercial adventure for profit. There is no finding that the motives
of the respondent were charitable.”243 Contemporary commentary on
Rosenthal suggested that it had established that “all radio broadcasts
as a part of which attempts are made to give legal advice, or to ac-
complish the equivalent thereof by means of fictitious and unreal
courtroom scenes or simulated trial procedure” were “contrary to the
public interest.”244
Despite the apparent authoritativeness of its holding, the
Rosenthal decision did not end the phenomenon of radio courts per-
manently, as at least one more reported decision addressed the issue.
A 1939 opinion of a lower New York City court refused to enforce an
arbitration award stemming from a radio program called the Jewish
Court for Peace and Justice.245 The judge explained: “Anyone who has
ever listened to one of these ‘trials’ on the air knows the sketchy
character of the testimony, the impatience of the master of ceremo-
nies, and even the arbitrators, due to the exigency of the shortness of
the time allotted for each trial.”246 The court continued:
I have listened to a number of such programs on the air, and the ig-
norance of those in charge of the commonest principles of law was
appalling. Atrocious advice has been given to poor ignorant people,
which could serve only to multiply the trouble they have brought to
these mountebank “courts.” In the beginning a few men learned in
the law permitted themselves to be used in connection with this
“swing time justice” until they realized the iniquity of the scheme.
Today no judge or self-respecting lawyer will lend himself to the
capitalization of human misery. . . . Certainly, no good is accom-
plished for the poor litigants who are beguiled into making their
243. Rosenthal, 12 N.E.2d at 821.
244. Quarterly Review of Decisions: Radio, supra note 231, at 300-01 & n.9 (“The cases
have been practically unanimous in including in the definition of ‘practice of law’ the giving of
legal advice and counsel by attorneys to their clients. These are the very functions that attor-
neys appearing in the ‘Good Will Court’ have been performing.”); see also Current Comment:
Radio, 8 AIR L. REV. 46, 48 (1937) (“It is submitted that since a radio sponsor cannot directly
practice law, not being a member of the bar, it cannot engage attorneys to advise on legal
problems without being guilty of the illegal practice of law.”).
245. See In re Blake, 17 N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (Sup. Ct. 1939). In that case, the 20-year-old
daughter of the defendant had been enticed into appearing on the air and had signed an
agreement purporting to bind her father to pay whatever award the radio “arbitrator” deemed
appropriate. See id.
246. Id. at 497.
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troubles entertainment for the world, and assuredly, much harm is
done. These ‘courts’ have no ability, no responsibility and no
authority, and should, as a matter of public interest, be discour-
aged.247
Although radio courts like the Good Will Court seem to have disap-
peared by the 1940s, disputes involving the use of the word “court” in
other radio programs continued to arise sporadically.248
What lesson should lawyers of the twenty-first century take from
the experiences of their Depression-era counterparts? On the one
hand, lawyers can hardly quarrel with many of the concerns ex-
pressed by opponents of the Good Will Court. The existing legal
precedent reviewed above demonstrates that giving specific legal ad-
vice to laypeople can create an attorney-client relationship,249 and
that fact alone should dictate caution to lawyers who engage in such
247. Id. Soon thereafter, a bill was sponsored in the New York legislature to prohibit the
use of the term “court” in certain broadcast programs. See Private Unauthorized Courts, 26
A.B.A. J. 502, 502 (1940).
248. The next radio program to incite the wrath of the ABA Committee on Unauthorized
Practice was the Court of Missing Heirs. Created by attorney James Waters, the program pre-
sented two probate cases a week, seeking heirs to estates. See DUNNING, supra note 184, at 148.
It had first appeared in October 1937 in limited broadcast, and Waters had found his first
missing heir within weeks. See id. By 1939 the program was broadcast nationally on CBS. See
id. (“During its run, Waters found more than 150 heirs worth nearly $1 million. Most had no
idea they were anyone’s heir, and many were rescued from the clutches of poverty.”). Con-
cerned about misleading the public, the ABA Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law
sought:
[to] induce the broadcasting stations in the United States, by agreement among
themselves or in some other practicable way, to agree that hereafter a radio program
should neither give or offer to give legal advice, nor by title or substance represent or
lead the public to believe that it emanates from a court or is a part of the judicial sys-
tem.
Edwin M. Otterbourg, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 A.B.A. J. 271, 271 (1941) (“The
Committee believes that the use of the word ‘court’ in radio programs results in a misrepresen-
tation of the judicial process over the air which is apt to lessen the respect for the administra-
tion of justice.”). The Committee succeeded in obtaining the approval of the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters for this policy. On July 28, 1941, the National Association of Broadcasters
issued a communication to its members suggesting that they refrain from the use of the word
“court” as part of the title of a radio program. The title of the offending program was changed
to Are You a Missing Heir? See Agreement Reached with National Association of Broadcasting,
7 UNAUTHORIZED PRAC. NEWS 47, 47-48 (1941). The ABA and various state and local bar
associations commonly entered into agreements such as this until the 1970s, when new concerns
about antitrust violations led to their rescission. See Rhode, supra note 180, at 10 n.36. Are You
a Missing Heir? ran until 1942, and then was revived for one season in 1946. See DUNNING, su-
pra note 184, at 148.
249. See supra Part I.
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activity outside formally created relationships. The public spectacle
of lawyers and judges participating in a program that seems to capi-
talize on human misery raises equally weighty concerns. In one sense,
the story of the Good Will Court’s demise is the tale of a selfless
group of lawyers who, with the sole motivation of protecting innocent
laypeople, put a quick end to a mockery of legal practice and, in so
doing, restored some dignity to an already-tarnished profession. This
is the official story of most attempts to eradicate the unauthorized
practice of law.250 One can easily imagine a modern version of the
story in which the organized bar awakens to the dire threat to civili-
zation posed by unscrupulous online lawyers and drives them out of
business.
Like all good stories, however, the tale of the Good Will Court
has an alternative interpretation. In this version, the Good Will Court
stands as an innovative use of modern technology to meet the wide-
spread need for legal assistance in a time of great economic hardship.
With the legal profession already threatened by a loss of business as a
result of the Depression, newly powerful bar organizations could not
tolerate any innovation that might eliminate the need for traditional
legal services. The battle waged against the Good Will Court was part
of a larger struggle to protect the traditional practice of law against
other modern encroachments, reflected in the contemporaneous cru-
sade against the unauthorized practice of law.251 Rather than symbol-
izing a victory for consumers of legal services, the death of the Good
Will Court thus becomes a defeat, depriving laypeople both of
250. See RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 2), supra note 180, § 4 cmt. b (“The
primary justification given for unauthorized practice limitations was that of consumer protec-
tion—to protect consumers of unauthorized practitioner services against the significant risk of
harm believed to be threatened by the non-lawyer practitioner’s inexperience or lack of ethical
constraints.”).
251. See HURST, supra note 178, at 328:
Against the challenge of unsatisfied needs for legal help, the record of the bar was
one of long inertia. The organized bar did not originate the legal aid movement, and
was slow to give it even limited support. The bar became concerned with lay compe-
tition, largely under the spur of lawyers’ economic distress . . . and did little self-
searching, to find out wherein lawyers were so inadequately serving people that they
should turn to other advisers.
See also RESTATEMENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 2), supra note 180, § 4 cmt. b (“Some con-
sumer groups and governmental agencies have criticized some restrictions as over-protective,
anti-competitive, and costly to consumers.”).
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needed education about legal principles and of an inexpensive alter-
native to traditional attorney-client relationships.252
This story has been retold over and over again in the last sixty
years. The bar prefers the tone of the first version, but laypeople may
find the second more convincing. Like the story of the technophobic
Clarence Seward, the saga of radio courts in the 1930s casts light on
our current struggles with the use of technology in law practice today.
Indeed, the campaign waged against the Good Will Court and its
progeny reflects in microcosm the conventional approach taken with
respect to legal advice-giving in nontraditional contexts. As the next
sections will show, each time that lawyers have sought to adapt ex-
isting media to answer legal questions posed by laypeople, the or-
ganized bar has moved to regulate—potentially out of existence—
such activity. The question is whether we shall be able to write a new
ending to the story for the Digital Age, as the legal profession grap-
ples with the issue of Internet lawyers. Before turning to that issue, I
shall review the other areas in which the bar has addressed the giving
of legal advice in nontraditional settings.
III. REGULATING LEGAL ADVICE IN NONTRADITIONAL CONTEXTS
A. Modern Regulation of Legal Advice on Radio and Television
Although apparently put to rest by the battle over the Good Will
Court, the issue of legal advice on radio and television broadcasts
continued to arise sporadically.253 A 1938 ABA opinion allowed offi-
252. See HURST, supra note 178, at 325:
The surveys showed . . . that city people knew little of when it might be to their inter-
est to seek legal advice, that they had no idea how to choose a lawyer, and that they
were afraid to go to a lawyer because they had unfounded and exaggerated notions
of what it would cost and what consequences would be involved.
253. In 1950, the ABA Journal published a letter sent to New York broadcasters from Ed-
win Otterbourg, Chairman of the New York County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Un-
lawful Practice of the Law. The letter decried “certain broadcasts which have seemed to sug-
gest that listeners, in dealing with their individual specific problems, could rely on off-hand in-
formation or advice, which was offered, or on answers which purported to give legal advice in
response to specific inquiries.” Edwin M. Otterbourg, Legal Advice by Radio, 36 A.B.A. J. 450,
458 (1950). He asserted that radio talk programs should be confined to “general information
about the law” and noted: “Obviously, for a man to base his conduct or stake his fortune on
advice given on a radio broadcast program, may lead to most unfortunate results, whether such
advice be given by a lawyer or a non-lawyer; if given by the latter it may constitute a penal of-
fense.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he situation is rendered especially hazardous when it is considered
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cially sponsored “educational” presentations.254 But in the 1960s, the
ABA reiterated its general ban on giving individually tailored advice
over the airwaves. In one informal opinion, the Committee on Pro-
fessional Responsibility stated that lawyers could participate in a lo-
cal radio quiz program and answer legal questions received from the
public, but cautioned:
[T]he lawyer should not answer any question that undertakes to ad-
vise a particular member of the audience in regard to what he should
personally do. . . . His participation in a panel discussion that had as
its objective the furnishing of personal advice in the answering of
questions would amount to a solicitation of professional employ-
ment. Furthermore, if a program is designed to answer the specific
personal problems of individual laymen, the organization putting on
the program may be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
and, if so, a lawyer who aids such organizations by appearing on the
program would be acting in violation of Canon 47.255
In Formal Opinion 298, issued in 1961, the Committee reaffirmed the
position it had taken in 1938, noting that the emergence of television
                                                                                                                                     
that the law in one state may be different from the law in another state. The air waves are no
respecters of state lines.” Id.
Occasional bar opinions during this period suggest that the problem of legal advice on
the air had not disappeared completely in the 1930s. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 228 (1941), reprinted in ABA Opinions, supra note 183,
at 524 (“A lawyer may not answer on a radio program specific questions with reference to the
law; for a lawyer thus to answer general questions is fairly certain to involve him, sooner or
later, in the violation of Canon 40 and Canon 27.”); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm.
on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 648 (1943) (indicating that a lawyer may not go on air with an inventor to
give a legal opinion as to how to protect her rights in an invention because the lawyer “would
be broadcasting legal information and advice regarding the individual rights of a person in a
specific case”); id. Op. 716 (1948) (stating that lawyers participating in a television talk show
about well-known cases must exercise care that “the discussion of such cases cannot be inter-
preted as advice on individual rights to any parties who may have similar problems not yet ad-
judicated”); id. Op. 805 (1955) (cautioning that an immigration lawyer appearing on air peri-
odically to give legal information must not advise about individual legal rights); see also N.J.
Sup. Ct. Comm. on Unauthorized Prac., Op. 4 (1971) (affirming that giving legal advice on the
radio and in newspapers to individuals is the practice of law because “[t]he vice . . . is that indi-
viduals submit their personal problems, and they are specifically answered by the columnist or
the commentator” (citing Green v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 209 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964))).
254. On May 8, 1938, the Committee issued Formal Opinion 179, approving local bar spon-
sorship of a radio broadcast of a sketch depicting the “unfortunate consequences” of failing to
get a lawyer to draft a will. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
179 (1938), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 183, at 449. The opinion characterized this
kind of broadcast as educational and thus distinguishable from attempts to solicit new clients,
which would “injure the public and degrade the profession.” Id.
255. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 528 (1962).
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had raised the issue again. The opinion asserted that judges might not
appear in simulated judicial proceedings, but permitted lawyers to
appear as actors or performers, as long as the program “conform[ed]
to the proper standards of the Bench and Bar in their participation in
judicial or other proceedings.”256
The modern era of regulating attorney speech began in 1977,
with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar.257
In Bates, the Court held that blanket restrictions on lawyer advertis-
ing were unconstitutional.258 That decision required the bar to rethink
the traditional prohibitions against self-promotion underlying many
ethics opinions of the prior forty years. Nevertheless, the approach of
subsequent bar opinions addressing the issue of lawyer participation
in radio and television advice programs has been strikingly similar to
that of the early opinions. General educational presentations have
been approved,259 but a number of opinions have reiterated cautions
against furnishing specific legal advice to individuals over the air.260
256. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 298 (1961), reprinted in ABA
OPINIONS, supra note 183, at 655. See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op.
230g (1961) (distinguishing Meet the Press as not implicated in Formal Op. 298), Informal Op.
1136 (1969) (stating that a recurring program on public television addressing matters of public
interest was permissible, as long as the program was “conducted with dignity, no legal advice
was given, and the entire operation seemed interesting and informative”).
257. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
258. See id. at 383.
259. See N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 480 (1981) (quoting the
Standing Committee on Association Communications and Division of Communications of the
American Bar Association):
The legal profession is not an island unto itself. It is in the mainstream of American
life. It must be responsive to the human needs of society. The law is neither rigid nor
detached from those whom it serves, and neither can members of the legal profession
function apart from society. They must reach out, become more visible as part of the
social fabric, and help the citizenry to realize more fully that the law serves the peo-
ple, not the people the law.
260. For example, Ohio Ethics Opinion 94-13 noted that radio may be an appropriate
method for educating the public generally about legal issues, but cautioned that if the format
permits listeners to ask questions, “a lawyer participating in this type of radio show must be
extremely careful not to impart individual advice.” Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Griev-
ances & Discipline, Op. 94-13 (1994). The opinion also warns that lawyers should be cautious
about learning secrets and confidences on the air. The Ohio opinion recommended a dis-
claimer, suggesting that “it may be prudent for a lawyer to advise a radio audience that discus-
sion in regard to questions will be general and not intended as individual advice for specific
problems.” Id.; accord Ala. St. Bar, Op. 349 (1980) (stating that a lawyer may participate in
radio interview as long as the lawyer refrains from giving general solutions to individual prob-
lems); Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 89-19 (1971) (stating that a 90-second ra-
dio spot must “not leave the impression that the [lawyer is] giving general advice applicable to
all individuals with similar problems”); Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 71-35
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Just as their counterparts in the 1930s, these bar opinions express the
concern that a lawyer giving individual legal advice on the radio will
have insufficient facts to give a full response,261 that a broadcast ex-
change between a lawyer and questioner could raise concerns of con-
fidentiality,262 and that other listeners might erroneously rely on the
advice given.263 Moreover, even though a number of bar opinions
have recommended the use of disclaimers,264 no opinion has taken the
                                                                                                                                     
(1971) (asserting that a lawyer may appear on a radio show, but must “not seek to solve specific
problems”); Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. E-270 (1983) (opining that a lawyer “should not
give personal legal advice to individuals who may call in to the program”); Miss. St. Bar Ass’n
Ethics Comm., Op. 74 (1982) (stating that a lawyer may appear on a public service newscast as
long as the lawyer “refrains from giving, or appearing to give advice, to particular persons
about their individual rights”); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial
Ethics, Op. 80-8 (1980) (asserting that a “lawyer may not give individual legal advice in re-
sponse to specific questions posed by individual callers”); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 86-4 (undated) (cautioning that there is a danger from the “implication which arises that
the broadcast attorney is an expert or specialist in the field in which he purports to offer ad-
vice”). See generally Rogers, supra note 11, at 67-72 (discussing bar opinions). Modern televi-
sion programs such as Judge Judy are distinguishable because they purport to mediate disputes
rather than proffer legal advice.
261. See N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 480 (1981) (recommending
that programs publicize disclaimers informing the public that the “general answers given are
not a complete analysis of the legal problems”); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on
Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-8 (1980) (noting that the time constraints of a radio program
would “preclude[] the lawyer from probing the caller to elicit the factual information she
needs”).
262. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op.
80-8 (1980) (observing that a radio program is not conducive to confidential communications);
Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 94-13 (1994) (“[C]onfidences
and secrets should not be divulged over the radio.”).
263. See Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 89-19 (1989) (advising that a radio
broadcast should not leave the impression that a lawyer was giving advice applicable to all in-
dividuals with similar problems); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judi-
cial Ethics, Op. 80-8 (1980) (“[M]embers of the public who have problems that appear similar
to the question posed may be misled into accepting the publicly disseminated question and an-
swer as applicable to their own problems.”).
264. See, e.g., N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 480 (1981) (cautioning
that a lawyer’s answering anonymous questions on the radio raises the risk of erroneous re-
sponse from lack of adequate information and that there should therefore “be a disclaimer ad-
vising the inquirer to the effect that on the basis of the question presented, the general answer
appears to be thus and so that for the inquirer’s protection it is recommended that they seek
competent legal advice”); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 94-
13 (1994):
As with legal seminars, it may be prudent for a lawyer to advise a radio audience that
discussion in regard to questions will be general and not intended as individual ad-
vice for specific problems. In addition, it may be helpful for the attorney to remind
the radio audience not to divulge confidences.
A disclaimer recommended by a Connecticut bar opinion reads:
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position that the disclaimer will relieve a lawyer of liability for indi-
vidual advice given on the air.265 Indeed, one New Hampshire bar
opinion warns attorneys participating in a radio call-in program to
consider “the possibility that a relationship may be established with
the callers that will implicate the rules concerning the confidentiality
of information and conflicts of interest.”266
The modern bar opinion most critical of radio call-in shows is
Iowa Opinion 93-8.267 It expressly disapproves of a law firm–spon-
sored radio call-in show in which callers, having been pre-screened
for conflicts of interest with firm members, would have their ques-
tions either answered on the air or referred to the bar association.
This opinion flatly asserts that “[t]he public broadcasting of an inter-
view between a client and a lawyer would be in violation of the law-
yer’s responsibility to protect the confidences of clients.”268 It further
notes: “Lawyers traditionally provide legal advice to their established
clients. However, it is difficult to see how such a relationship can
arise out of a simple contact by telephone, without personal confron-
tation and without means to identify or otherwise personally to relate
                                                                                                                                     
This program is being brought to you as a public service of the Connecticut Bar As-
sociation. The purpose of this program is to provide the public with general legal in-
formation and an insight into the judicial process. It is not designed to provide an-
swers to specific legal programs [sic] or to disseminate legal advice on pending cases
of controversies.
Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 89-4 (1989). The frequency of announcing the
disclaimer is important because listeners tune in at different times and may not hear a dis-
claimer read only at the beginning. See N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1994/95-3 (1995).
265. In a New Hampshire opinion, a lawyer’s call-in program featured the following dis-
claimer:
Every problem is unique and the producers of this program and the New Hampshire
Bar Association want everyone listening to understand that it is very important to
consult with your own attorney prior to applying the advice heard on this or any
other program to their own situation as small changes in the facts can completely
change the legal result. Further, the attorneys on this program want to be sure that
all listeners understand that only their own lawyer can take the time to fully under-
stand their individual problems and properly advise them of the correct legal action.
N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1994/95-3 (1995). Nevertheless, the opinion went on to cau-
tion: “[I]n addition to broadcasting the proposed disclaimer, the program attorneys are cau-
tioned to avoid providing specific answers to any caller, and each answer should explain that
additional facts may change the legal advice applicable to a particular situation . . . .” Id.; cf.
Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-8 (1980) (rec-
ommending that lawyers not give individual advice over the radio because when “the lawyer’s
relationship with the inquirer is fleeting and impersonal, the lawyer may have a diminished
sense of professional responsibility to the inquirer”).
266. N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1994/95-3 (1995).
267. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 93-8 (1993).
268. Id.
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to the inquirer and to determine all the necessary information to ren-
der an informed opinion.”269 The Iowa opinion reflects how deeply
rooted the hostility toward nontraditional advice-giving may be
within the bar.270
To what extent do cyberspace and on-air advice-giving parallel
one another? On the one hand, legal advice given in an open forum
such as a chat room or website resembles advice given over the radio
in that it is open to any member of the public and thus lacks confi-
dentiality. But this is not true with respect to individualized ex-
changes of e-mail between a questioner and an individual lawyer. On
the other hand, in the medium of cyberspace the questioner may
have a greater opportunity to provide information to the lawyer than
he would have in a radio broadcast. Moreover, unless the exchange
occurs in real time, the lawyer has ample time to consider her answer
to the question and need not provide the “off-the-cuff” advice that
the bar so often decries.
B. Giving Legal Advice in Writing
1. Giving Legal Advice in Newspaper Columns. Because
communication in cyberspace today primarily consists of writing,
another analog of online advice is the newspaper advice column.
Concerns about regulating legal advice in newspaper columns
emerged in the 1920s and have been the source of published bar
opinions ever since. As in the case of radio and television broadcasts,
bar regulators have focused largely on ensuring that lawyers give no
specific legal advice in these columns.
When the ABA substantially revised and supplemented its 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics in 1928,271 it added a section specifically
addressing the issue of newspaper advice columns. Canon 40, “News-
papers,” simply provided: “A lawyer may with propriety write arti-
cles for publication in which he gives information upon the law; but
269. Id.
270. The opinion certainly overstates its case in suggesting that lawyers must meet face-to-
face with clients in order to serve them professionally, as many lawyers have no doubt provided
legal services to clients whom they have never met in person.
271. Supplemental Canons to the original Canons were proposed for adoption in 1928. See
J. Purdon Wright, Important Supplemental Canons of Ethics Proposed, 14 A.B.A. J. 292, 292
(1928). They were adopted in July 1928. See Striking and Successful Celebration of Associa-
tion’s Semi-Centennial, 14 A.B.A. J. 447, 479 (1928).
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he should not accept employment from such publications to advise
inquirers in respect to their individual rights.”272 Canon 35, another
new section, also provided some basis for limiting legal advice col-
umns. Titled “Intermediaries,” it stated:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or ex-
ploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes
between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities and qualifica-
tions are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary.
A lawyer’s relation to his client should be personal, and the respon-
sibility should be direct to his client.273
Although the record is murky, the issue of newspaper columns ap-
parently caused enough concern to prompt the ABA’s Committee on
Professional Responsibility to dedicate a number of formal opinions
to the topic in the 1930s and 1940s.
The early ABA opinions set the tone for what would be the pre-
vailing standards for regulating legal advice in newspapers.274 The first
formal opinion to address the issue of publishing legal advice, issued
in 1933, stated:
A lawyer is not justified in giving an opinion without an opportunity
to ask the client for information as to the concrete facts in the cli-
ent’s case, and without an opportunity to see the instruments or
documents and to ascertain the dates and other facts, which the cli-
ent has not given or may not deem material. Nor can the client be
safe in acting on generalizations. And, moreover, other member
banks having problems similar to the question answered, may be
misled into accepting the published question and answer as applica-
ble to their own problems.275
272. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 40 (1928).
273. Professional Ethics Committee Rules of Procedure, 32 A.B.A. J. 302, 303 (1946).
274. The first Formal Opinion to construe Canon 40 was Opinion 92, issued on May 2, 1933,
which endorsed the publication of articles on general legal subjects, assuming that they would
be “dignified and instructive treatment[s] of the law, its history, philosophy, and interpreta-
tion.” ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 92 (1933), reprinted in
ABA OPINIONS, supra note 183, at 340.
275. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 98 (1933), reprinted
in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 183, at 347. Publishing this opinion on August 29, 1933, the
Committee responded to a query by attorneys representing a state bankers’ association that
answered written questions from member banks in a series of written “legal bulletins.” Id. The
Committee asserted that this type of advice controverted Canon 35, because it could “easily be
used as a means of advertising the professional services of the lawyers, as well as exploiting
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By 1945, the committee had flatly condemned newspaper advice
columns. In Formal Opinion 270, the committee addressed a column
that was to publish answers to questions of interest to the general
public. The prospective author, an attorney, had said that the column
would be “brief, concise, correct, and if there [were] the slightest
doubt about the correctness of the particular answers, then the ques-
tion and answer [would] not be printed in the column.”276 The attor-
ney also proposed to publish a disclaimer in which “the reader
[would] be cautioned not to rely on the answer in the column as legal
advice, but to consult his attorney,” and he promised to issue his an-
swers under an assumed name.277 Despite these extensive precautions,
the committee asserted that this column would violate both Canon 35
and Canon 40. Opinion 270 explained:
The column will be in essence one in which the lawyer undertakes to
give advice for the benefit of inquiries in respect of their individual
rights, which Canon 40 forbids. Finally, it does not meet the re-
quirement of Canon 35 that the relations of a lawyer with those to
                                                                                                                                     
their services for the profit of a lay agency.” Id. The opinion contrasted this activity with that
approved in Opinion 92, “where concrete questions are not submitted by a party seeking legal
advice relating to his own situation.” Id. A similar issue arose again in Formal Opinion 162,
issued on August 22, 1936, where a trade magazine offered its members a lawyer-written advice
column concerning legal issues common to the journal’s subscribers. See ABA Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 162 (1936), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra
note 183, at 432. The Committee approved the publication of articles of general interest, but
said that “it would be unethical and contrary to the precepts of the Canons for the attorney to
allow his name to be carried in the magazine or other publication in the manner indicated in
the foregoing statement, as a free legal adviser for the subscribers to the publication.” Id. The
Committee addressed this issue more fully in Opinion 273, issued on October 25, 1946, in per-
mitting a general counsel of a trade association to issue opinions on matters of general interest
that would be circulated through bulletins to the association’s members. See ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 273 (1946), reprinted in ABA OPINIONS, supra
note 183, at 605. The Committee noted that the republication of these bulletins had recently
been held to be unauthorized practice by the ABA’s Committee on Unauthorized Practice of
Law. See id. Nevertheless, the Committee noted that issuing general opinions was not neces-
sarily improper:
In any case where a member might well apply the advice given in the opinion to his
individual affairs, the lawyer rendering the opinion should specifically state that this
opinion should not be relied on by any member as a basis for handling his individual
affairs, but that in every case he should consult his counsel. In the publication of the
opinion the association should make a similar statement.
Id.
276. Professional Ethics Committee Rules of Procedure, supra note 273, at 303.
277. Id.
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whom he gives legal advice should be direct and personal and that
this service must not be exploited by an intervening lay agency.278
In order to avoid the scope of Canon 40, Opinion 270 noted, any ad-
vice given in articles had to be of a “general nature on legal sub-
jects.”279 Opinion 270 remained the leading word on newspaper col-
umns for nearly twenty-five years.280
Although the concern about newspaper advice columns lingered
into the 1960s, the ABA’s attitude toward newspaper advice columns
changed in 1969 when the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
superseded the Canons of Professional Ethics. The new Model Code
specifically addressed the question of publications by lawyers in Dis-
ciplinary Rule 2-104(A)(4).281 Titled “Suggestion of Need of Legal
Services,” the rule precluded lawyers from accepting employment re-
sulting from “in-person unsolicited advice to a lay person,” but ap-
pended a carefully worded exception: “Without affecting his right to
accept employment, a lawyer may speak publicly or write for publica-
278. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 270 (1945), reprinted
in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 183, at 598.
279. See id. Henry Drinker, one of the leading figures in the development of legal ethics,
was a member of the committee that issued Opinion 270. In his influential treatise entitled
Modern Legal Ethics, he furnished this rationale for such close scrutiny of newspaper advice
columns:
It is believed that Canon 40 was designed primarily to sanction articles in law maga-
zines or occasional articles in other publications and that it would be difficult if not
impossible to conceive of a daily, weekly, or monthly column in a newspaper or
magazine devoted to the discussion of legal matters which would not, sooner or later,
violate Canon 40 and also Canons 27, 35, and 47. What the readers of such columns
want is not a general discussion such as they can find in a law book or in an article in
a law magazine, but something practical which they can apply to their own personal
experience. Laymen usually are unable to formulate questions clearly to such a col-
umn and a lawyer answering such is apt to follow what he thinks his readers will want
to hear about and to answer the personal problem which he sees behind their ques-
tions. This is what the publications will ultimately see that they get.
HENRY S. DRINKER, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 264 (1953). Drinker also asserted that Canon 40
would be violated by “[t]he giving by [the lawyer] of legal advice to persons with whom he has
not the personal contact and background required between lawyer and client to make his ad-
vice reliable” and by “[e]nabling the lay publisher, sponsor, or broadcaster to give legal advice,
constituting the unauthorized practice of law.” Id. at 263.
280. Opinion 270 was followed in at least three informal ABA opinions. See ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 463 (1961) (asserting that a bar association may publish a
news column of a general nature on legal subjects); Informal Op. 538 (1962) (stating that con-
tributing an article treating a practical question of law will not violate the ABA canons); In-
formal Op. 840 (1965) (describing rules meant to guide lawyers participating in legal seminars).
281. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(a)(4) (1980).
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tion on legal topics so long as he does not emphasize his own profes-
sional experience or reputation and does not undertake to give indi-
vidual advice.”282 Accompanying Ethical Consideration 2-2 explained
the purpose of this rule:
A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of educating mem-
bers of the public to recognize their legal problems should carefully
refrain from giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable
to all apparently similar individual problems, since slight changes in
fact situations may require a material variance in the applicable ad-
vice; otherwise, the public may be misled and misadvised. Talks and
writings by lawyers for laypersons should caution them not to at-
tempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the information
contained therein.283
Ethical Consideration 2-2 acknowledged, however, that a public pur-
pose could be achieved by lawyers attempting to educate laypeople
about their legal rights.284 For whatever reason, very little attention
has been focused on newspaper advice columns since the advent of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.285 Indeed, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which largely have supplanted the
Model Code, make no specific mention of newspaper advice col-
umns.286
In recent years, state bars have issued a handful of opinions on
newspaper advice columns, continuing the traditional prohibition
282. Id.
283. Id. EC 2-2 (1980).
284. Ethical Consideration 2-2 stated:
The legal profession should assist lay-persons to recognize legal problems because
such problems may not be self-revealing and often are not timely noticed. Therefore,
lawyers should encourage and participate in educational and public relations pro-
grams concerning our legal system with particular reference to legal problems that
frequently arise. Preparation of advertisements and professional articles for lay pub-
lications and participation in seminars, lectures, and civic programs should be moti-
vated by a desire to educate the public to an awareness of legal needs and to provide
information relevant to the selection of the most appropriate counsel rather than to
obtain publicity for particular lawyers.
Id.
285. The most recent application of the Model Code in this area is Informal Opinion 1464,
which summarizes the past opinions. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Informal Op. 1464 (1980).
286. This may suggest that much, if not all, of the concern with newspaper columns was
generated by the bar’s ban on advertising and other self-promotion that was held unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in Bates. See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text. [xref]
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against giving specific legal advice.287 The general response in most
bar opinions has been to endorse efforts to educate the public, but
also to express strong reservations about the lawyer answering legal
questions.
The similarities between newspaper columns and online legal
advice readily emerge when looking at a typical bar opinion from the
1970s, Florida Opinion No. 70-30.288 In that opinion, the Florida
Committee on Professional Ethics considered a few sample questions
that might be sent to a lawyer by inquiring laypersons. One sample
question and answer provided by the lawyer read:
Q. I pay my rent on the first day of each month in advance. I have
no lease. Must the landlord give me notice if he wants me to move?
Must I give the landlord the same notice if I want to move?
A. Yes to both questions. At least fifteen days advance notice is re-
quired if a landlord wants the tenant to move at the end of the
month. Similarly, a tenant is required to give the same notice if he
intends to move at the end of the month.289
The Florida committee disapproved of this practice, relying on ABA
Opinion 270 to note that “legal columns must be limited to answering
general questions.”290 As in the opinions on radio and television ad-
287. See, e.g., Ala. St. Bar, Op. 86-27 (1986) (allowing an article to be written providing
only general legal information); Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 75-16 (1975)
(allowing a lawyer to write an article based on general information only); id. Op. 60-28 (1961)
(forbidding a lawyer to write an article answering legal questions and noting that local bar as-
sociations already maintain legal aid services that provide legal assistance without cost); Miss.
St. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 109 (1985) (allowing a lawyer to write an article based on
general information); N.J. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Unauthorized Prac., Op. 4 (1971) (prohibiting a
lawyer from writing an article giving individualized legal advice); R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory
Panel, Op. 93-9 (1993) (allowing articles of general legal significance to be written by lawyers);
Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 425 (1985) (same); Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Op. 410 (1983) (same).
288. See Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 70-30 (1970).
289. Id.
290. Id. The Committee on Professional Ethics was concerned that the “format of the col-
umn and questions being answered [did] not comport with the limitations properly indicated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-5 and DR 2-104.” Id. The Committee found
precedent for its decision in ABA Formal Opinion 270, which held “that an attorney may not
answer individual inquiries for legal advice through a newspaper column.” Id.; see also N.J.
Sup. Ct. Comm. on Unauthorized Prac., Op. 4 (1971) (stating that “[t]he vice of the posited
question is that individuals submit their personal problems, and they are specifically answered
by the columnist or the commentator”). The only bar opinion that has approved the giving of
specific legal advice is Oregon Opinion 1991-3, issued in July 1991. See Or. St. Bar Ass’n Legal
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vice, the bar opinions addressing newspaper advice columns have
urged the use of disclaimers to impress upon readers that they must
not rely on the information provided in the column.291
The treatment of newspaper advice columns closely mirrors that
of radio and television advice programs, although there are substan-
tial differences between the two types of advice-giving. In newspaper
columns, there is no direct communication between questioner and
answerer, as there generally is on radio and television programs. A
lawyer writing a newspaper column has more time to reflect upon the
answer, including time to check for conflicts and to ensure a compe-
tent reply. On the other hand, the question and answer in these set-
tings are given in public, without confidentiality. Newspaper advice
columns are somewhat akin to Dear Esquire and other such websites,
except that on many such sites there is little, if any, editorial control
over the content posted by either questioners or answerers. The level
of detail in Internet queries far exceeds what one would expect to see
in a newspaper column, and often the reply is far more specific and
pointed. Again, however, we can see that the bar’s prohibition on
giving specific advice has been consistent, regardless of the medium
used.
                                                                                                                                     
Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-3 (1991). When considering the inquiry, the Oregon Bar Association
prohibited the lawyer from making only “false or misleading communications.” Id.
291. An Alabama bar committee addressed the use of disclaimers in two separate opinions.
One opinion recommended but did not require a disclaimer at the end of a lawyer’s newspaper
column. See Ala. St. Bar, Op. 86-27 (1986). The other stated that a disclaimer would be re-
quired if a newspaper column contained “a statement or claim regarding the services offered by
the lawyer.” Ala. St. Bar, Op. 87-141 (1987). Additionally, Alabama Opinion 82-577 cautioned
against the “inherent dangers” of newspaper advice columns:
1) giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently similar
individual problems, 2) attempting to solve individual problems of specific lay read-
ers, and 3) accepting private employment which can be traced to advice [given] to a
lay reader in an article in connection with which [the lawyer’s] professional experi-
ence or reputation was emphasized.
Ala. St. Bar, Op. 82-577 (1982). Bar opinions often endorse the use of disclaimers to advise the
public about the general nature of the information provided and the danger of relying on the
column to solve their own legal problems. See, e.g., Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics,
Op. 70-30 (1970) (stating that an attorney’s legal column in the newspaper should be limited to
general answers); Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 425 (1985):
EC 2-5 cautions that a lawyer in educating the public in the recognition of legal
problems should be careful to avoid giving the impression that a general solution is
applicable to all similar problems, since the different fact situations obviously vary
the proper advice. Therefore, writings by lawyers for laymen should caution them
not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the information given.
LANCTOT TO PRINTER 11/30/99 2:56 PM
230 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:147
2. Giving Legal Advice in Books. The question of lawyers’
giving legal advice in books and treatises has arisen far less
frequently than advice-giving in other media, but there have been a
few attempts to regulate conduct in this area.292 First, in 1941, the
ABA’s Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law,
together with the Committee of Publishers and Associations on Bar
Cooperation, adopted a Declaration of Principles on the publication
of law books. The Declaration stated: “It is the duty of such
organizations studiously to avoid granting requests for advice or the
performance of other services which would constitute the practice of
law and not hesitate to suggest, in reply to such requests, that the
inquirers’ own counsel be consulted in such matters.”293 The
Declaration further agreed that law books published after August 1,
1941, would carry a disclaimer with respect to the furnishing of legal
advice.294 Whether this agreement had any effect is unclear, but by the
1970s cooperative efforts like this one had raised substantial antitrust
concerns and generally had been rescinded.295 Second, many state
bars, worried about the unauthorized practice of law, attempted to
prevent the publication of “self-help” legal books.296 The leading case
of New York County Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey297 took the position that
publication of How to Avoid Probate by a lawyer did not constitute
292. Far more energy has been devoted to controlling the ability of laypeople to publish
legal advice in books. See WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 15.1.2, at 828 (stating that “[t]he bar’s
largely successful campaign against unauthorized practice has left a large field free from non-
lawyer competition”).
293. Declaration of Principles, 7 UNAUTHORIZED PRAC. NEWS 37, 38 (1941).
294. Id. (“It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering
legal, accounting, or other professional service”). The 1947 ABA Journal, reporting an accord
reached in December 1946 to implement these principles, explained: “A principal objective of
the association was to lessen and forestall the sale of such books and services, and their use by
non-lawyers, on the basis of express or implied representations that they obviated the need for
obtaining definitive advice from lawyers in particular cases arising.” Representations As to Law
Books: Important Principles Agreed to by Publishers, 33 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (1947).
295. See Rhode, supra note 180, at 10 n.36.
296. See, e.g., Dacey v. Florida Bar, 427 F.2d 1292, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970) (describing an ac-
tion for unauthorized practice brought by the Florida Bar against the author of book on avoid-
ing probate); Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339, 352 (Conn. 1969) (holding that an es-
tate planner engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by distributing booklets on trusts and
then preparing wills and trusts for clients); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 913 (Or.
1975) (holding that the publication of a do-it-yourself divorce manual was not the practice of
law).
297. 21 N.Y.2d 694 (1967).
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the practice of law because there was neither personal contact nor
personal advice given on a specific problem.298
The distinction drawn by Dacey is logical: books do not respond
directly to questions posed by laypeople, and thus they do not create
the same concerns about personalized legal advice as radio talk
shows and newspaper columns.299 There simply is no interaction be-
tween the author and the anonymous individual with a legal problem
who purchases the book; the author does not purport to bring legal
expertise to bear on a set of specific facts.300 The general distinction
between general information and specific legal advice can easily be
observed in this context.301 The closest online analogy to publishing
legal advice in books would be the posting of general newsletters, ar-
298. See id. at 695; see also Gilchrist, 538 P.2d at 917 (stating that a book “offer[s] general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific prob-
lem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person”). There is a minority view that treats
books as the equivalent of legal advice, and some jurisdictions have suggested that “compre-
hensive and specific” advice in a divorce kit “parallel[ed] much of what an attorney would cus-
tomarily advise his clients who seek dissolution of marriage.” Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d
683 (Fla. 1974), quoted in Andrew S. Morrison, Is Divorce Mediation the Practice of Law? A
Matter of Perspective, 75 CAL. L. REV 1093, 1105 (1995).
299. According to one ethics opinion, the principal concern for such books is careful avoid-
ance of Rule 8.4 misconduct, because publishing “grossly erroneous or misleading materials”
could constitute a violation of 8.4(c) or 8.4(d). Utah St. Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm.,
Op. 95-01 (1995) (noting that “[i]n the mere publication of forms or text, there is no personal
contact or relationship to any particular individual, nor is personal advice given on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person”). Nevertheless, the Philadelphia
Bar Association took the position that writing a book as an attorney “might be considered
practicing law, particularly if individuals are going to rely on it in making decisions that may
affect their legal rights and liabilities.” Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 93-16
(1993). The Committee further cautioned that the information in the book should be accurate
and up-to-date when published. See id. For a collection of cases on the question of when the
sale of books constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, see Patricia J. Lamkin, Annotation,
Sale of Books or Forms Designed to Enable Laymen to Achieve Legal Results Without Assis-
tance of Attorney as Unauthorized Practice, 71 A.L.R.3d 1000 (1976).
300. But see Fadia v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 830 S.W.2d 162, 162 (Tex.
App. 1992) (finding no difference between personal legal advice and legal advice published in a
book).
301. See State Bar of Mich. v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1976) (stating that the adver-
tisement and distribution to the general public of no-fault divorce forms coupled with general
textual instructions is not the unauthorized practice of law); In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365,
369 (Mo. 1978) (holding that the advertisement and sale of divorce kits does not constitute the
unauthorized practice of law unless personal advice as to legal remedies is given); cf. ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1195 (1971) (stating that the publication of a book
about draft deferments does not constitute the practice of law, but should still observe the
“spirit” of Ethical Consideration 2-5).
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ticles, or other legal writings on a lawyer’s website, an activity that is
unlikely to be viewed as creating an attorney-client relationship.302
C. Giving Legal Advice in Seminars
More analogous to the provision of specific legal advice online
are seminars, which recently have received attention from the bar.
Because of their inherent promotional nature, seminars generally
were prohibited prior to the adoption of Ethical Considerations 2-2
and 2-5 of the Model Code. Those sections stressed the important
educational function seminars could serve.303 By the early 1980s, the
newly adopted Model Rules had eliminated any reference to semi-
nars, and, in the last fifteen years, the use of seminars by lawyers as a
marketing tool has increased substantially.304 At the same time, state
bars have focused increasingly on potential ethical pitfalls of semi-
nars, as evidenced by a large number of opinions in recent years.305
302. The current controversy over the investigation of Nolo Press by the Texas State Bar
for unauthorized practice of law indicates that the battle over giving legal advice in “do-it-
yourself” books continues to rage. See Fried, supra note 51, at A4; Nolo Press, Your Right to
Use Self-Help Law Books and Software, (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.nolopress.com/texas/rights.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Nolo’s le-
gal self-help software is also under investigation. See John Council, Self-Help Legal Software
Judged Unauthorized Practice in Texas, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 2, 1999, at 4.
303. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-2 (1980) (stating that
“[t]he legal profession should assist laypersons to recognize legal problems because such prob-
lems may not be self revealing”); id. EC 2.5 (“A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of
educating members of the public to recognize legal problems should carefully refrain from
giving . . . a general solution applicable to all apparently similar individual problems.”).
304. See generally Frederick C. Moss, The Ethics of Law Practice Marketing, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 601, 661 (1986); Nina Keilin, Note, Client Outreach 101: Solicitation of Elderly
Clients by Seminar Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1547, 1561 (1994).
305. See, e.g., Ala. St. Bar, Op. 86-115 (1986) (advising that lawyers can speak at legal
seminars so long as they do not profess to give individual advice and do not attempt to solicit
clients); Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 75-36 (1977) (suggesting that lawyers
can teach seminars so long as they do not seek to give individual advice at such seminars); Ind.
St. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 10 (1986) (advising that lawyers may use seminars to
provide information to the public about the availability of legal services “so long as such infor-
mation does not purport to provide general solutions to individual problems”); Mass. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 83-4 (1983) (suggesting that seminars are ethically acceptable, but
that lawyers must refrain from soliciting clients while conducting them); N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 548 (1984) (affirming the ethical propriety of seminars so long as
they have an educational purpose and are not merely a forum for soliciting clients); Sup. Ct. of
Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 489 (1992) (suggesting that seminars are ethically acceptable so
long as they are not designed primarily for publicity or profit and so long as lawyers partici-
pating in such seminars do not answer laypersons’ questions regarding specific problems). Like
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Among the ethical issues to have arisen is the question of giving spe-
cific legal advice to participants in seminars, either during a question-
and-answer period or in individual conversations. Once again, bar
opinions have drawn a distinction between giving general legal in-
formation and tailoring legal advice to the specific facts put forth by
the inquirer. These opinions usually have allowed lawyers to answer
requests for general legal information.306 On the other hand, a num-
ber of bar opinions have emphatically warned lawyers not to answer
specific legal questions during seminars.307 A “seminar must be to in-
form rather than to give legal advice.”308
                                                                                                                                     
opinions are Ala. St. Bar, Op. 87-119 (1987); id. Op. 86-49 (1986); State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on
Rules of Prof’l Conduct; id. Op. 92-10 (1992); id. Op. 88-7 (1988); id. Op. 87-12 (1987); Cincin-
nati Bar Ass’n Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Op. 94-95-03 (undated); Conn. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 94-3 (1994); Haw. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Op. 78516 (1978); Ill.
St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 94-4 (1994); id. Op. 763 (1982); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Con-
duct, Op. 91-16 (1991); id. Op. 89-41 (1990); Md. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 88-33
(1988); id. Op. 81-36 (1981); Mass. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 86-3 (1986); State
Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-99 (1991); id. Op. RI-81
(1991); Miss. St. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 156 (1988); Nassau County (N.Y.) Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 87-25 (1987); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-93/11
(1993); N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 540 (1984); N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 508 (1979); N.C. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 36 (1988);
Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 94-13 (1994); id. Op. 87-7
(1987); Ohio St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Conduct, Op. 94-2 (1994); Pa.
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 86-144 (1986); R.I. Sup. Ct.
Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 93-103 (1993); id. Op. 91-12 (1991); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 90-37 (1991); State Bar of S.D. Ethics Comm., Op. 88-3 (1988); Sup. Ct. of Tex.
Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 394 (1979); Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 856
(1986); State Bar of Wis. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. E-94-4 (1994); id. Op. E-89-1
(1989); id. Op. E-80-19 (1981).
306. See, e.g., State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-141
(1992) (“If the proposed seminar were a mere informational gathering, it would serve a useful
public purpose and should be encouraged.”); Miss. St. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 156 (1988)
(finding the education of the public about legal issues to be desirable); Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l
Ethics Comm., Op. 394 (1979) (noting that it is proper for a lawyer to participate in a seminar
the purpose of which is to impart information, but improper if the seminar’s purpose is to
“publicize, or make money for, its sponsors, the lawyer, or others” (citing ABA Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics, Informal Op. 840 (1965))). Like opinions are Ala. St. Bar, Op. 87-119 (1987);
State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 92-10 (1992); id. Op. 87-23 (1987);
Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 75-36 (1977); Haw. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd.,
Op. 78516 (1978); Ind. St. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 10 (1986); Md. St. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Ethics, Op. 81-36 (1981); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial
Ethics, Op. RI-81 (1991); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 87-7
(1987); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 87-1 (1987); State
Bar of S.D. Ethics Comm., Op. 88-3 (1988); Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 489
(1992); Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Prac. of L., Op. 179 (1994).
307. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 92-10 (1992); State
Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-141 (1992); id. Op. RI-81
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Illustrating this concern is New Hampshire Bar Opinion 1992-
93/11, which warns lawyers against answering any questions at semi-
nars, because an answer may confuse other listeners who attempt to
use the information to solve their own problems.309 In fact, this opin-
ion cautions that it might “be difficult to determine, even in hind-
sight, the extent to which the lawyer’s response to individual ques-
tions at such seminars confers the status of ‘client’ on a member of
the public . . . .”310 The opinion suggests that one way of reducing the
possibility of such a misapprehension is specifically to inform the at-
tendee that no attorney-client privilege has developed from the lim-
ited interaction between the lawyer and the questioner. In addition, a
                                                                                                                                     
(1991); Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 489 (1992); cf. In re Morin, 878 P.2d 393, 401
(Or. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that lawyer improperly allowed paralegals to give specific le-
gal advice to clients found at “living trust” seminars).
308. State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 92-10 (1992). The opinion
also warned that “[i]t is improper for an attorney, during the seminar to answer questions of
laymen concerning their specific individual legal problems.” Id.; see also Fla. St. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 75-36 (1977) (stating that a lawyer may not give legal advice on
particular legal problems to those attending a class covering general legal subjects); State Bar
of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-141 (1992) (reaffirming previous
opinions that discourage a lawyer from giving specific legal advice at seminars); id. Op. RI-81
(1991) (stating that a lawyer could obtain employment originating from a seminar when at-
tendees approach the lawyer, but that the lawyer must instruct attendee to set up an appoint-
ment, rather than to begin consultation at the seminar); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on
Grievances & Discipline, Op. 94-13 (1994) (allowing a lawyer to accept legal employment re-
sulting from the giving of seminars).
309. See N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-93/11 (1993). The opinion noted that the
Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit answering questions posed by the participants,
but recognized that answering questions raises particular difficulties:
Any answer, which may be entirely appropriate for the questioner, may confuse or
be misapprehended by other listeners as applying to other facts. Off-the-cuff answers
without an opportunity for in-depth examination of the client’s situation present po-
tential issues of competence under Rule 1.1, and the lawyer (and the audience) may
be exposed to disclosure of potentially criminal or tortious acts by the questioner,
which may in turn lead to difficult decisions under Rule 1.6 . . . Also, as it may not be
sufficiently clear whether the questioner is a client, the possible client relationship
may raise problems of potential conflicts of interest with existing or former clients,
which will be difficult to check under the circumstances. It may also unintentionally
mislead participants as to what they can expect of the lawyer in the future. Lawyers
can lessen these risks by specifically disclaiming a client relationship, and by being
careful not to imply one.
Id.
310. Id.; cf. Davis v. York Int’l Corp., No. CIV.A.HAR 92-3545, 1993 WL 180224, at *2 (D.
Md. May 24, 1993) (holding that, at a continuing legal education presentation, a lawyer’s an-
swering another lawyer’s question about a specific case did not suffice to establish an attorney-
client relationship).
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lawyer should take every step to avoid implying that an attorney-
client relationship ever existed.311
Other bar opinions have also cautioned against lawyers giving
individual legal advice at seminars.312 Bar opinions from such jurisdic-
tions as Ohio,313 Arizona,314 and Michigan,315 for example, have
stressed the importance of warning attendees that the material being
311. See N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-93/11 (1993).
312. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 87-23 (1987)
(“Anyone inquiring about specific problems must be admonished to consult an attorney for
legal advice.”); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-81
(1991) (stating that the lawyer may obtain employment originating from a seminar when at-
tendees approach the lawyer, as long as the lawyer instructs the attendees to set up an ap-
pointment, rather than to begin consultation at the seminar); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 87-1 (1987) (advising lawyers who answer questions from
the audience in educational courses to make clear that answers are not intended as specific le-
gal advice); State Bar of S.D. Ethics Comm., Op. 88-3 (1988) (prohibiting lawyers from con-
ducting seminars in which they give specific legal advice and accept requests for representa-
tion). Opinions providing similar admonitions include: Ala. St. Bar, Op. 87-119 (1987); id. Op.
86-115 (1986); State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 92-10 (1992); Fla. St.
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 75-36 (1977); Haw. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Op. 78516
(1978); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-141 (1992); N.J.
Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 540 (1984); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on
Grievances & Discipline, Op. 94-13 (1994); id. Op. 87-7 (1987); Sup. Ct. of Tex. Prof’l Ethics
Comm., Op. 394 (1979); Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Prac. of L. Op. 179
(1994).
313. Ohio distinguishes between seminars that offer legal information as it applies to eve-
ryone and seminars that provide individuals with unsolicited advice. See Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 87-7 (1987) (opining that “as long as the lawyer
conducting the seminar is not giving unsolicited advice that someone should obtain counsel or
take legal action, or touting or recommending himself or members of his firm for employment
by those in attendance,” then the lawyer may conduct the seminar). Another Ohio opinion
notes:
To avoid giving individual advice, it would be prudent for the lawyer to advise the at-
tendees that the lawyer’s discussion in regard to questions will be general and not in-
tended as individual advice for specific problems. In addition, it may be helpful for
the attorney to remind the attendees not to divulge confidential information.
Id. Op. 94-13 (1994).
314. See State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 92-10 (1992) (warning
lawyers that it is improper for an attorney to answer specific individual legal questions at a
seminar).
315. See State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-141 (1992):
A lawyer may not purport to deliver legal services to attendees at a seminar at which
confidences and secrets of the individual attendees cannot be preserved, [because]
there is little or no opportunity for the lawyer to communicate with attendees suffi-
cient to enable the attendees to make informed decisions concerning their particular
situations, [and] there is no opportunity for the lawyer to exercise independent pro-
fessional judgment regarding options more suitable to a particular attendee . . . .
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supplied is only general information and that it should not be used to
solve individual problems. The Ohio bar opinion recommends: “To
avoid giving individual advice, it would be prudent for the lawyer to
advise the attendees that the lawyer’s discussion in regard to ques-
tions will be general and not intended as individual advice for specific
problems.”316 In a slightly different context, a Hawaii bar opinion
warns that lawyers participating in a “Law Day” booth with the pur-
pose of furnishing free legal information “must not attempt to solve
the person’s legal problem in particular or provide a general solution
to all apparently similar personal problems that could have important
functional differences.”317
The bar’s treatment of advice-giving in seminars parallels its his-
torical treatment of advice-giving through mass media devices such as
newspapers, radio, and television. With regard to seminars, the bar
has stressed both the dichotomy between general information and
specific advice and the lack of confidentiality inherent in the process.
Seminar advice does carry with it some of the risks of radio and tele-
vision advice in that the lawyer lacks time to reflect on the response
and to ensure that there is no potential conflict of interest. In addi-
tion, at least one recent opinion on seminars has expressly recognized
what was only implicit in older opinions—the risk that giving specific
legal advice may inadvertently create an attorney-client relation-
ship.318 Perhaps most relevant to our inquiry is the bar opinions’ cau-
tionary tone with respect to the efficacy of disclaimers.319 For the full-
est treatment of these issues, however, we must turn to the bar opin-
ions addressing a very recent technological advance—the 900 num-
ber.
D. Giving Legal Advice on the Telephone Through 900 Numbers
One final means of nontraditional legal advice-giving is the 900
number, a telephone service in which an attorney charges callers a
certain amount per minute for a consultation. These services merit
our particular attention because they closely parallel the exchanges
316. Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 94-13 (1994) (noting
the risk in answering questions when those attending the seminar listen to an answer provided
by a lawyer and act upon that information to solve their own problems).
317. Haw. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Op. 78516 (1978).
318. See N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-93/11 (1993).
319. For example, in the bar opinions collected in notes 306-308, the presence or absence of
a disclaimer does not seem to alter the warnings against giving specific advice.
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on individual websites that offer an answer to a legal question for a
set fee. The bar opinions issued in the last few years have warned that
the practice of using 900 numbers is rife with ethical land mines.320
The opinions have focused specifically on whether these telephone
conversations create attorney-client relationships, and, if so, whether
such relationships can be disclaimed.321
320. See, e.g., Ala. St. Bar, Op. 91-24 (1991) (permitting a 900-number service to provide
information to nonclient creditors concerning bankruptcy matters); Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 93-08 (1993) (observing that the attorney-client relationship cannot
be disclaimed when advice is given via a 900-number service); id. Op. 92-06 (1992) (recognizing
an attorney-client relationship when advice is given via such services and requiring lawyers to
screen potential clients to ensure competency); L.A. County Bar Ass’n Prof’l Responsibility &
Ethics Comm., Op. 449 (1988) (permitting such service but requiring duties of confidentiality,
competency, and avoidance of conflicts of interest); N.J. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Att’y Advertising,
Op. 17 (1994) (concluding that such service is not per se unethical and that an attorney-client
relationship would exist); N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 664 (1994) (noting
that if the relationship is limited to general advice, the client must be advised of the conse-
quences of such limitations); id. Op. 625 (1992) (permitting general legal advice to be given,
provided that callers are told that there are substantial limitations on the applicability of the
information); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 92-10 (1992) (re-
quiring all traditional ethical duties to be applied to a 900-number service); Pa. Bar Ass’n
Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 95-52 (1995) (noting that telephone law-
yers assume all ethical responsibilities when giving legal advice); id. Op. 90-156 (1991) (re-
quiring lawyers to screen calls initially, without charge, to determine whether they have suffi-
cient expertise to handle the matter); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 91-15
(1991) (requiring full disclosure of charges before advice is given); Utah St. Bar Ethics Advi-
sory Opinion Comm., Op. 96-12 (1997) (noting that an attorney-client relationship is created
and that all ethical rules apply); Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1577 (1994)
(requiring that telephone clients be advised not to try to solve problems based on information
provided by 900-number recordings); Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Prac. of L.,
Op. 185 (1995) (concluding that no attorney-client relationship is formed where “basic factual
information” is provided on various legal topics). See generally John P. Gillard, Jr., Pay-Per-
Call Legal Advice, Professional Integrity, and Legal Licenses: Why 1-900-LAWYERS Is a Call
to the Wrong Number, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 549 (1996) (examining regulations and ethical con-
siderations governing lawyers’ use of 900 numbers and weighing the benefits to society against
the cost to the reputation of the legal profession); Brian S. Stuart, Note, From Heavy Breathing
to Habeas Corpus: Phone Law in the Nineties, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 455 (1995) (discussing
the potential for legal malpractice arising from the use of 900 numbers); Ann Davis, Legal Ad-
vice Lines Gain Favor, Ethical Scrutiny, NAT’L L.J., May 6, 1996, at A6 (noting the possibility
of an unauthorized practice violation when a 900-number attorney is not licensed to practice in
the caller’s home state).
321. Some 900-number services provide only prerecorded information, rather than live
conversation between an attorney and a caller. When there is no interaction between the attor-
ney and the caller, the issue of giving specific legal advice usually does not arise, although there
still may be concerns about notifying the caller about the limitations of the information pro-
vided. For example, the Virginia bar allowed a 900-number service that provided pre-recorded
information about bankruptcy law, as long as the message “include[d] a statement which clari-
fie[d] that the message [was] general information only and not specific legal advice, and which
caution[ed] the listener against trying to solve problems based on the message’s general infor-
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The Kansas bar has been the most active in addressing the issue
of 900 numbers, issuing two comprehensive bar opinions in the last
seven years. The first opinion, Kansas Opinion 92-06, responded to
the proposal of a small law firm that had been furnishing free legal
advice on an 800 number and wanted to begin advertising a 900 num-
ber that would charge callers a “rough equivalent” of the firm’s
hourly rate.322 The service was to be called “Dial-A-Lawyer,” and
each call was to begin with a “recorded disclaimer [that] would indi-
cate that only certain general advice is given, and that the firm does
not take or solicit clients from such calls.”323
Opinion 92-06 does not categorically denounce this practice, al-
though it notes that the ethical hazards it presents “may make a 900
service more of a headache than it’s worth.”324 Rather, the opinion
                                                                                                                                     
mation.” Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1577 (1994). In a later opinion, the
Virginia State Bar said that no attorney-client relationship arises when an lawyer records a
message to be played for callers using the 900-number service, as long as no legal advice is
given in the message. See Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Prac. of L., Op. 185
(1995) (asserting that 900-number phone messages do not constitute the practice of law and
that therefore legal ethical rules do not apply). New York Opinion 625 took a similar approach,
warning that “some portion of the audience for the proposed 900 service will be composed of
relatively unsophisticated members of the public” and that they should be notified of the lim-
ited nature of the information they would receive. See N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 625 (1992); see also Ill. St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-06 (1998) (stating that charging $15 for
five minutes of prerecorded information on a 900-number service is more like a book on tape
than advice, but that the $15 may not be a reasonable fee); cf. Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 95-52 (1995) (stating that a recording is “a form of transmis-
sion of legal services” and thus subject to ethical duties). The opinion advises further:
Those duties may be mitigated by the fact that the advice which you are dispensing is
general rather than specifically tailored to a particular client’s requirements, but your
responsibilities may be somewhat enhanced by the fact that you receive no feedback
or reaction whatsoever from the listener to your telephone message, if he does not
contact you thereafter. You must recognize that you are dealing with anonymous
people, who may never be known to you, but who may yet rely on general telephone
advice, and in the event of some misunderstanding which you are not able to clear
up, perhaps rely to their detriment.
Id.
322. Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 92-06 (1992) (stating that the
firm planned to use the service to answer general questions about domestic relations, workers’
compensation, landlord-tenant disputes, “and other relatively simple matters”).
323. Id. In addition to the disclaimer, the attorneys would not handle calls from states in
which they were not licensed to practice. See id. Moreover, no fee would be charged for the
first minute so that those who called in error would not be billed. See id. Telephone calls would
be limited to 30 minutes, and the total cost of the call “would not exceed a typical hourly rate
for a similar length personal appointment.” Id.
324. Id. (noting that “[t]he creation of a 900 pay-call system is not per se unethical” and
that “[f]or consumers who must miss work and schedule an appointment for routine legal ad-
vice, such systems may be beneficial”).
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takes the position that “advertising that the 900 service is intended to
provide ‘legal advice’ to those who call the service establishes the at-
torney-client relationship if confidential information is given.”325
Once the exchange is characterized as an attorney-client relationship,
a variety of obligations arise. As to the duty of competency, Opinion
92-06 notes that the “lawyer’s duty to render competent legal advice
does not depend on whether the advice is given in a law office or over
the phone, whether the client was privately referred or comes to the
firm because of legal advertising, or whether a fee is paid.”326 The
opinion notes that the lawyer must also screen 900-number clients for
conflicts of interest and asserts that a blanket disclaimer at the begin-
ning of telephone calls cannot suffice to waive such conflicts.327
Rather, “[t]he screening for conflicts used in the 900 service must be
as thorough as conflicts checks used for new clients who come to the
office.”328
Opinion 92-06 identifies another troubling aspect of 900-number
legal advice—the issue of client abandonment. It considers the hypo-
thetical situation in which an accident victim calls “Dial-A-Lawyer”
325. Id. In contrast:
Discussing baseball with a person over a 900 service may create a fee from the tele-
phone company, but it is not legal advice. Without the status of lawyer-client being
established, in our opinion the lawyer would not have a basis to charge or collect a
fee “for legal advice” directly or through the phone company.
Id.
326. Id. The opinion notes that it is permissible for the service to limit its advice to simple
matters under Kansas Model Rule 1.2 (c), as long as the limitation on the scope of services is
truthful and is given before the clients incur billable charges. See id. Because such screening is
required, the “900 ‘meter’ cannot be switched on automatically.” Id. Otherwise, a lawyer who
billed when he was not competent to advise on a particular issue would likely violate Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5’s prohibition against unreasonable fees. See id.
327. See id. The opinion states that the limitations on the advice given over the telephone
are of “little value” if they otherwise violate the rule against conflicts of interest. Id. It also
notes that clients have the “right to legal advice given in accord with the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct,” which may not be waived without consent after consultation. Id.
328. Id. The opinion further states:
The typical situation is on a Friday, Wife calls Dial-A-Lawyer about a divorce,
wanting to know “her rights.” During the call she imparts confidential information.
On Monday husband calls the same firm using Dial-A-Lawyer. There may be a
problem of counsel even talking to husband if wife gave important information rele-
vant to the matter and that information is not otherwise generally available. The con-
flict is there regardless whether firm takes the wife’s case. Certainly they cannot
charge Husband for the 900 service when a conflict exists. Thus it is better to avoid
the call at all.
Id.
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just before the statute of limitations expires on a possible negligence
action. The Kansas Bar Association Committee on Ethics/Advisory
Services asserts that, “for lawyers whose clients ask advice on a topic
about which the lawyer is not competent to comment, the Rules cre-
ate a duty to inform client of such and ensure client’s decision
whether and how to proceed is knowledgeable.”329 Discussing the hy-
pothetical, Opinion 92-06 states: “Having been informed of the cli-
ent’s jeopardy, Dial-A-Lawyer attorneys must act in a timely emer-
gency fashion to preserve the client’s rights, even if the firm says it
will not take such cases directly from 900 calls.”330 Because the initial
telephone consultation creates a professional relationship, “that cre-
ates a positive duty to advise a client accurately and professionally to
whatever extent necessary. Follow-up contacts initiated by counsel
may be required.”331 At a minimum, the firm must have “a policy on
what it will do if the client needs a longer period for explanation”
than the thirty-minute maximum identified in its advertising.332
Finally, Opinion 92-06 expressly addresses the issue of malprac-
tice, stating that “the recorded disclaimers and actual conversations
in the 900 system cannot in any way limit the liability of the firm to
the client.”333
In Opinion 93-08, the Kansas committee considered whether a
900-number service could structure itself to avoid the creation of at-
torney-client relationships and their attendant obligations. The serv-
ice considered in the opinion took “great pains” to avoid formation
of an attorney-client relationship, limiting itself to providing “legal
information” and beginning each call with a preamble stating that
“no advice is given over the line, that an attorney-client relationship
is not established, nor does the right of confidentiality apply.”334
329. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
330. Id.
331. Id. (“Expecting the client to redial the 900-number again for further advice we believe
is an improper conditioning of advice on incurring another fee.”); see also Cal. St. Bar Standing
Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Proposed Formal Op. 95-0015 (1995) (stating that
the duty to volunteer advice is necessary “if the failure to consider such advice could result in a
foreseeable adverse consequence to the client” (citing Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
332. Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 92-06 (1992).
333. Id. The opinion also identifies other ethical issues involving advertising, after-acquired
legal work, fees, and fee-sharing with laypersons.
334. Id. Op. 93-08 (1993). The system would use CD-ROM technology to provide legal in-
formation, but “[i]f asked for an opinion on the information, answering attorney (or supervised
nonlawyers) would decline to answer.” Id.
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Skeptical of the claim that such a service would be an “ancillary busi-
ness service” rather than the practice of law, Opinion 93-08 states
unequivocally that “‘legal information’ in this context creates an at-
torney-client relationship within the purview of the Model Rules”335
and expressly denies that “an effective disclaimer can be crafted in a
900-pay-for-information service sufficient to avoid the requirements
of the Model Rules.”336 Other bar opinions have also taken the posi-
tion that giving legal advice on a 900-number service creates an at-
torney-client relationship that cannot be disclaimed.337
335. Id. The opinion also notes that if a caller wants to know what the statute of limitations
is in an automobile accident, and the 900-number service provides that information, “the law-
yer must assume the client will rely and act upon the information provided, whether given as
legal advice or simple information.” Id. Furthermore, “a fiduciary relationship is established
when there is reliance, and with such reliance comes the normal duties imposed on lawyers not
to abandon clients.” Id. (citing Procanik v. Cillo, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988)); see also
N.J. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Att’y Advertising, Op. 17 (1994) (“[A]n attorney-client relationship
may be found to exist if there is some ‘identifiable manifestation’ that a person relied on the
lawyer in his or her professional capacity.” (quoting In re Palmieri, 385 A.2d 856, 860 (1978)).
336. Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 93-08 (1993). The opinion also
rejects the proposed disclaimers as ineffective because of the prohibition against prospective
waivers of malpractice liability, stating:
If the tort statute of limitation is two years and the lawyer negligently informs the
client that the applicable statute is three years, client later relies on the advice and is
non-suited, can lawyer then claim no malpractice liability because of all the disclaim-
ers in the 900 service that no attorney-client relationship existed? We find no
authority for that position.
Id. Opinion 93-08 also notes the possible implications for confidentiality from the attempted
disclaimers, stating: “We do not believe the lawyer can counsel client to accept ‘legal informa-
tion’ with the understanding that client confidences do not apply especially given MRPC 1.8(h)
and our historical litigation holding active licensed lawyers accountable to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct irrespective of their economic pursuits.” Id.; see also Cal. St. Bar Standing
Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Proposed Formal Op. 95-0015 (“Using prere-
corded advisory message and soliciting the caller’s oral consent may be inadequate for the
caller to clearly understand the limited scope of advice being provided or the significance of the
limits on these services.”).
337. See Ill. St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 94-11 (1997) (stating that “callers to the legal advice service
are clients of the law firm who are entitled to the protection of clients afforded by [the Rules of
Professional Conduct]”); L.A. County Bar Ass’n Prof’l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Op.
449 (1988) (stating that a “hot line” providing legal advice for a fee is allowed, but that the at-
torney must afford the caller all pertinent ethical duties such as confidentiality); N.J. Sup. Ct.
Comm. on Att’y Advertising, Op. 17 (1994) (commenting that a 900-number disclaimer stating
that the lawyers “cannot accept responsibility for the answers or advice provided” was “in con-
tradiction of established law and public policy”); Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances
& Discipline, Op. 93-1 (1993) (stating that a 900-number lawyer must provide clients calling the
“dial-a-lawyer” service with the same protections he would afford any client coming to his of-
fice); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 95-52 (1995) (recog-
nizing that a recorded message by a lawyer explaining general real estate law may be done
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Although most jurisdictions that have considered the issue treat
900-number conversations as creating attorney-client relationships, a
minority view permits the lawyer to give advice without triggering
such a relationship. New York State Bar Opinion 664 indicates that
the attorney “should provide disclosure of the extent of the advice
being offered and the extent of the attorney-client relationship cre-
ated during the telephone conversation.”338 In so doing, “a lawyer
may restrict his or her representation to the provision of general ad-
vice on legal problems that frequently arise.”339 The opinion further
reasons that many laypeople “may appreciate (1) a discussion of gen-
eral areas of law that are more tailored to their particular situation
than a book or article might be, or (2) a quick identification of the le-
                                                                                                                                     
through a 900-number service, but cautioning that this activity brings with it the ethical respon-
sibilities arising when legal advice is given); id. Op. 90-156 (1991) (requiring a lawyer to screen
calls to determine if he is competent to provide the advice sought); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l
Guidance Comm., Op. 91-15 (1991) (opining that the lawyer must be competent to answer the
questions asked before advising the caller); Utah St. Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op.
96-12 (1997) (stating that “if the advice sought is pertinent to the attorney’s profession, and if
the attorney gives the advice for which fees will be charged, an attorney/client relationship is
created that cannot be disclaimed by the attorney giving the advice”). California’s proposed
Formal Opinion 95-0015 takes a position similar to that of Kansas. See Cal. St. Bar Standing
Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Proposed Formal Op. 95-0015 (citing Perkins v.
West Coast Lumber Co., 62 P. 57 (Cal. 1900)). The opinion noted that “[w]hen a party seeking
legal advice consults an attorney and secures that advice, however, the relation of attorney and
client is established prima facie,” and it rejected disclaimers as both insufficient to avoid creat-
ing such a relationship and possibly violating the rules against false or misleading statements.
Id. Virginia Opinion 1328 addressed a variation of these services, in which a lawyer established
a 900-number service promising to answer any legal questions for a year, via the telephone, for
a certain price. See Va. St. Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1328 (1996). The opinion
stated that whenever legal advice is provided by a lawyer to a person, whether in person or
over the telephone, an attorney-client relationship exists. See id.
338. N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 664 (1994). The opinion recommends
that the lawyer inform the caller:
(1) that some legal issues may be too complex to result in clear, concise and com-
plete responses by telephone, (2) whether the lawyer will restrict his or her represen-
tation to advice of general applicability or whether the advice will be sufficiently
tailored to the specific facts at hand to constitute complete legal advice, (3) the ar-
rangements that will be made if competent representation would require legal re-
search, review of documents and advice that cannot be provided during the initial
telephone call, and (4) whether the representation is limited to telephone advice or
also encompasses other steps . . . .
Id.
339. Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-2 (1980)). New
York has not adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
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gal issues involved, even if the discussion is general, and does not
provide any answers to the issues raised.”340
In light of the case law previously reviewed, as well as the long
history of bar regulation of advice-giving, the Kansas approach seems
far more consistent with the traditional understanding of the attor-
ney-client relationship. The New York opinion acknowledges that
some kind of attorney-client relationship is created, but also assumes
that only general information is to be transmitted by the lawyer. As
we have seen, transmitting general information has rarely been char-
acterized as sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship. On
the other hand, paying a fee for legal advice has ordinarily been
strong evidence of a professional relationship. As Utah Opinion 96-
12 explains: “[I]f legal advice is sought from an attorney, if the advice
sought is pertinent to the attorney’s profession, and if the attorney
gives the advice for which fees will be charged, an attorney-client re-
lationship is created that cannot be disclaimed by the attorney giving
the advice.”341 Moreover, the New York opinion does not fully ana-
lyze how far the lawyer may go in disclaiming responsibility for the
advice he gives, nor does it address whether certain disclaimers might
be void as against public policy, since most people will not pay for le-
gal advice, in any guise, unless they expect to be able to rely on it.342
These divergent approaches reflect an emerging tension in the
area of nontraditional advice-giving. The majority apparently as-
sumes that conduct creating an attorney-client relationship is to be
avoided at all costs, either by way of disclaimer or by studiously
340. Id. Under this approach, 900-number advice services are consistent with the admoni-
tion of Ethical Consideration 2-2 to help the public to recognize legal problems. Other jurisdic-
tions have noted the difficulties in finding an attorney-client relationship emerging from 900-
number conversations. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 93-1 (1993)
(asserting that 900-number services are improper for Iowa lawyers, although “it is difficult to
see how such a relationship can arise out of an initial contact by telephone, without personal
confrontation and without means to identify or otherwise personally to relate to the inquirer”);
Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 92-10 (1992) (opining that it
seems unusual when legal advice is given to a caller with whom the lawyer has no previous pro-
fessional affiliation or relationship). The Iowa opinion noted, however, that such relationships
could develop and impose substantial duties on the lawyer. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct, Op. 93-1 (1993).
341. Utah St. Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 96-12 (1997) (citing Breyer-
Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 707 (Utah 1990)).
342. See N.J. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Att’y Advertising, Op. 17 (1994) (explaining that “con-
sumers will not call if they do not have specific problems for which they need advice—advice
on which they intend to rely” and that “[c]onsequently, they will have every reason to believe .
. . that an attorney-client relationship will exist”).
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avoiding the giving of specific legal advice. The New York opinion,
however, comes close to advising that the lawyer create some kind of
limited professional relationship by way of disclaimer, without ex-
plaining the ramifications of such limitations.
E. Giving Legal Advice in Cyberspace
As yet, only a few bar opinions have discussed the ramifications
of giving legal advice to strangers in cyberspace, and none has at-
tempted to analyze this question in light of the case law or the history
of regulating analogous conduct. In an early discussion of the subject,
South Carolina Opinion 94-27 permitted online legal discussions
“solely for the purpose of discussing legal topics generally, without
the giving of advice or the representation of any particular client.”343
That same year, Oregon Bar Opinion No. 1994-137 permitted the de-
velopment of an online legal data base that would furnish informa-
tion to inquirers, but would not provide live communication. The
opinion noted that “if someone at the legal information service were
generating legal advice during an on-line session by giving personal
advice, that is the practice of law.”344 Tennessee Advisory Ethics
Opinion 95-A-576 permitted lawyers to respond to laypersons’ re-
quests through private e-mail, but cautioned that providing specific
legal information could create an attorney-client relationship.345 Ari-
zona Bar Opinion 97-04 recommended that lawyers should “probably
not” answer questions raised in online chat rooms because of the in-
ability to check for potential conflicts of interest and the risk of dis-
closing confidential information.346 It continued: “Ethically, it would
follow that lawyers should not answer specific legal questions from
lay people through the Internet unless the question presented is of a
general nature and the advice given is not fact-specific.”347
Some opinions have indicated that online exchanges can create
attorney-client relationships. The most emphatic on this score is Illi-
343. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-27 (1995). The opinion further stated that if
the lawyer wished to represent clients through online activities, the lawyer would have to “ob-
tain sufficient information to identify his client in order to make a complete conflicts inquiry.”
Id.
344. Or. St. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1994-137 (1994).
345. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 95-A-576 (1995) (unpublished
opinion) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
346. State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 (1997).
347. Id.
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nois Bar Opinion 96-10, which states that “lawyers participating in
chat-groups or other on-line services that could involve offering per-
sonalized legal advice to anyone who happens to be connected to the
service should be mindful that the recipients of such advice are the
lawyer’s clients, with the benefits and burdens of that relationship.”348
Somewhat less definitive is Philadelphia Bar Opinion 98-6, published
in 1998, which considers a hypothetical situation in which a lawyer
who has filed a class action against a corporation later participates in
an online discussion group in which questions are raised about the
suit by participants. Opinion 98-6 identifies a number of potential
ethical concerns that might arise from any responses the lawyer might
give.349 It also notes that the lawyer must be cautious about not cre-
ating, albeit inadvertently, an attorney-client relationship, which be-
gins “when a person would have a reasonable expectation that such a
relationship was formed.”350 The opinion recommends a disclaimer.
More recently, two opinions from New York have discussed
lawyer activity on the Internet. New York Opinion 709, issued in Sep-
tember of 1998, considers a number of ethical issues arising from a
lawyer’s intended use of a website in connection with a business that
would “conduct trademark searches, render legal opinions on avail-
ability of trademarks, and file and prosecute applications to register
trademarks.”351 The attorney had planned to give legal opinions on
the telephone, but otherwise to use unencrypted e-mail to communi-
cate with clients. Noting that using the Internet to practice law is
“analogous to conducting a law practice by telephone or facsimile
machine,” the opinion concludes that the various obligations of tradi-
tional client representation would inhere in this practice as well.352 It
reiterates the New York committee’s position in the 900-number dis-
348. Ill. St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 96-10 (1997).
349. See Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (1998) (warning that the lawyer
must be concerned about truthfulness to third parties, must beware of the dangers of remaining
anonymous, must be concerned about the likelihood that newsgroup participants might be lo-
cated in jurisdictions in which the lawyer is not licensed to practice, and must be cautious about
violating rules against solicitation).
350. Id.
351. N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (stating that the duties in-
clude complying with state requirements to post a statement of client rights and responsibilities,
conducting adequate conflicts checks, ensuring competency, preserving confidentiality, and
avoiding solicitation).
352. Id. The opinion also warns of the dangers of providing legal services to clients outside
of New York without considering the possibility of unauthorized practice of law. See id.
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cussion353 that “a conflicts check is not required where the attorney’s
interaction is limited to providing general information of an educa-
tional nature, no confidential information is obtained from a client
and no specific advice tailored to a client’s particular circumstances is
rendered.”354
New York City Opinion 1998-2 addresses a similar proposal for
a website providing trademark searches and other intellectual prop-
erty–related services.355 The firm also wished to establish a “listserv-
type discussion area on the subject of general intellectual property
and legal issues.”356 The opinion advises that lawyers participating in
the discussion should employ “substantial caution and vigilance” to
avoid giving or appearing to give specific legal advice.357 The opinion
adds that a disclaimer might not shield the firm against a claim that
specific online communication had established an attorney-client re-
lationship.358
F. The Past Is Prologue
The legal profession’s historical hostility to giving specific legal
advice to laypeople outside the confines of traditional attorney-client
relationships is unlikely to disappear overnight, regardless of how at-
tractive the new medium of computer technology may appear to
some lawyers. Although such vehement technophobes as Clarence
Seward may be fewer in number today, ambivalence about the effect
of the Internet on traditional law practice remains, and the opinions
addressing Internet advice-giving perpetuate the seventy-year pattern
of skepticism toward nontraditional forms of legal advice. This is not
to suggest that such concerns have no merit. Unregulated use of the
Internet to dispense legal advice is fraught with peril, both for the un-
suspecting layperson seeking such advice and for the lawyer who
carelessly produces it. But it is important for the legal profession to
remember that the peril arises not from the technology itself, but
from the failure to harness its power appropriately.
353. See supra notes 338-340 [xref] and accompanying text.
354. N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998).
355. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 1998-2
(1998).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See id.
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Having offered some observations about the risks inherent in
permitting Internet advice-giving to continue without scrutiny by the
organized bar, I conclude with some reflections on how this aspect of
the new medium ought to be regulated. The difficult question facing
the profession is whether the potential of this technology to serve the
legal needs of millions of people can be fully harnessed within the
traditional model of an attorney-client relationship, or whether the
profession ought instead to embrace recent proposals for the recogni-
tion of a more limited form of professional relationship that would
permit lawyers to give specific legal advice to willing laypeople with-
out incurring all the duties that would ordinarily follow. Resolving
this issue in a way that both protects the public and maximizes the
potential of this new technology will be one of the principal chal-
lenges for our profession in the next century.
CONCLUSION
A. The Peril
The peril that arises from unregulated advice-giving on the
Internet is two-fold. The peril to laypeople seeking legal advice by
posting questions online is that they will receive bad advice and rely
on it to their detriment. The peril to an unwary lawyer who gives le-
gal advice to strangers online is that a stranger who is harmed by such
advice will seek recourse through either a civil suit or a disciplinary
complaint with the bar. As my review of the applicable law demon-
strates, many of the exchanges between lawyers and laypeople in cy-
berspace that we considered at the beginning of this Article could be
viewed as creating attorney-client relationships, provided the lawyer
gives specific legal advice. The perils of unbridled advice-giving on-
line are particularly acute in certain contexts because some Internet
exchanges are more likely than others to create attorney-client rela-
tionships. This is especially true of exchanges in which the layperson
pays the lawyer for the advice given. The payment of a fee and the
more confidential nature of these e-mail exchanges are likely to be
sufficient indicia that reliance on the advice was reasonable. But even
free e-mail exchanges are likely to suffice if the lawyer gives specific
legal advice. Similarly, lawyers who answer questions posted on sites
like Dear Esquire and FreeAdvice likely are creating attorney-client
relationships by giving specific legal advice tailored to the ques-
tioner’s individual situation. Even conversations in discussion groups
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and chat rooms may ripen into attorney-client relationships if lawyers
give detailed legal advice to specific individual questioners. On the
other hand, more general postings to such groups, or even specific le-
gal comments that are not tailored to individual questions, are un-
likely to generate reasonable reliance on the information given.
In each of these settings, disclaimers are unlikely to provide the
blanket protection so many lawyers apparently seek, especially if the
legal advice given is particularized to the inquirer’s factual situation.
Neither courts nor bar counsel is likely to be sympathetic to lawyers
who have given negligent advice and then try to rely on boilerplate
disclaimers to absolve them of responsibility for harm. The courts
have been especially protective of laypeople when lawyers attempt to
enforce contracts against them,359 and this view is likely to apply with
particular force in cyberspace transactions. That is not to suggest that
lawyers will be unable to defend themselves against such claims,360 but
rather to caution that the case law and historical precedent cast sub-
stantial doubt on the ability of lawyers to avoid the consequences of
giving specific legal advice. Only the most foolhardy of lawyers would
359. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 9.1, at 497 (stating that courts scrutinize le-
gal-fee contracts more stringently than other contracts because the lawyer acts as a fiduciary
agent for the client).
360. One possible defense we have not discussed is a First Amendment challenge, in which
a lawyer disciplined for negligent advice-giving online claims that restrictions on lawyer advice-
giving in cyberspace are unconstitutional infringements of the right of free speech. A full
treatment of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article, but I believe such a claim is
likely to be rejected on the ground that the giving of specific legal advice is conduct, not
speech. The Supreme Court has endorsed restrictions on attorney speech in a variety of differ-
ent contexts, including: limitations on public comments about pending cases, see Gentile v.
State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); in-person solicitation of clients, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); and mail solicitations targeted at accident victims and their families,
see Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995). A court is unlikely to find that lawyers
have a First Amendment right to give negligent advice and thereby to commit malpractice. At
the same time, courts have acknowledged in the context of unauthorized practice of law that
the line between general information and specific legal advice must be carefully drawn to avoid
infringing on protected speech. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Techs.,
Inc., No. 97-2859, 1999 WL 47235, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (finding that application of
an unauthorized practice statute to computer software providing legal information did not vio-
late the First Amendment), rev’d 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (recognizing that a
recent amendment to the unauthorized practice statute, An Act Relating to the Definition of
the Practice of Law, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 799 (West), superseded the holding of the dis-
trict court); Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193-94 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam)
(holding that a ban on the sale of printed material purporting to explain legal practice and pro-
cedure, as well as on a secretarial service’s typing legal forms, violates the First Amendment);
see also Rhode, supra note 180, at 62-70 (examining First Amendment implications of unau-
thorized practice prohibitions).
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gamble a license to practice law on the odds that a reviewing court
would respect a boilerplate disclaimer of responsibility for attorney
negligence or incompetence.
Our natural concern about these very real dangers, however,
must not dictate our reaction to the phenomenon of Internet legal
advice. Although the dangers from unchecked use of computer tech-
nology to provide legal advice to strangers are real, they are not the
inevitable byproduct of that technology. It is human error and human
frailty, not the mere existence of new communication devices, that
lead to negligence and ethical violations. This reality is often ob-
scured by an overreaction to new technology. Indeed, when use of
the Internet began to expand several years ago, some firms sharply
restricted its availability because of concerns that employees might
view inappropriate sites or otherwise waste time. They apparently
failed to consider that the average employee probably wastes more
time with the decidedly non-technological morning newspaper or
with real-time gossiping at the water cooler.361 The legal profession
must be wary of similarly overreacting to the new medium without
giving due consideration to the great potential benefit of the under-
lying conduct that it facilitates.362
361. See David Beckman & David Hirsch, Internet: Who Needs It?: Law Office Managers
Must Set Policy for Online Access and Limitations, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 93 (describing a law
firm policy that banned staff from access to the Internet from their terminals because the firm
“didn’t want to invite trouble”); Joe Dysart, Establishing an Internet Policy, CREDIT UNION
EXECUTIVE, May-June 1998, at 18 (describing policies used by companies to block or control
access); Wendy R. Leibowitz, ‘Netiquette’ from Miss Manners, Kraft, Dickstein Shapiro, et al.,
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at B11 (noting that 55 of 115 law firms surveyed in 1996 had limita-
tions on Internet access); Michael Tarsala, Futz Up? Too Much Goofing Off, That’s What,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Mar. 11, 1998, at A11 (highlighting the loss in employee productivity
from abuse of Internet access). In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed a House of Representatives ap-
propriations bill after amending it to prevent federal government employees from having ac-
cess to computer games such as Solitaire on their office computers. See S. 1023, 105th Cong.
(1997); 143 CONG. REC. S9510 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1997). However, the amendment failed to
pass in the House, perhaps in part because of the substantial costs inherent in removing games
from thousands of government computers. See Leslie Goff, Not Playing Around,
COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 1, 1997, at 83, 84. There is no record of any similar attempt to ban
government employees from bringing the Washington Post into their offices in order to ensure
that they do not waste time on the crossword puzzle. See Amy Harmon, On the Office PC,
Bosses Opt for All Work, and No Play, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at A1 (noting Senate pas-
sage of a bill to remove Solitaire from office computers).
362. See Josh Blackman, Legal Practice in Cyberspace, L. OFFICE COMPUTING, Oct.-Nov.
1995, at 64 (suggesting online communication as a means of “bridging the client/attorney gap”).
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B. The Promise
Computer technology as it now exists—doubtless considered ru-
dimentary in five years—permits laypeople to have their legal ques-
tions answered promptly in writing by a practicing attorney at low
cost, without having to make appointments and to travel to the law-
yer’s office. This revolutionary technology has the potential to serve
the unmet legal needs of millions of Americans of low and moderate
income who cannot afford to hire attorneys, at a time when the num-
ber of lawyers in the United States continues to expand.363 The chal-
lenge to the legal profession is to nurture this nascent potential, while
at the same time protecting the public against negligent advice.
Starting from the premise that online advice-giving creates an attor-
ney-client relationship, we therefore must inquire whether there is
room within the existing regulatory framework for a professional ar-
rangement that is limited to a mere exchange of question and an-
swer.364
If the bar were explicitly to recognize that giving specific legal
advice online creates a traditional attorney-client relationship, what
363. An invaluable resource on this issue is the record of the Conference on the Delivery of
Legal Services to Low-Income Persons, held at Fordham Law School in December 1998. See
Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751 (1999) [hereinafter Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services].
For a critique of the inequitable distribution of legal services, see Deborah Rhode, Symposium,
The Future of the Legal Profession: Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 682
(1994) (noting that half of all lawyers’ time is spent on clients in the top 15% of income distri-
bution); see also ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND
CIVIL JUSTICE vii-viii (1996) (noting that the private bar and publicly funded legal services
programs now serve only a small portion of the legal needs reported by low-income house-
holds).
364. In light of the case law we have already reviewed, as well as a long history of treating
similar conduct as creating an attorney-client relationship, it seems highly unlikely that courts
would exempt Internet advice-giving from the traditional approach, especially when the alter-
native would be to leave lay questioners with no legal recourse. Although some of the commen-
tary at the Fordham Conference suggests that the relationship might be understood as that of a
“prospective client,” once specific advice is given, as in Togstad, this fiction is far more difficult
to maintain. See Bruce A. Green, Foreword: Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and Professional Issues
in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1713, 1729
(1999) (noting that it is “unclear” whether recipients of brief advice are clients, but questioning
whether they could fairly be treated as nonclients to whom no duties were owed); Mary Helen
McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat: Reflections on the Fordham Recommenda-
tions on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2625 n.39 (1999) (noting that
characterizing the questioner as a prospective client may be “fiction”).
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would the ramifications be for lawyers in cyberspace?365 By giving the
advice, the lawyer would incur core obligations to the client that
could not be disclaimed. First, the lawyer must ensure that she has no
conflict of interest that would preclude furnishing objective advice.366
Second, the lawyer must give competent advice, obtaining whatever
information is necessary from the questioner and doing whatever re-
search is required to provide such advice.367 Third, the lawyer must in-
form the questioner about the benefits of confidentiality, even if a
question has been posted publicly, and she ordinarily would be ex-
pected to keep all communications confidential, unless specifically
authorized by the recipient to make them public.368
These familiar duties of loyalty, competency, and confidentiality
fit comfortably with the limited model of Internet question and an-
swer that we are considering. In fact, one might argue that carrying
out these duties might actually be easier in the online environment,
because e-mail allows lawyers and their clients to communicate
cheaply and efficiently, from almost anywhere, at any hour of the day
or night. Moreover, e-mail communications can be preserved as a re-
cord of the transaction. The ability to retain a complete record of
these communications could be a powerful tool for bar regulators. A
requirement that lawyers who give legal advice in cyberspace keep
copies of all communications for a certain period of time would facili-
tate the resolution of subsequent conflicts over whether the lawyer’s
conduct comported with applicable rules.369
 Yet, the one duty we have not yet addressed is the most prob-
lematic—the duty of diligence (once more commonly known as the
duty of zealous representation). Although the innocuous wording of
365. For a discussion of some of these issues as they might arise in the context of giving
brief legal advice, see generally Richard Zorza, Response to the Conference:
Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics and Technological Innovation in Le-
gal Practice: From Threat to Opportunity, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659 (1999).
366. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1998).
367. See id. Rule 1.1.
368. See id. Rule 1.6.
369. Similar recordkeeping requirements already exist with respect to financial records, see
id. Rule 1.15, and certain forms of advertising, including attorney websites, see id. Rule 7.2. The
requirement to keep copies of e-mail would not seem to be any more burdensome than other
types of files kept by attorneys, and the maintenance of confidentiality ought not to be at issue,
since ordinarily the only reason for bar regulators to seek access to these documents would be
in response to a complaint by a disappointed client, who always has the ability to consent to
disclosure. See id. Rule 1.6 (mandating confidentiality of information relating to representation
unless the client consents after consultation).
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Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 simply states that “[a] law-
yer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in represent-
ing a client,”370 this requirement historically has been understood to
commit the lawyer to take all lawful steps necessary to protect a cli-
ent’s interests.371 Can this duty be met when a lawyer gives a client
specific legal advice, but does not volunteer additional information
about other legal issues that might lurk beneath the surface? If the
lawyer concludes that immediate legal action is required to protect
the lay questioner, is the lawyer obligated to take such action on the
questioner’s behalf? Or can the lawyer limit the legal relationship to
the furnishing of specific legal advice? Ordinarily, once an attor-
ney-client relationship has been created, the lawyer must protect the
client’s interests and must not abandon the client. The Model Rules
impose substantial limitations on the ability of a lawyer to withdraw
from an existing professional relationship and require that even upon
termination of the relationship, the lawyer “shall take steps to the ex-
tent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests.”372 Moreo-
ver, as I noted previously, the courts are unlikely to view sympatheti-
cally a lawyer’s attempt to have the client consent to bargaining away
a core duty like that of diligence.373
For some lawyers, the imposition of a full-fledged attorney-client
relationship upon the giving of specific legal advice might be an ac-
ceptable aspect of practicing law in cyberspace. Indeed, for lawyers
committed to a new type of law practice in which the bulk of their
client base will come from the Internet, the idea that giving specific
legal advice online may obligate the lawyer to perform additional
services for the recipient may have little impact on that practice,
other than to reinforce the obligation not to dispense such advice
lightly. But for many other lawyers, who might be willing to provide
370. Id. Rule 1.3.
371. See id. Rule 1.3 cmt.:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction
or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advo-
cacy upon the client’s behalf.
For a thoughtful critique of this model, see generally Fred Zacharias, Limited Performance
Agreements: Should Clients Get What They Pay For?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915 (1998)
(criticizing legal and professional standards governing limited performance agreements as dis-
honest).
372. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1998).
373. See supra notes 148-152 [xref] and accompanying text.
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brief legal assistance in cyberspace but not to undertake further re-
sponsibilities, the application of the traditional professional model
may discourage their participation.
In light of this dilemma, the most difficult issue for the profes-
sion is whether to recognize a more limited form of client representa-
tion in which a lawyer and client agree to establish certain boundaries
to the relationship, such as limiting the lawyer’s duty simply to pro-
viding competent legal advice on a specific problem. Although the
potential benefits of encouraging more limited relationships should
not be ignored,374 the substantial ethical issues arising from this de-
velopment remain troubling.375 The idea of “discrete task representa-
tion,” sometimes called “unbundling” legal services, has surfaced in
recent years as a possible remedy to unmet legal needs. The model is
that of a menu of legal tasks from which the client, in consultation
with the lawyer, is permitted to purchase only the services that he
needs and can afford.376 By unbundling these services, the lawyer can
give at least limited assistance to the person who needs help, without
incurring other weighty obligations, and the client can obtain re-
course that he otherwise could not obtain. In many ways, giving spe-
cific legal advice to clients online, while expressly disclaiming any ad-
ditional responsibilities, is a classic example of discrete task represen-
tation.
374. For an optimistic view of this potential, see generally Zorza, supra note 365.
375. Some general discussion of these concerns appears in the Report of the Working Group
on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819 (1999).
376. For discussions of discrete task representation, see generally Mary Helen McNeal, Re-
defining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 295 (1997) (suggesting discrete task representation as a solution to legal
problems for elderly clients who can neither afford legal services nor qualify for free legal aid);
Michael Millemann et al., Rethinking the Full-Service Representational Model: A Maryland Ex-
periment, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1178 (1997) (concluding that a limited representational
model for legal services would provide increased availability of legal information and increased
public confidence in the administration of justice); Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal
Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421 (1994) [hereinafter Mosten, Family Lawyer]
(discussing barriers to serving as legal counsel to pro se litigants in the realm of family law and
recommending a preventative approach to legal counseling); Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling
Legal Services: A Key Component in the Future of Access to Justice, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan.
1997, at 9 [hereinafter Mosten, A Key Component] (recommending removal of ethical, mal-
practice, and attitudinal barriers to unbinding of legal services); Lonnie A. Powers, Pro Bono
and Pro Se: Letting Clients Order off the Menu Without Giving Yourself Indigestion, BOST. B.J.,
May-June 1998, at 10 (discussing the ethical considerations when advising pro se litigants about
discrete issues on a pro bono basis).
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The issue of limited representation recently has come to the
forefront in recommendations developed and adopted at the Confer-
ence on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons, held
at Fordham University Law School in December 1998.377 Among the
many recommendations adopted were a series of proposals to en-
courage so-called limited legal assistance.378 The recommendations
note that “[r]ecent experiments in the delivery of legal services—
some but not all driven by technology—suggest the possibility of
significant increases in access to services, provided the rules
governing the practice of law are not interpreted to inappropriately
narrow the delivery and evolution of services.”379 In response to these
experiments, the conference recommendations identify three general
categories of legal assistance: “(1) traditional, ‘full-service’
representation; (2) limited legal assistance; and (3) general advice.”380
Within the “limited legal assistance” category are two subdivisions:
“brief, specific advice” and “assistance requiring a diagnostic
interview.”381
Although the recommendations do not explicitly explore advice-
giving on the Internet, the conference’s notion of “brief, specific ad-
vice” clearly encompasses such conduct.382 The recommendations de-
fine “brief, specific advice” as “answering a specific question or lim-
ited set of related questions without follow up or exploration by the
legal services provider,” noting further that “the client must be ad-
vised that the service is limited to brief advice only.”383 The recom-
377. See Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services, supra note 363.
378. Id. at 1774-78, Recs. 47-64.
379. Id. at 1774, Rec. 48.
380. Id. at 1775-76, Rec. 59.
381. Id. at 1776, Rec. 60.
382. The two examples of “brief, specific advice” are:
(i) Potential client calls legal services office and states, “My boyfriend registered his
car in my name because he had so many parking tickets. Now, he has more parking
tickets under my name. Do I have to pay them?” The answer is “yes.”
(ii) Consumer calls legal services office and states that she was turned down for
credit and that her credit report is incorrect, and asks what she should do. Legal
worker advises her how to get a copy of her credit report, that the report is free, and
the steps she should take to get the credit reporting agency to revise the information.
Id. at 1776, Rec. 60. The recommendations advocate further study of how to govern a variety of
methodologies, including “hotlines, websites (informational, unintelligent form fill-in, intelli-
gent form fill-in, email with an attorney, and online videoconferencing), ghostwriting, pro se
clinics, unbundled services, form pleadings, community education, and those methodologies to
be developed in the future.” Id. at 1778, Rec. 63.
383. Id. at 1776, Rec. 60(a).
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mendation contemplates that the lawyer providing such service
would be bound by the traditional duties of confidentiality, compe-
tence, and loyalty, but that “[t]he lawyer or legal services program
has no duty to provide complete assistance with respect to the indi-
vidual’s legal problem.”384 Moreover, that recommendation suggests
that the duty of loyalty ought not to be construed to restrict the law-
yer with respect to potential conflicts of interest “to the same degree
as the lawyer who renders more extensive representation.”385 It would
require lawyers engaged in this practice to develop systems to safe-
guard against disclosure of client confidences and the emergence of
conflicts of interest.386 In the second form of this service, “assistance
requiring a diagnostic interview,” the recommendation contemplates
that the lawyer “shall elicit sufficient facts to enable an appropriate
decision as to the limited service(s) to offer the client and for the cli-
ent to make an informed decision about how to proceed.”387 Again,
once the limited services have been provided, “the lawyer or legal
services program has no further obligation with respect to this cli-
ent.”388
The recommendations do not clearly state whether these pro-
posals represent an interpretation of existing law or a blueprint for
changing the law. In particular, although the recommendations use
the term “client” with respect to the recipient of the “brief, specific
advice,” they also assert that one traditional duty owed to clients—
the duty of fully representing the client, or the duty of diligence—sim-
ply will not apply in this context. The recommendations essentially
sidestep this dilemma by asserting that “[r]ules regarding the admini-
stration of justice, rules governing the practice of law, and rules pro-
hibiting the unauthorized practice of law should not be created, ad-
vanced, interpreted, or applied so as to obstruct such efforts to in-
crease access.”389 There is only a feeble attempt to resolve the com-
plex ethical issues posed by this new scheme:
The application of the above recommendations to current ethical
provisions, including standards of competence and diligence, confi-
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See id. The recommendation leaves untouched the traditional requirement that a law-
yer avoid actual conflicts of interest. See id.
387. Id. at 1777, Rec. 60(b).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1778, Rec. 62.
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dentiality, and conflicts of interest, needs concrete assessment and
evaluation, particularly with respect to the impact on clients and the
resolution of their legal problems or questions.390
In contrast to the conference recommendations, which essen-
tially argue for a gloss on existing law, there currently is at least one
proposal to amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to per-
mit more limited forms of the attorney-client relationship. The ABA
has created a group called the Ethics 2000 Commission to consider
reform of the Model Rules.391 John Jenkins, chair of the ABA’s
Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services, has suggested
amending Model Rule 1.2(c) or its comment to recognize that “limi-
tation of the objectives of a representation is especially appropriate
when lawyers render advice to moderate-income consumers through
nontraditional methods such as a telephone ‘hotline.’”392 Although
this recommendation stems in part from some lawyers’ unwillingness
to participate in telephone hotline programs, the rationale presuma-
bly would be applicable to cyberspace as well.
What would be the best approach to facilitating limited repre-
sentation in cyberspace? In my view, neither existing case law nor the
ethical rules as they are currently written would permit the type of
sharply limited professional relationship contemplated by the Ford-
ham Conference. The Model Rules impose a variety of duties upon
the formation of attorney-client relationships393 and require that they
be fulfilled even in difficult circumstances, such as in the representa-
tion of impaired clients.394 Merely to announce that lawyers in such
390. Id. Rec. 64.
391. See Ethics 2000 Commission Hears Plenty of Suggestions for Reforming Model Rules,
66 U.S.L.W. 2789, 2789 (June 23, 1998).
392. Id. at 2790. The full testimony is available on the World Wide Web. See Testimony of
John S. Jenkins (visited Sept. 15, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jenkins.html> (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). His recommended change to Model Rule 1.2(c) is to add the sentence:
“Limited objectives may be particularly appropriate in the case of moderate-income clients.”
Id. He has also suggested adding the following language to the comment: “When providing
representation to moderate-income clients, and to other clients, it may be appropriate, after
consultation with the client, to limit the representation to providing brief advice such as that
which may be available through a bar association, other not-for-profit, or for-profit telephone
hotline service.” Id.
393. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1998) (duty to accom-
plish the lawful objectives of a client); id. Rule 1.3 (duty of diligent representation); id. Rule 1.6
(duty of confidentiality); id. Rule 1.7 (duty of loyalty); id. Rule 1.16 (duty not to abandon a cli-
ent and to protect a client’s interests even if the relationship is to be terminated).
394. See id. Rule 1.14.
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contexts do not owe their clients the duty of full representation does
not make it so. This is not to criticize the professionalism of the dedi-
cated lawyers who regularly provide limited service to low-income
people, who might otherwise receive no legal assistance at all.
Rather, it is simply to caution that the ethical questions surrounding
limited legal representation are far more complex than may be ap-
parent at first glance.
Presumably, the logical step would be either to amend the
Model Rules to clarify the relevant parameters of the attorney-client
relationship, or to draft new rules that specifically acknowledge the
kind of limited representation contemplated by the Fordham Confer-
ence.395 But I remain ambivalent about that remedy as well. Even the
first step of defining the circumstances in which such limitations
would be appropriate may be difficult to accomplish by rule.396 But
the underlying question goes to the heart of the legal profession’s
mission of service. As one scholar has put it, the question is whether
a boat with one oar is better than no boat at all.397 There is a real dan-
ger of creating a two-tiered model of legal services, in which the
well-to-do get the Mercedes and the less fortunate get the Hyundai.398
We cannot ignore the risks to the lay public from establishing a type
of professional relationship that may not provide them with the legal
protection they need, particularly if the model somehow insulates the
lawyer against all malpractice liability.399 On the other hand, it is a so-
395. See Green, supra note 364, at 1729 (“The obligations of lawyers giving brief advice to
individuals should be addressed by a rule, whether these individuals are characterized as ‘cli-
ents,’ ‘prospective clients,’ or ‘non-clients;’ and the obligations identified in the rule should
make sense for legal services lawyers no less than corporate lawyers.”).
396. See McNeal, supra note 364, at 2622 (noting the difficulty of defining scenarios in
which legal professionals could “provide accurate, helpful assistance based only upon minimal
facts offered by the client”).
397. See generally McNeal, supra note 364.
398. A skeptic might argue that an unbundled relationship that excludes the duty of dili-
gence is so stripped down that it more resembles “Adobe,” a fictional car in a Saturday Night
Live commercial parody that was made entirely of clay.
399. The tension that unbundling legal services may create between the “two potentially
conflicting values [of] expanded access to the system of justice and protection of the public” is
discussed in CANTRIL, supra note 363, at 14; see also Mosten, A Key Component, supra note
376, at 14 (proposing that “civil immunity be statutorily granted to unbundling lawyers in re-
spect to any lawyering task or issue not specifically undertaken by the lawyer if a legisla-
tively-approved discrete task engagement letter agreement is signed by the client,” but noting
that in the absence of such statutory authority, lawyers attempting to limit liability by contract
will have “shallow safe harbor”); Mosten, Family Lawyer, supra note 376, at 431 (“The public
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bering experience to read posting after posting on the Web by lay-
people who obviously need legal help and cannot afford it. My con-
cern is that the bar’s historic ambivalence about technology not be-
come the driving force behind efforts to regulate Internet advice-
giving. Nevertheless, I believe it is premature to decide whether a
new model of attorney-client relationship is needed, at least when
there is little research currently available on whether the possible
harms to less sophisticated consumers from limited legal assistance
would be offset by the benefits from having access to at least some
legal advice.400
As the new century dawns, we must remember that the techno-
logical challenges that confront our profession are not unprece-
dented. In the same way that our predecessors in the law sought to
adapt common law principles to the dramatic social changes wrought
by the Industrial Revolution,401 so we inevitably shall struggle to de-
termine how twentieth-century legal principles can be harmonized
with the vastly expanding technological advances of the next century.
As lawyers begin to take their first tentative steps into the brave new
world of cyberspace, we too will have to reconcile traditional ap-
proaches to the practice of law with the host of new possibilities that
world presents.402 Indeed, in light of the exponential growth of Inter-
                                                                                                                                     
policy of protecting clients and their rights to pursue malpractice claims may conflict with the
public policy of providing legal access through limited scope lawyer representation.”).
400. One last point that merits further study is the issue of practicing law across state lines
as it undoubtedly will arise in cyberspace. The question of loosening traditional restrictions on
multijurisdictional practice has come to the fore in recent years, but little formal attention has
focused to date on how use of the Internet by lawyers is likely to accelerate this development.
See, e.g., Symposium, Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 657
(1995) (discussing ethical rules governing multijurisdictional practice, without raising issues
relating to the Internet). At present, however, lawyers who give specific advice to laypeople
online ought to ensure that they are providing that service only as to jurisdictions in which they
are licensed to practice, in order to avoid becoming test cases for the application to the Internet
of statutes governing the unauthorized practice of law.
401. For discussions of past efforts to reconcile such changes, see HURST, supra note 178, at
10-11, who states that “the law has almost always been acted upon by, or has responded to,
technological change, rather than controlled it . . . .” See generally MORTON HOROWITZ,
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1992) (tracing the progression of legal thought against
the background of an evolving political, social, and economic atmosphere).
402. Some have suggested that the legal profession must transform itself in response to the
challenges of cyberspace, or risk extinction. The most ambitious analysis of this issue is found
in M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995). Katsh asserts:
The next generation of lawyers cannot rely on the exclusionary powers of
state-imposed or print-imposed boundaries to maintain the status, power, and dis-
tinction enjoyed by the profession in the past. If lawyers are to survive better than
scribes or calligraphers did in the post-Gutenberg world, they need to do more than
adapt new technologies to traditional practices and processes.
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net use in the last few years, one might easily argue that lawyers who
fail to avail themselves of the new technology will be doing a dis-
service not only to themselves but also to their clients.403 Whatever
path we take as a profession, we should ensure that lawyers harness
the power of new technology not to protect economic self-interest,
but to serve the future hour.
The story of the Good Will Court may yet be told again, but this
time we can decide how the story will come out. History need not re-
peat itself. We as a profession are capable of responding to the chal-
lenges posed by the Digital Revolution. If we act with imagination
and with boldness, we can harness the transformative power of com-
puters to further our ability to provide legal services to those who
need them. Or else, like Clarence Seward in the days of old, we can
refuse to take the elevator.
                                                                                                                                     
Id. at 94.
403. Cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (imposing negligence liability for
failure to utilize new radio technology that might have prevented the accident).
